

Problems of COMMUNISM

AFTER THE CONGRESS WHAT?

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Richard Lowenthal

KHRUSHCHEV AND STALIN

*Robert Conquest
Lazar Pistrak*

THE PARTY

Leonard Schapiro

THE SOVIET ECONOMY

Rush V. Greenslade

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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Congress and Its Aftermath Schism Among the Faithful, by Richard Lowenthal.....	1
The Three Funerals of Joseph Stalin, by Robert Conquest.....	15
Khrushchev and the Purges, by Lazar Pistrak.....	21
The Party's New Rules, by Leonard Schapiro.....	28
Forward to Communism?, by Rush V. Greenslade.....	36

BOOKS

The Economics of Communist China, by Alexander Eckstein.....	43
Filling Stalin's Shoes, by Leon Gouré.....	46

NOTES AND VIEWS

How Statistics Are Made, by Jan S. Prybyla.....	50
Some Aspects of Soviet Reality, by JUSTAN	54
Correspondence	58

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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Congress and Its Aftermath

EDITORS' NOTE: The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which at first seemed to promise not much more than a unanimous confirmation of the party's plan to achieve "full communism" within 20 years, ended up as an affair at which passions ran high, issues were raised, aired, but not resolved, and decisions were taken which may yet have a profound effect on the future course not only of the Soviet Union, but of the entire Communist movement throughout the world. This, indeed, is the opinion of Richard Lowenthal, who in his article traces the vicissitudes of Khrushchev's attempt to achieve a greater flexibility and revolutionary élan in the policies of both the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement, while at the same time merging both into one cohesive and disciplined whole. The 22nd Party Congress, says the author, has dealt an irreversible blow to this attempt, and henceforth we may expect to see growing discord and even a tug-of-war within the Communist camp, and especially a sharpening of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

That a lack of "monolithic unity" is characteristic not only of the international Communist movement but of the Soviet Communist Party itself is shown by Mr. Robert Conquest, who in his article depicts the shifts in the party's image of Stalin, particularly since 1956, link-

ing the ups and downs of the Vozhd's posthumous fortunes to the disputes over wider policies within the leadership of the CPSU. Mr. Pistrak's article (taken from his book The Grand Tactician) provides further evidence that the new "de-Stalinization" drive has been inspired by purely political considerations, and that the righteous wrath of Khrushchev et al. over "Stalin's crimes"—some lurid examples of which were offered to the delegates at the 22nd Congress—should be viewed with a healthy dose of suspicion. Similar suspicion, as Mr. Schapiro's article makes clear, should be exercised with regard to the new program and by-laws of the CPSU, for while they do reflect the desire of certain elements of the party for a greater measure of internal democracy, they are by and large calculated to strengthen, rather than dilute, the party's power over the rest of society. Finally, in "Forward to Communism?," Mr. Greenslade analyzes the economic program that is to bring the Soviet people onto the threshold of the Promised Land. As demonstrated by the author, the program is highly questionable not only in economic terms, but even as a propaganda document. Nevertheless, it sheds considerable light on the general line of the party's economic policy, and thus, too, on the future development of the entire Soviet system.

Schism Among the Faithful

By Richard Lowenthal

IN THE HISTORY of the Russian revolution and of international communism, N. S. Khrushchev is emerging with increasing clarity as a figure of transition. He, more than anyone else, has helped to destroy the Stalinist

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forms of organization and thought that were no longer adequate to the changing character of Soviet society and the changing international situation. Applying a rare combination of realistic shrewdness and primitive faith, he has striven valiantly to replace outdated dogma with a new ideological synthesis. This synthesis has attempted, inside the Soviet Union, to combine the

development of a new incentive economy with the continued monopolistic rule of the party. Beyond Russia's frontiers it has attempted to combine the expansion of Soviet power with the advance of independent revolutionary allies in a single bid for world hegemony. Khrushchev is now beginning to see this beatific vision disintegrate before his eyes—to discover that while his work of destruction will last, his synthesis is proving much more fragile and shortlived than the dogma it was intended to replace.

The 22nd Congress of the CPSU marks the moment of truth when this discovery forced itself on Stalin's successor. Already labeled the Congress of the "second de-Stalinization," it has been widely interpreted as a new stage in a development that began at the 20th Congress in 1956. Certainly the great themes of post-Stalinism were heard at both congresses: the denunciation of the regime of mass terrorism and the pledge to avoid its return, the proclamation of the autonomy of national parties within the Communist world movement and of the equality of Communist governments within the "socialist world system," and the vision of worldwide victory without world war. Yet the writer will attempt to show that behind this verbiage the congresses were vastly different; that while the 20th Congress saw the birth of the new synthesis described above, the 22nd saw the beginning of its collapse.

The foundation of Khrushchev's policy for international communism has been his belief that there could be no major contradiction between the interests of Soviet power and the interests of revolutionary expansion by independent Communist states and movements. The collapse of this assumption became manifest at the 22nd Congress with the breakdown of the Soviet-Chinese show of formal unity, ending the compromise negotiated after prolonged debate at the 1960 Communist world conference. This breakdown forced Khrushchev's hand. In contrast to the 20th Congress—where the dramatic form Khrushchev chose for "de-Stalinization" (his notorious "secret speech") was mainly impelled by domestic resistance within the party and government leadership to his political innovations—the dramatic events at the 22nd Congress were prompted by the international crisis. It was the open Chinese challenge to the authority of Khrushchev and his team, expressed in persistent and even provocative backing for the defeated Stalinist remnants in the USSR and the Soviet bloc, that forced the Soviet leaders publicly to destroy the last shreds of the Stalin legend and to remove the body of their teacher from Lenin's side—going far beyond the formal ideological résumé of the process of de-Stalinization for which the CPSU and the Russian people had been prepared.

The prospect of open and insoluble ideological quarrel between the two principal Communist powers leaves the international Communist movement bewildered and divided, without a recognized organizational center or ideological authority. In the babble of voices that has replaced the traditional *unisono*, some of the leaders can be overheard repeating lines familiar from the ideological crisis of 1956-57—the crisis that followed the first de-Stalinization. But that first crisis was overcome with the help of Chinese support for Soviet leadership. The new crisis is likely to prove more lasting—not only because the same solution is no longer open, but because the developments that have led to the crisis have also proven that the assumptions underlying Khrushchev's version of "proletarian internationalism" were hopelessly wrong.

Some Basic Differences

To grasp the depth of the new crisis in relations between the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement, we have to go back to a contrast between Khrushchev's concept of these relations and Stalin's.

Stalin won and consolidated his position of total control over the Soviet Union by proclaiming the principle that the power interests of the Soviet state—of the "building of socialism in a single country"—must be given clear preference over the interests of "world revolution" whenever the two were in conflict. Recognition of the possibility of such conflict, and of the need for a clear choice, was the core of his ideological difference with Trotsky, his first and most formidable rival. Haunted by his vision of "capitalist encirclement" of the isolated Soviet state, confirmed for him by the failure of any Communist movement outside Russia to win power by its own strength, Stalin forced his principle on the international Communist movement, using the international centralism of the "world party" created by Lenin to make all Communist parties accept the complete subordination of their struggle to the interests of the "fatherland of all toilers." In the end, such subordination became, in the Stalinist view, the very criterion of true "proletarian internationalism." The annexation of the Baltic states, Eastern Poland, and Bessarabia during World War II, and the later creation of a Communist-governed empire by Soviet bayonets, were offered as proof that the expansion of Soviet power was the only realistic way to promote the advance of the Communist system. To the believers, Stalin's choice appeared justified by success to the point where the interests of world revolution were wholly comprised in the interests of the Soviet Union.

Yet even then, the first case of an independent Communist revolution, that of Yugoslavia, was beginning to create unforeseen problems, and the victory of communism in China foreshadowed much greater difficulties. Consistent to the end, Stalin had advised against the decisive steps towards the conquest of power in both countries, whether from doubts about the possibility of success or from anxiety about its consequences. Communist states that had arisen by independent revolutions clearly could not be run by remote control from Moscow in the same way as could Soviet-created satellite states or powerless Communist parties; though an attempt to establish such control was tried in Yugoslavia, it failed so dismally that it was not even undertaken in China. Yet Stalin remained unwilling to abandon in principle his Soviet-centered definition of "proletarian internationalism" and his claim to the primacy of Soviet state interests for the whole worldwide Communist movement. This inability to adjust his outlook to the new fact of a plurality of independent Communist states—expressed, *e.g.*, in the pathological hunt for "Titoist conspirators" throughout Eastern Europe—remained a major source of political rigidity and an element of Soviet political weakness right to his death.

KHRUSHCHEV, ON THE CONTRARY, started from a recognition of the new situation and from the conviction that it could be turned into a decisive source of strength. China and even Yugoslavia proved that the age of Soviet isolation and of "capitalist encirclement" was over. The old imperialist order had been weakened beyond the possibility of another long-term stabilization; it could no longer resist the revolutionary movements of the colonial peoples; and in a world in revolutionary flux, new independent Communist victories were possible, if only the USSR would use its own increased strength to aid and encourage them. By recognizing the actual independence and equality of China and Yugoslavia, and by giving the fictitious independence of the satellite governments and parties some element of substance in the form of increased domestic autonomy, he hoped to strengthen greatly both the cohesion of the "socialist camp" and its attraction—while at the same time preserving for outsiders the Soviet Union's leadership on the bases of its historic prestige and greater power. By proclaiming the right and duty of all Communist parties to find their own roads to victory according to national conditions, he wished to improve their chances to ride the crest of the new revolutionary wave. The rebirth of Leninism expressed above all Khrushchev's confident expectation that, after 30 years of a steady buildup of Soviet strength and a steady accumu-

lation of "imperialist contradictions," the time had come at last when Soviet power and world revolution could advance in step—without a major conflict of interests and hence without subordination of the one to the other—to bring about a Communist-dominated world.

That had been the vision underlying Khrushchev's visit to Peking in the fall of 1954, when he negotiated a revision of Stalin's unequal treaty of alliance with Mao, as well as his journey to Belgrade in the spring of 1955, when he tried to win back Tito to the bloc by the disavowal of Stalin's policies and the recognition of "different roads to socialism." It was made explicit in Khrushchev's public report to the 20th Congress, when he advanced his concept of the "socialist world system" as a commonwealth of equals, with scope for a diversity of institutional means in the pursuit of common aims on the basis of common principles. The position of the Soviet Union "at the head of the camp" was not even explicitly mentioned on this occasion, not because it had been abandoned but because, as simultaneous party documents showed, it was taken as assured by the Soviet party's uncontested ideological authority and its unique role as the historically first and most powerful member of the system. The belief that the Soviet position did not require enforcement through organizational means was further underlined when the Cominform, once a key instrument of Stalinist discipline in the international Communist movement, was dissolved two months later.

The Ensuing Crisis

In its essentials, this Khrushchevian vision was maintained even after the October crisis of 1956, and after subsequent discussion revealed serious confusion in the international Communist movement.

The October events were not, in fact, a simple consequence of Khrushchev's belief in a harmonious alliance of independent revolutionary powers, or even of the loosened grip on the satellite empire. They occurred rather because this loosening coincided with a triple crisis of authority caused by the disclosure and disavowal of Stalin's crimes, by the involvement of many East European Communist leaders in the "anti-Titoist" phase of those crimes, and of general uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of the succession struggle in the Soviet Union. This crisis of authority led to bitter and prolonged struggles within the leadership of a number of East European Communist parties (struggles in which the Yugoslavs intervened to some extent). The consequence was an atmosphere of uncertainty at the top—without which the phenomena of public criticism and

finally of mass opposition could not have developed in Poland and Hungary.

The manner in which the Soviet leaders coped with the crisis was still characteristically Khrushchevian and non-Stalinist in that it allowed a considerable diversity of solutions and did not seek to restore the type of detailed administrative control from Moscow upon which Stalin had insisted. In Poland, the Soviets reluctantly accepted a change in leadership that went beyond their wishes and made considerable concessions to the desire of the new team to demonstrate its "equality" and internal autonomy, insisting only on maintaining the Communist party dictatorship and receiving new guarantees for continued unity in foreign policy. In Albania, as we now know, they accepted with equal reluctance the continued power of the Stalinist team of Enver Hoxha, after backstairs promptings had failed to bring about a broadening of the leadership or a posthumous rehabilitation of Hoxha's executed "Titoist" opponent, Koci Xoxe. Only in Hungary, where "reformers" failed to gain control of the party in time to prevent a popular rising, and where the Nagy government created by this rising proved willing to abandon party dictatorship and the Soviet alliance, did the Soviets use armed force to retain the country within their empire—and even here they imposed a new leadership headed by "moderate reformers" and allowed it some degree of autonomy in domestic policy.

Nevertheless, the October events posed new questions of principle for which different answers were put forward by various Communist parties; thus the Soviet leaders were confronted for the first time since Stalin with the problem of how to define and preserve the necessary minimum of international unity in the Communist movement. The issues raised were formidable. If the Budapest uprising had begun as a genuine workers' movement against a degenerate bureaucratic regime, and had only later fallen into the hands of "counter-revolutionary" leaders—as not only the Yugoslavs, but also the Polish and Italian Communists at first maintained—then a Communist party dictatorship could no longer be regarded as the necessary form of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." If the Yugoslav Communists had the right to keep their "non-aligned" position in foreign policy, then Imre Nagy should also have had the right to take Hungary out of the Warsaw Pact. If the new autonomy meant that there was no longer any "leading party," any single center for the Communist world movement, as Togliatti had claimed after the 20th Congress, then no doctrinal judgment binding on all true Communists could be pronounced by any authority short of a unanimous world conference;

if organized relations among autonomous Communist parties were to be confined to bilateral contacts, as the Poles suggested, even that solution would be barred.

AT THE MOSCOW international conference of November 1957, the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders, acting in concert, succeeded in meeting these issues by defining the minimum requirements of international Communist unity without revoking the fundamental innovations of the 20th Congress. The admissibility of different roads to Communist power and of institutional diversity in its use was maintained; but the need for a common foreign policy of all "socialist states" was sharply stressed, and ideological principles were formulated that would continue to distinguish all true Communists from "revisionist" traitors. To ensure unity in the interpretation of these principles as well as in the decision of foreign policy, the continued need for Soviet leadership both in the "socialist camp" and in the world Communist movement was made explicit; and while no new formal international organization was set up, moves were made to extend the national liaison machinery of the CPSU, to create a Soviet-edited international journal, and to recognize formally the need to hold further international conferences from time to time.

This solution proved ultimately acceptable (despite strong Polish and Italian misgivings) to all but the Yugoslavs and some small "revisionist" minorities in the West. The crisis had apparently been overcome without a renunciation of Khrushchev's new faith in the harmony of the interests of the Soviet empire and the world revolution; Soviet leadership had been restored without a return to the Stalinist subordination of world communism to Soviet interests, or to Stalinist methods of enforcing it.

In retrospect, it can be seen clearly that the basic reason for this temporary success was the actual harmony of Communist power interests within the Soviet empire. However different the national conditions and intra-party histories of the satellite states, their leaders—whether old Stalinists or "national Communist" reformers—felt ultimately dependent on Soviet backing to maintain control over their own people, a feeling that was strengthened by the shock of the Hungarian uprising. Their desire for national autonomy was always limited by this consideration and, within this limit, could be satisfied by the Khrushchev type of Soviet leadership. The Yugoslav leaders, who had gained power on their own and maintained it for years in the face of Soviet hostility, were once again the only exception. The crisis could be solved with comparative ease because it had been caused by the temporary shock of

de-Stalinization, not by the nature of the new policy that had taken the place of the Stalinist synthesis, and because it had broken out in an area where the basic assumptions underlying the new policy were not put to the test, except in the marginal case of Yugoslavia.

True, it was of symptomatic significance that Khrushchev's policy had failed to win back the one independent Communist state in Europe—that Tito remained unwilling to join the Warsaw Pact in return for his "rehabilitation" as a good Marxist-Leninist and for a guarantee that he could retain the peculiar institutions he had developed in the meantime. But that failure could be explained by the prolonged dependence on Western aid into which the Yugoslav regime had been driven by Stalin's intolerance, and by the consequent weakening of its international revolutionary zeal. At any rate, Khrushchev felt able to regard Tito's obdurate nonalignment as no more than a minor irritant and refused to revise his basic outlook: even after the Yugoslavs in the spring of 1958 adopted a "revisionist" party program in which they refused to identify the Soviet bloc with the cause of socialism, Khrushchev had them expelled from the fraternal community of Communist parties once again, but carefully refrained from repeating Stalin's attempt to bring them to heel by economic, military and political pressure. On the contrary, after a short period of vigorous ideological denunciation, he settled down to treat Yugoslavia as a reasonably friendly neutral state, and was rewarded by finding that the Yugoslavs this time made no sustained attempt to propagate their heresies within his East European empire.

The Role of China

Clearly, it was only Moscow's relations with Peking that could provide the real major test of the policy consensus achieved in the Communist camp. The Chinese attitude was of infinitely greater importance for the future of relations between the Soviet empire and world communism than Tito's independent stance; and here Khrushchev's new outlook at first seemed to yield ample dividends. In 1954-55, the Chinese had been brilliant partners and even pioneers in the effort to overcome the rigid attitude towards the ex-colonial, uncommitted countries, which the "socialist camp" had inherited from Stalin; they had been helpful in this sense at the Geneva conference on Indochina, at the signing of the "Five Principles of Coexistence" with India, and at Bandung. In 1956, though apparently worried by the drastic form of Khrushchev's downgrading of Stalin, they publicly welcomed the substance of the critique

of Stalin's "Great Power Chauvinism," including his policies towards Yugoslavia—and this at a time when Molotov was still defending those policies inside the Soviet leadership. During the crisis later on in the year, they actively intervened in the Soviet-Polish dispute in favor of a compromise combining increased national autonomy for Poland with explicit recognition of Soviet leadership, while vigorously defending Soviet intervention in Hungary against all critics. Finally, during the Moscow conference of November 1957, Mao reacted to the double shock of Hungary and the discovery of his own domestic opposition in the "Hundred Flowers" campaign by placing strong emphasis on fighting "revisionism" as "the principal danger"; but he also personally took the initiative to have the Soviet Union's position "at the head of the socialist camp" embodied in the Moscow declaration, at a moment when Khrushchev had clearly eliminated the Stalinist opposition and established himself as the uncontested Soviet leader.

It may be readily assumed that not even at that time was this Chinese zeal for reestablishing the Soviet Union's position as a leader of the "socialist camp" based on unqualified admiration for Khrushchev's genius as a statesman or ideological innovator, or on general agreement with his doctrinal approach and political style: the whole independent historical development of the Chinese party under Mao precluded that. But the Chinese Communists were then vitally interested in maintaining the cohesion of the bloc while preserving their post-Stalin achievement of independence and direct influence on the bloc's European members, and universal recognition of the leading role of a CPSU headed by Khrushchev seemed the best way to achieve both objectives. Would not Stalin's benevolent but comparatively inexperienced successor, once restored with Chinese help to a position of international preeminence at a moment of crisis, have to lean heavily on the advice of the kingmaker in Peking? The expectation seemed plausible enough, so long as one assumed that no major conflict of interest could arise between the two main powers of the Communist world. The outcome of the 1957 Moscow conference—the "Maoist re-construction of the center" under Soviet leadership—was possible only because at that moment both Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung still held that assumption.

By the spring of 1958, it must have been clear to the Chinese Communist leaders that their expectation of continued major influence on the formation of Soviet policy had been unfounded, and that Chinese interests had a fairly low place in Khrushchev's list of priorities. The sharp left turn in domestic economic policy taken by the second session of the 8th Congress of the CPC—the "Great Leap Forward" and the first pilot schemes

for the creation of the People's Communes—is inexplicable without a sharp disappointment of Chinese hopes for massive new Soviet capital aid; and the same disappointment probably played its part in the Chinese pressure for treating the Yugoslavs once again as enemies: Why should people who take money from the American imperialists continued to receive Soviet credits as well? The summer brought the tentative Soviet acceptance of a summit conference on the Middle Eastern crisis "within the framework of the Security Council," showing scant regard for Peking's political prestige, and (after the withdrawal of that acceptance) Khrushchev's visit to Peking and the joint communique promising "all-round consultation"; yet while full Soviet political support was given to Peking during the subsequent bombardment of Quemoy, the military support appears to have been unsatisfactory at the crucial point. Most important of all, this was the year during which the Soviets agreed first to expert discussions on the possibility of an inspected ban on nuclear tests, and then, during political three-power negotiations on the subject, to a moratorium on such tests. As they also consistently refused to supply their Chinese allies with ready-made nuclear arms, a successful test ban agreement would have amounted to an attempt to exclude China permanently from the circle of nuclear powers.

Conflicts and Compromises

The ground for the later Chinese charges of an opportunistic neglect of international revolutionary solidarity by the Soviet leaders must have been laid by these successive disappointments. As in Tito's case in 1948—though there had been long-standing ideological differences due to diversities of historical development—this too was a clear conflict of national interest which took ideological forms. Finding that the Soviets consistently failed to give Chinese economic, political and military objectives the same high priority as did the Chinese themselves, Mao naturally came to doubt the fitness of Khrushchev and his team for the role of international leadership for which he had cast them. As has frequently been pointed out, the claim in the Chinese Central Committee's resolution on the People's Communes that these revolutionary innovations constituted a direct shortcut to the "higher stage" of communism amounted to an ideological preparation for challenging the right of the Soviets—still halting at the "lower stage" of socialism—to lead the world Communist movement.

The Soviet response showed instant awareness of the danger and a determination to forestall it: Moscow

promptly described the new Soviet Seven-Year Plan as a program for laying the foundations of communism and called an extraordinary party congress to adopt it; on the other hand, the Soviet party press vigorously attacked as "utopian" any attempt to reach the "higher stage" before a high level of technical productivity had been achieved and the conditions for material abundance created. By December 1958, under the dual impact of Soviet criticism and the severe practical difficulties of the communes, the Chinese withdrew this first ideological challenge. As the 21st Congress of the CPSU opened in February 1959, a truce had clearly been called; Chou En-lai explicitly recognized that Russia alone had entered the road to the "higher stage" and a new Soviet-Chinese economic agreement was signed.

The truce was broken in the fall of the same year, once again for a non-ideological reason: Khrushchev's visit to the United States and his preparations for a summit conference revived intense Chinese fears of a possible Soviet-American agreement at Peking's expense—above all, presumably, in the form of a serious attempt to close the "nuclear club." The new disagreement was soon reflected in the failure to issue a communiqué on the Khrushchev-Mao talks held in Peking on the Soviet Premier's return trip from the United States; in Khrushchev's subsequent public reference to the "Trotskyite adventurism" of a policy of "neither peace nor war"; in a series of warnings against illusions about the nature of American imperialism published in the Chinese press during the winter and repeated by the Chinese observer at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact in February 1960; and in Khrushchev's ostentatious detachment from Chinese claims against India and Indonesia during his winter visit to both countries. This time, the Chinese did not stop at ideological forays to challenge the "leading role" of the Soviets. They raised the charge of Soviet "opportunism" at a number of leadership meetings of international front organizations, openly seeking to recruit allies in other Communist parties, and finally, on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth in April, they published in a series of articles what amounted to the ideological platform for their attack.

WITH THAT, THE EXISTENCE of a Russo-Chinese "ideological dispute" on the principal issues of international Communist strategy became public knowledge. Its course from April to the conference of the 81 Communist parties which met in Moscow in November, and to the compromise declaration published by it in December 1960, may be assumed here as generally known. While that declaration on balance favored the Soviet viewpoint on the immediate matters in dispute, its most

important aspect was that it *was* a compromise, and openly conceived as a starting point for further compromises. Moscow's monopoly of ideological authority had been the implicit precondition for the unity of action of independent Communist powers and autonomous movements as conceived by Khrushchev at the time of the 20th Congress. It had been made explicit following the crisis in Eastern Europe at the 1957 Moscow conference. Now it was explicitly denied by Khrushchev himself; he reported that the Soviet delegation had asked that the formula referring to the CPSU as the "leading party" of the world movement be dropped from the 1960 declaration, because it had in fact become impossible to lead all Communist parties from a single center. But without such a center, unity in both the world movement and the "socialist camp" could henceforth be preserved only by a process of continuous adjustment leading to ever new compromises—as in any alliance of non-ideological governments or parties.

The harmony of interests between independent Communist powers and movements had supposedly been guaranteed by a common ideology, interpreted by a generally recognized authority. The actual conflicts of interest, leading to conflicting interpretations of the ideology, had destroyed that authority. There remained, of course, major common interests recognized by all sides as overriding the internecine conflicts, and it remained true that these common interests were rooted in the common ideological opposition of all Communist parties and governments to the non-Communist world. But it was the paradox of the new situation that this common "ideological" interest could now only be made to prevail over the differing national interests if the latter were adjusted in a non-ideological, pragmatic way, and the bitter struggle for ideological leadership abandoned.

Yet when the 1960 Moscow compromise was concluded, the Chinese Communists were already determined to view it as a mere stepping-stone in a long-term struggle to win for themselves the leading role in the world Communist movement. The proof of this, and the root cause of the breakdown of the compromise, was that they persisted in supporting Khrushchev's "Stalinist" opponents within the Soviet European empire, with whom they had concluded a tactical alliance during the previous phase of open conflict.

Allies Against Khrushchev

We have seen that, far from being genuine Stalinists in their outlook, the Chinese Communists had warmly supported Khrushchev during the critical period of 1956-57. Even the new "leftist" ideas which they de-

veloped during the first phase of Sino-Soviet tension in 1958—ideas of "uninterrupted revolution" at home and unlimited support for revolutionary movements abroad—were "Trotskyite" rather than "Stalinist" in inspiration. Nevertheless, the common antagonism to Khrushchev on the part of the Chinese Communists and the defeated Russian Stalinists may have suggested a rapprochement between them even then. Both distrusted Khrushchev's personal diplomacy in general and his eagerness for top-level contacts with the Americans in particular. Both reproached him for his "softness" towards the Yugoslav heretics and for his costly foreign aid policy benefiting "bourgeois nationalist" rulers of uncommitted, ex-colonial countries. Finally, both believed that the road to the "higher stage" of communism lay through increasing the importance of payments in kind—as envisaged, in different ways, in Stalin's last pamphlet *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* and in the Chinese communes—whereas Khrushchev was seeking to put both agricultural deliveries and *kolkhoz* wages on a cash basis in order to subject costs and returns to the yardstick of the ruble.

It is, at any rate, noteworthy that the same period (September-December 1958) which witnessed the Soviet ideological campaign against the utopian Chinese claims for the communes also saw a sharp revival of attacks on the "anti-party group," beginning with the disclosure of Bulganin's role in it and ending with obvious preparations for the expulsion of its members from the CPSU. (It was at the December Plenum of 1958, the first Central Committee plenum for which minutes were published, that Khrushchev said that "the tongue rebels against calling these people comrades.") Conversely, when the Soviet truce with the Chinese was sealed at the 21st CPSU Congress in February 1959, the prepared attacks from the floor on the "anti-party group" were not followed up by Khrushchev, and there was even talk at that time of sending Molotov as ambassador to The Hague—possibly in the expectation that he would first recant his errors. All this seems to suggest that Khrushchev at least suspected a link between the Chinese and the Russian Stalinists even then.

What must remain conjecture for the 1958 phase of the dispute may be regarded as definitely established for the 1960 phase. At the 22nd Congress, CC Secretary Ilychev disclosed that in April 1960 Molotov had submitted his first ideological statement since his 1957 defeat; it had arrived in the form of an article sent to *Kommunist* on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth—the date when the public Chinese attack started. Other speakers at the Congress described the content of Molotov's position in terms closely paralleling the Chinese views. Such harmony in both time and

content could hardly be accidental; nor can it have been accidental that within a few weeks after these moves Molotov was recalled from Ulan Bator, President Voroshilov (the last undisclosed member of the former Stalinist majority in the party Presidium) was prevailed upon to retire for reasons of health, and *Pravda* published Tvardovsky's anti-Stalinist poem.

ABOUT THE SAME TIME, the Chinese also picked up the support of the Albanian Stalinist leaders, who had already enthusiastically joined in Peking's violent anti-Yugoslav campaign in 1958 and had only reluctantly been persuaded by Khrushchev to tone it down during the 1959 lull. Up till then, Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu had steadfastly refused to "de-Stalinize" their own regime but had never openly opposed Khrushchev. After the Chinese attacks, they refused to join in the proposal, made by Bulgaria and Rumania on Soviet instructions, for an atom-free zone in the Balkans, and they vigorously sided with the Chinese against Khrushchev at the Bucharest and Moscow conferences of 1960. Here, too, Khrushchev reacted at once. By August 1960, two months after the Bucharest clash, pro-Soviet elements in the Albanian Central Committee apparently tried to rally opposition to Hoxha in preparation for the forthcoming Albanian party congress. They were promptly purged, however, and the congress was postponed till February 1961, while a number of pro-Soviet officials were arrested as "plotters."

Now it seems clear that by the time of the Moscow conference Khrushchev was prepared to accept a prolonged period of "divergent unity" with the Chinese, that he considered the preservation of the alliance and of a broad outward unity of world communism worth the price of putting up with recurrent disagreements on diplomatic tactics and continued competition for influence among some peripheral Communist parties. Unless he had made that judgment, he would not have accepted a compromise renouncing the Soviet claim to a monopoly of ideological leadership. But he could make that judgment only because he was confident that his own policy, based on the superior power of the Soviet Union and its East European empire, would on the whole continue to prevail in such an inter-Communist tug-of-war. And this presupposed that the substantial achievement of the 1957 settlement—the consolidation of his own power in the Soviet Union and of Soviet control in Eastern Europe—remained intact. Renunciation of sole leadership of the world Communist movement and acceptance of Chinese competition within it were possible for the sake of unity; renunciation of sole control over his own empire was out of the question.

Hence Khrushchev followed up the Moscow compromise by quiet steps to break the Albanian opposition, only to find that the Chinese continued to back Hoxha in his defiance. When the Soviets refused to grant Albania new aid agreements, the Chinese offered Tirana substantial new credits on the eve of the Albanian party congress, which endorsed Hoxha's policies. When the



"Mr. K.'s Nightmare"

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Albanian show-trial of pro-Soviet officials, on charges of plotting with Yugoslavia, Greece and the United States to overthrow the Albanian regime, was answered last summer by the withdrawal of Soviet submarines and of Soviet and East European technicians from Albania, Chinese technicians moved into the breach. Because they were consciously embarking on a long-term struggle for world Communist leadership, the Chinese Communists were not prepared to abandon their first small ally in Europe—nor do they seem to have discontinued their cooperation with Molotov, whose criticism of the draft CPSU program in a letter sent from his Vienna sinecure to the Central Committee, as summarized by *Pravda* editor Satyukov at the 22nd Congress, appears to parallel closely the Chinese arguments. Yet, for Khrushchev, Chinese willingness to respect his power within the USSR and the Soviet empire proper must have been the minimum test of the value of the 1960 compromise.

Point of No Return?

The breakdown of the compromise at the 22nd Congress must, in this author's view, be understood in that light. It is misleading to say that the attacks on Molotov and Hoxha in Khrushchev's opening report were merely diplomatically-veiled attacks on the Chinese. Khrushchev was really announcing his determination to liquidate the remnants of Stalinist opposition within the Soviet empire and was, by implication, warning the Chinese that he would do so whether they approved his action or not. Chou En-lai, by publicly criticizing the attack on Albania and by laying a wreath at Stalin's tomb, issued a counter-warning that China would refuse to sanction the expulsion of Albania from the Communist camp and was ready even to go to the defense of Stalin in order to challenge the legitimacy of Khrushchev's leadership of the Soviet Union. The compromise broke down because Khrushchev had to insist that ideological competition within the international Communist movement stop at the borders of the Soviet Union's own power sphere, and because the Chinese refused to respect these limits.

There was in these events an element of mutual surprise. The Chinese seem to have expected that Khrushchev, for the sake of unity, would not dare bring the Albanian quarrel into the open; hence Chou's premature departure when Khrushchev did the contrary. The Soviets seem to have expected that the Chinese, for the sake of unity, would not dare go publicly to the defense of the Albanians and even of Stalin; hence the Soviet leadership's need, in the later stages of the Congress, to

go far beyond Khrushchev's opening reports in the endeavor to destroy the Stalin image. Once faced with the prospect of open conflict, neither side retreated.

The Chinese Communists have since reprinted Hoxha's all-out attacks on the "anti-Marxist revisionism" of "Khrushchev and his group" along with the Soviet attacks on Hoxha, and Peking has been insisting at every opportunity on Albania's continued membership in the "socialist camp" and the Communist world movement. More than that, Mao himself has signed the messages conveying the CPC's congratulations to the Albanian party under Hoxha's leadership on its "correct policy" and particularly on its intransigent struggle against revisionism and for world Communist unity. Meanwhile, the Soviets, having lined up the support of a safe majority of Communist parties (but not of a substantial minority) for political condemnation of the Albanians, have broken off diplomatic relations with Tirana without awaiting the formal verdict of any international Communist conference, have induced most of the East European states to take corresponding measures, and did not invite the Albanians to the Warsaw meeting of the intra-bloc Council for Mutual Economic Aid in mid-December. And again, the Chinese have countered by refusing to send an observer to the CMEA meeting, by continuing demonstratively friendly exchanges with Albania after the Soviet break, and by causing the North Korean and North Vietnamese Communists to send clearly friendly and fraternal—if less demonstrative—New Year messages to the Albanian leaders as well.

The resulting situation is unprecedented. As no international Communist conference has spoken, the Albanians must still be regarded even by the Soviets as members of the international Communist movement; indeed, an Albanian delegate has taken part in the Moscow Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions in late 1961, even sitting on the committee which drafted its resolutions, in spite of the rupture of Soviet-Albanian diplomatic relations! Again, at the Stockholm session of the World Peace Council in December 1961, an Albanian delegation actively cooperated with the Chinese, and that session, along with recent articles in the Chinese press, showed that the 1960 compromise has broken down as completely on general policy as on the form of unity, with the issue of priority for "peaceful coexistence" or for "wars of liberation" once again the center of dispute. Thus, the world Communist movement, while openly divided politically, is not yet formally split in the organizational sense. Yet, at the same time, state relations between the Soviets and their East European followers on one side and Albania on the other are already broken!

As these lines are being written, both sides are apparently lining up for another international Communist conference. The Chinese are reported to have called for one in a circular sent to various Communist parties, and an editorial in the Polish party monthly *Nowe Drogi* indicates that the Soviets, too, regard it as the right and duty of the international movement to pronounce on the points at issue. But before speculating on the probable line-up and outcome of such a conference, we must note the crucial significance of the fact that Khrushchev has taken open governmental action without waiting for an international judgment. The reason can only have been that, after both Tirana and Peking defied the public attack to which Khrushchev had committed the prestige of the CPSU and the Soviet regime, he came to view a demonstrative reassertion of Soviet imperial discipline as a matter of the utmost urgency—too urgent to await action by an international conference which might have to be deferred until Moscow had had time to work on the waverers, and the outcome of which might depend on Russian preparedness to force a majority vote and Chinese willingness to submit to it. So, Khrushchev preferred to take unilateral state action first and thus confront an eventual international conference with an accomplished fact.

This means that Khrushchev, like Stalin, has been forced to make a hard choice between Soviet imperial interests and the unity of the world Communist movement—and that he has made the same choice as Stalin did. But for Khrushchev the choice was more drastic. For while Stalin was able to have Yugoslavia excommunicated by the Cominform before he took public state action against her, Khrushchev no longer had any such ready machinery of excommunication at his disposal. He had renounced that machinery in pursuit of his belief in the cooperation of equal and independent Communist powers and movements, and in the harmony of interests or at least the comparative ease of compromise between the Soviet empire and the forces of international revolution. Now, however, he has been forced back to the "Stalinist" use of state power because that belief, which was to distinguish his world role from Stalin's, has failed.

The Broadening Chasm

For the international Communist movement, the situation poses two quite distinct, though obviously connected, questions. On the one hand, each Communist Party, whether ruling or not, has to take a position in the policy dispute between the CPSU and the Sino-Stalinist coalition. On the other, each party has to

make up its mind on the Soviet view that the Albanians, but not the Chinese, should be read out of the community of "Marxist-Leninist parties" for refusing to submit, and has also to consider whether such a decision should be forced through by majority vote in the face of Chinese opposition and even at the risk of an open split. This second decision not only may determine whether some loose "conciliar" unity of the type attempted in the 1960 compromise can still be preserved, but will also settle the question whether the Communist parties siding with Khrushchev shall in the future enjoy more or rather less autonomy than hitherto. A decision preserving formal unity despite open political disagreement would obviously mean increased autonomy for all those Communist parties whose leaders might feel disposed and able to grasp it, while a formal split would be likely to lead to a reassertion of the "leading role of the CPSU" over those parties which side with it.

This interconnection between the policy issue and the organizational issue is already having a somewhat paradoxical effect on the line-up of some of the European parties. Those parties whose leaders have followed the policies of "de-Stalinization" with the greatest reluctance and have always looked back nostalgically to firm Stalinist discipline under Soviet leadership—like the French Communists outside and the Czechs and East Germans inside the bloc—are now the most determined in supporting Khrushchev's break with the Stalinist Albanians. Conversely, the Italian Communists, who have welcomed the substance of de-Stalinization most cordially, have again come out for a "polycentric" type of world movement which would permit the open airing of inter-party political differences, and have taken the view that the toleration of such differences for a possibly prolonged period is a precondition for preserving unity in the new situation. As a consequence, they have promptly been admonished by their more conservative and Soviet-oriented opponents that such un-Leninist tolerance would prevent a clear and firm international condemnation of Albanian "adventurism" and might even legalize Chinese factional activity in the world movement and in individual Communist parties.

IT IS WITHIN the Soviet European empire that a preliminary survey reveals the clearest picture of the reactions of party leaders to the controversy—and also the smallest potential for further change. Feeling that their own power, today no less than in 1956-57, ultimately depends on Soviet backing, both "reformers" and "conservatives" among the East European Communist leaders have on the whole rallied to Khrushchev's colors with equal clarity. A pro-Albanian (or rather, perhaps,

an anti-Yugoslav) minority within the Bulgarian party, apparently looking up to the old Stalinist Chervenkov, if not actually led by him, seems to constitute the only exception in this area. It is particularly remarkable that Gomulka, while fully utilizing the impact of the "second de-Stalinization" to justify his autonomous agricultural policy, has been the first Communist leader to revive the formula—which he so stubbornly resisted in 1957—of the "leading role of the Soviet Union" in bloc foreign policy; and that the other principal "reformer," Kadar, while also introducing new "autonomous" measures in agriculture, has gone further than anyone else in denouncing the views of the Chinese as "Trotskyite" and "senile Leftism." In the eyes of all the Communist leaders within Russia's European empire, the need for a common foreign policy clearly outweighs any interest they may have in extending their autonomy beyond the considerable measure willingly granted by Khrushchev; hence, all are willing to side with him on both the political and organizational issues.

The Asian members of the "Socialist Commonwealth," with the exception of Outer Mongolia where the Soviets are clearly still in control, combine hesitation on political issues with opposition to organizational measures. Both the North Korean and North Vietnamese parties have avoided criticizing Albania either at the 22nd Congress or after, and both sent warm fraternal greetings to the Albanian leaders on their liberation anniversary (November 28) and again at New Year's, expressing hope for further Albanian cooperation within the "socialist camp." But neither of these parties has adopted the Chinese formulations implicitly criticizing Soviet conduct, and the North Koreans have even gone out of their way repeatedly to emphasize the role of the CPSU as the vanguard of the world Communist movement and leader of the socialist camp. Ruling over countries which are geographically separated from the USSR (in the Korean case by a corner of Chinese territory and in the Vietnamese case by the whole of China), but having in the past tended to accept guidance from the Soviet Union rather than from China, these parties seem anxious above all to avoid an open break that might make them predominantly dependent on China. So long as some "conciliar" unity can be preserved, they will undoubtedly continue an effort to mediate; should an open split materialize, the Vietnamese party at least may have to "go Chinese."

EXCEPT FOR more or less insignificant minority groups here and there, the Communist parties of the advanced Western countries seem to stand solidly behind Khrushchev's policies of peaceful coexistence abroad and de-

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Problems of Communism?

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Stalinization at home. The serious discussion among them concerns the desirability of tolerating major differences in the international movement, with the corollary of full autonomy for each party, as has been advocated by both the Italian and Belgian party leaders, or of forcing a definitive split, with a reassertion of Soviet international leadership, as clearly desired by the French. The determining factor in this line-up is whether the leaders of a particular party continue, as in Stalin's time, to conceive of the party as primarily dependent for its domestic progress on the increase of Soviet power and prestige and therefore to regard the party's identification with the Soviet Union as its basic political asset, or feel on the contrary that they would have a better chance of overcoming their isolation in domestic politics, and ultimately advancing to power on the shoulders of a broad left-wing coalition, if that identification were less complete.

In practice, among the Western Communist parties only the Italian has shown real and serious hope of winning power via an independent "national road to socialism." This has been the reason for the party's unusually good relations with the Yugoslav Communists throughout recent years. Thinking in terms of pioneering a new Communist strategy and a new style of party life for Western Europe, the Italian CP has kept itself politically far more alive than its Western fellow parties, but at the price of some degree of democratic "softening up" in its discussions. In the debates that have followed the 22nd Congress, three main tendencies have asserted themselves within the Italian Communist leadership. A conservative minority, led by Scoccimarro, has warned against ambitions for autonomy and heretical new ideas and has tended to put allegiance to Soviet leadership in the forefront. A strong revisionist group, led by Amendola and Alicata, has criticized the 1957 and 1960 Moscow declarations as retrogressive compromises with the "dogmatists," going back on the insights of the 20th Congress of 1956; it has explicitly denied that revisionism is the main danger at the present time, has called for open inner-party debate in preparation for the next party congress, and has given a heretical Yugoslav

slant to its advocacy of "national roads to socialism" by admitting that in some African countries, for instance, socialism might be achieved without a Communist Party. In the center, Togliatti has shown his familiar maneuvering skill, seeking to contain the revisionist pressures and keep within the limits of an orthodox defense of the Soviet Union as the "vanguard" of international communism, while at the same time avoiding a frontal counterattack on the innovators and trying to canalize their drive in order to gain increased tactical elbow-room for his "national road" inside Italy. The blueprint for this road, including the conquest of power by parliamentary means and continued toleration of non-Communist satellite parties after victory, has in fact long been approved by Moscow. Yet it must be obvious to Togliatti as well as to the "revisionists" that this policy would lose much of its credibility in Italy if, following an open international Communist split, the party's allegiance to Moscow were to be visibly demonstrated once again. And the possibility cannot be excluded that, in such a situation, serious pressure might develop for keeping the Italian party outside any new Soviet-led organization.

TURNING TO THE non-ruling Communist parties of Asia, the revival of the dispute between Moscow and Peking is bound to reactivate the factional conflicts that are endemic among the Indian and Japanese Communists, although the majority of both parties will certainly wind up on the Soviet side. In the Indian party's case, the central leadership actually welcomes the opportunity for taking a national Indian stand against China on the frontier issue without violating its duties to international communism; but the same leadership has officially clamped down on any discussion of de-Stalinization, knowing that this topic has little attraction in Asia and that a broad debate of Stalin's crimes might well weaken the party further. On the other hand, the most important non-ruling Communist party in Asia, that of Indonesia, has been the first in the world to side clearly and unambiguously with the Chinese. Its leader, Aidit, not only sent New Year's greetings to the Albanian party along with the other ruling parties of the "socialist camp," but has demonstratively congratulated the Chinese on their struggle to maintain the unity of the Communist movement, and has publicly criticized the Soviet use of public denunciation and state pressure before exhausting the methods of fraternal discussion. Neither the North Korean nor the North Vietnamese party, nor, to the present writer's knowledge, any other Communist party outside China, has gone so far in declaring its stand.

The bulk of the remaining Communist parties in Asia, the Arab world and Latin America, including quite a few whose spokesmen abstained from mentioning the Albanian issue at the 22nd Congress, seem since to have sided with the Soviets. The votes of these parties, most of which are weak and dependent on outside support, may well ensure the formal excommunication of Albania at an international conference. But it is already clear that whether China formally submits or walks out in such a case, that will not be the end of the matter—for the real long-term contest between Soviet and Chinese influence on the Communist movements of the underdeveloped regions has barely begun. In the long run, the line-up of these movements will be decided by two issues on which their own future must depend: the degree of risk the Communist powers would take in supporting "colonial wars of liberation," and their own choice between a "peaceful road to socialism" (whether by parliamentary means or by gradual penetration of a pro-Soviet nationalist dictatorship) and Chinese-style partisan warfare.

The stand taken by the Indonesian CP, after prolonged wavering and despite the fact that the country in general views the Chinese as an unpopular alien minority and the Soviets as a friendly great power, suggests that the party is not satisfied with the fruits of the friendly relations between Khrushchev and President Sukarno—that it is losing confidence in its chance of converting Soviet influence on the regime into a growing share of Communist control without sharp conflict. In India, the advocates of revolutionary violence within the CP, who used to attack Mao for alleged "opportunism" around 1950, have long constituted themselves as the pro-Chinese faction in the present dispute. In Guatemala, the clear stand belatedly taken by the CP on the Soviet side seems closely linked to its hopes for the electoral success of a leftwing front. Again, some parties that have been willing enough to condemn Albania in the first place seem to have wavered when, at the Stockholm meeting of the World Peace Council, the Chinese and Albanians moved to include the struggle for independence of the colonies on the agenda of the next world congress, and the Soviets defeated the move; the Cubans, for instance, after duly speaking against Albania in Moscow, seem to have become "neutral" in the dispute since Stockholm.

Finally, the conflict is likely to have a quite specific effect in tropical Africa, where hardly any Communist parties exist as yet. Historically, all Communist parties outside the Soviet Union, if not directly founded on Soviet initiative, have arisen through the ideological and organizational transformation of local groups of revolu-

tionary socialists under the influence of the Soviet model and of Soviet emissaries. A number of African states today clearly have the raw material for a similar transformation—parties or trade union groups headed by intellectuals with a Marxist education and a mixture of nationalist and social-revolutionary ideas. However, their "Bolshevization" may prove far more difficult now that a unique, universally recognized model is lacking. The leaders of these "Afro-Marxist" groups are interested in the Communist model above all because of its effectiveness in securing unity of doctrine and of will; if it becomes instead a source for importing foreign ideological and political splits, they may well prefer to go ahead in consolidating their own rule with a home-made, eclectic ideology, as the Yugoslavs have been quietly advising them to do for some time. The recent anti-Communist turn of Sékou Touré, the Afro-Marxist ruler of Guinea, and the fact that he demanded the recall of the Soviet Ambassador but made no complaint against the behavior of the Chinese (who are at least equally entrenched) may prove symptomatic of the way in which African leaders may use the new schism to preserve their own ideological and practical independence.

Polycentrism—Wave of the Future?

By the time of the 1960 Moscow compromise, it was already clear that there was no road back to the centralized world party created by Lenin. There is none now. Independent Communist powers do exist; and experience has proved that independent Communist powers cannot be subordinated to the ideological authority and organizational discipline of a single center.

The alternative attempted by the 1960 conference was to preserve an alliance of autonomous parties held together by a common faith. It was implicitly admitted that differences about the interpretation of that faith in the light of different national interests might arise from time to time, but it was hoped that the common basis of ideology and interest would be strong enough for compromises to be reached again and again in a process of steady adjustment.

This "conciliar" model of world communism has broken down because of the inherent difficulties of compromise by pragmatic adjustment among totalitarian ideological parties and states. At least one of the two major state parties has refused to renounce the right to carry "ideological struggle" into the territory of the other. Yet without some mutual respect of parochial authority—or of the principle "*cuius regio, eius religio*"—ideologically independent state parties can hardly live together in a common oecumenic organization. The

Italian Communist leaders have been quite right in arguing that open "comradely" debate of inter-party differences in a spirit of mutual understanding and respect is the only way to preserve some measure of Communist world unity in the present situation. But they have only been able to suggest such an un-Leninist solution because they are constantly exposed to the anti-ideological influence of an atmosphere of "bourgeois liberalism."

A NEW CULT?

Some Differences of Opinion

Together with my colleague-journalists I travelled in the United States when Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was there. These travels were a model of the Leninist combination of firmness and flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy. . . .

It may be that some of the diplomatic ladies of the Western world found it shocking, but it was simply magnificent when once, during one of the provocative speeches made by a Western diplomat [at the United Nations General Assembly session] N. S. Khrushchev took off his shoe and started banging the desk with it. (*Stormy applause. Laughter.*) It immediately became clear to everyone: we are decisively against, we do not wish to listen to such speeches! In addition to which Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev placed his shoe in such a manner (in front of our delegation sat the delegation of fascist Spain) as to make its tip rest—though not completely—against the neck of the fascist Minister of Foreign Affairs. This particular case was a manifestation of diplomatic flexibility. (*Laughter, stormy applause.*)

—From the speech of A. I. Adzhubei at the 22nd CPSU Congress, *Izvestia*, October 28, 1961.

. . . The present Soviet leaders . . . are frantically conducting the Khrushchev personality cult. The whole world can judge this, if only by the lavish propaganda set in operation about him. We have even reached a point where some stupidities committed by Khrushchev which bring discredit to the Soviet Union—such as when he took off his shoes in the UN General Assembly—are slavishly elevated to theory and presented as "magnificent examples of the Marxist attitude." As amazing as this may seem, A. Adzhubei, in his speech during the 22nd CPSU Congress which was published in the Soviet press, called this gesture something "simply magnificent!" Has this also been done within the framework of the struggle against the personality cult?

—From "Deeper and Deeper in the Mire of Anti-Marxism," *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), January 9, 1962.

The remaining alternative is schism, *i.e.*, permanent factional struggle with each Communist party forced to take sides, whether formal mutual excommunication takes place or not. The Chinese Communists would probably like to preserve mutual recognition of some ultimate community of faith as a formal basis on which all-inclusive meetings could take place from time to time—just as common congresses of the Russian Social Democrats took place long after Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had established separate factional organizations. Like their predecessors, these meetings would be forums for recurrent wrangles about the recognition of mandates (for, say, the Albanians or Yugoslavs) and recurrent contests for the votes of factionally uncommitted parties (such as Cuba). Such an arrangement would enable Mao to keep the Soviets ideologically bound to the alliance while he continued the struggle for leadership. Whether the Soviets will be willing to maintain such a fiction of unity without a minimum of submission to “majority rule”—a relation that would be as remote from democracy as from centralism—remains to be seen.

THE EFFECTS OF the schism on the chances of individual Communist parties are likely to differ widely. A few strongly entrenched and confident leaders may use the opportunity to acquire real political independence, shake off the identification with any foreign state and actually improve their chances of gaining power, while remaining “national Communist” totalitarians. Other parties, whose leadership has proved divided in the past, may be paralyzed or split by the new factional struggle and find their attraction altogether destroyed. Probably the majority will at first side with Russia from automatic habit, but will face a gradual decline in their following as it becomes more and more evident that their position represents merely submission to a foreign

power and no longer solidarity with a worldwide movement.

But the most profound repercussions may well be those on the Soviet Communist Party itself. For the second time within five years, it will have to revise its image of its own international role. In 1956, Khrushchev ordered the party to abandon the Stalinist concept that the progress of world revolution was wholly dependent on Soviet strength. Now it will have to unlearn the Khrushchevian belief that the progress of world revolution would invariably increase that strength. Khrushchev was right in facing the fact that independent revolutions may occur outside Soviet control; Stalin was right in thinking that such revolutions may not necessarily be to the advantage of the Soviet Union. But if the progress of revolution and the expansion of Soviet power are distinct and sometimes mutually contradictory processes, it follows that the Soviet Union has as little chance to win world hegemony as any other power. This is not going to be the Soviet Century after all.

No doubt, it will take time for these ideological implications of the schism to be generally realized by the Soviet Communists. But as the ultimate irrelevance of world revolution to the greatness of the USSR comes to be understood, the disillusionment of the believers among them is bound to be profound. It is hardly likely that either the aggressive élan of Khrushchev's foreign policy or the zest of his campaign for a “Leninist” ideological revival at home can recover from this blow. Yet the self-confidence of the more pragmatic element among Russia's administrators, technicians and scientists will not be impaired by the discomfiture of the ideologues. The Congress of the “second de-Stalinization” has also sown the seeds, then, of a future “de-Khrushchevization”: in the next crisis of succession, reassertion of the primacy of an ideological party may no longer be the safest road to victory.



The Three Funerals of Joseph Stalin

By Robert Conquest

IT MUST HAVE BEEN with some quickening of personal interest that General Monk, at the time still the most powerful man in England, viewed the preparations for the trial and mutilation of the corpse of Oliver Cromwell, the ruler with whom his whole career had been associated. That operation was carried out, of course, as part of a return to legality.

Other historical parallels, from a variety of barbarous pasts, have occurred to many commentators in connection with the recent downgrading of Stalin. None of these pasts, however, seems to compare in fierceness with the Stalin era of Soviet history. What distinguishes the latter and makes it so difficult to place in historical perspective is the phenomenon of a narrow-minded, suspicious man with one or two *idées fixes* running a vast modern state. We are all quite used to the idea of a Roman Empire or an Abassid Caliphate being ruled by a man of this type. But the notion of such a dynasty arising in a country with industry and science is difficult to grasp. Further, Marxism is, in some respects at least, a "modern" ideology and theory of society. How can it have produced a system of rule, and a cadre of rulers, closer in many respects to the Sudanese Mahdia in the last century than to the respectable Marxist burgomasters of Vienna or Stockholm?

But there is no bucking the realities. This extraordinary evolution did take place. Stalin's court, with its poisoners and its buffoons, was far closer to a compromise between the coarse encampments of Attila's horde and the subtle *couloirs* of Byzantium than to anything in the present-day West. Stalin himself seems to have realized this, with his special attachment to and admiration of Ivan the Terrible. It is easy to imagine that

such scenes as the one in which Stalin and his entourage fell into fits of laughter at Anna Pauker's husband imitating Zinoviev being shot had their tone almost consciously set by recollections of Ivan roistering with his *Oprichniki*.

Milovan Djilas has complained that a fault of Marxism is its lack of a theory of political liberty. This is not quite fair: Marx, with all the ambivalence that characterizes his attitude towards democracy, took it for granted that the proletarian state would have at least the liberties of expression prevailing in the then "bourgeois" republics. In particular, he condemned any restriction of freedom of the press—a condemnation which it seems rather odd to encounter in the Russian edition of his *Works*. The fact is that the Stalinists (and indeed Lenin) simply took advantage of Marx's failure to elaborate his views into definite instructions to his disciples. It would not be regarded as a sound defense for a maniac driver on English roads to plead that there were no signs saying "Keep to the Left." Certain things are understood, except by complete aliens.

The alien intruders, in the case of Marxism, have been the power-maniacs. Marx failed to consider that it might be possible, even for Marxists, to be motivated not just by a desire to save people, but rather by an urge for power. It does not seem to have occurred to him that in a dictatorship those rising to the top might be people who like to be dictators.

BY DECISION OF the 22nd CPSU Congress, Stalin's body now lies in a lesser grave flanking that of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Cheka. Yet, when one thinks of the still surviving heritage left by Dzerzhinsky, one may get the feeling that Stalin, too, in spite of his progressive demotion, still retains a position of considerable influence. And one would not be wrong. Even in his new and powerful attack on the late dictator at the

Mr. Conquest, a British poet and student of Communist affairs, has within the past year published Power and Policy in the USSR (reviewed on p. 46 of this issue), and Courage of Genius (Collins and Harvill Press, London)—an account of Pasternak's ordeal.

recent Party Congress, Khrushchev again acknowledged: "Of course, Stalin has done a great service to the party and to the Communist movement, and we give him his due."

This, indeed, has been the ambivalent attitude expressed by Khrushchev ever since any public criticism of Stalin has been possible at all. While Stalin was alive, the present First Secretary was among the heartiest adulators of "our dear father, wise teacher, and genius leading the party, the Soviet people, and the working people of the whole world—Comrade Stalin!"¹ It was only when, in the struggle for power, the darker secrets of the Soviet past began to be dragged out that Khrushchev launched his most violent attack on Stalin, in his "secret speech" at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956. The remarks he made then will be remembered for their bitterness and for their exposure of some of the crimes of the past. Yet, even then, Khrushchev saw fit to acknowledge that "in the past, Stalin undoubtedly performed great services to the party, to the working class, and to the international workers' movement"—indeed, that Stalin's excesses were not "the deeds of a giddy despot" but acts which he had considered necessary "in the interests of the party."

As we shall see, every time there has been any sign of genuine anti-Stalinism gaining influence, Khrushchev has gone out of his way to emphasize Stalin's "positive" role. But all this has been largely a variation of emphasis, whereas the essentials of the official estimate of Stalin have varied comparatively little over the last five or six years. It is probably true that any government which seeks to rule the Russia of the future with reasonable success must (unless, indeed, it reverts to 100-percent Stalinism) repudiate the Stalinist past. Yet, as this article will try to bring out, the twin and opposite pulls of the political advantages seen, on the one hand, in maintaining continuity and, on the other, in repudiating responsibility must—as long as the apparatocracy lasts—result in some sort of compromise like the present one.

No regime in Russia can really get the weight of the Stalinist past off its back until it truly repudiates *all* the repressions of the late dictator and rehabilitates *all* his victims. It is not just, or even mainly, a question of the non-oppositionists, the military men, and the writers. It is true that "the period of mass repression" has been condemned, and that implicitly at least this rehabilitates millions who were victimized after 1936 on pseudo-political charges. Yet, when Kaganovich is accused of shooting hundreds of railwaymen, he is accused of nothing more nor less than a type of behavior that was

repeated in every industry, office, university, and army unit, and under the direction of every single one of the present leaders.

IT IS TRUE that the responsibility of those who had minor positions in the 1930's is proportionately less than that, let us say, of Molotov. But where we happen to know anything of the past of these minor characters, it is clear that their activity was just as terroristic. Of Korotchenko, for example (until 1961 a candidate member of the Party Presidium and still Chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and a member of the Central Committee), we happen to know a good deal thanks to the acquisition of the Smolensk Archives, which reveal a truly horrifying story of his misdeeds as party secretary for Smolensk in the early part of the Stalin epoch.²

And if the great majority of those who formed the Central Committee of the mid-1930's were (as Khrushchev said in 1956) illegally shot to death, what of the legitimacy of the present regime? Those survivors of the Great Purge who have been rehabilitated in the last few years may well claim that they alone stood for anything resembling legal rule in the party. But, of course, there has been no move to restore them to their old positions.

After the 20th Party Congress, there were indeed unofficial reports (from the same sources which gave the first intimations of Khrushchev's "secret speech") that an attempt had been made in certain party circles to challenge the current leadership's right to the succession. These voices, it is understood, called for a new party congress to elect a Central Committee untainted by the past. That some such spontaneous movement sprang up seems confirmed by a long article which appeared in *Pravda* of April 5, 1956, severely condemning a number of party branches and individual Communists for "demagogic statements" and "slandorous fabrications and anti-party assertions." "Under the guise of condemning the cult of the individual," said the article, "some rotten elements try to cast doubt on the correctness of the party's policy." At one branch which was cited as an example, *Pravda* charged that four named members had "used inner-party democracy to make slanderous speeches directed against the party policy and its Leninist foundations," and still had not been rebuked by the branch as a whole.

Moreover, the present leaders labor under the necessity, like a millstone around their necks, of having to

¹ From an article by Khrushchev honoring Stalin's 70th birthday, published in *Pravda*, December 21, 1949.

² See Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1958.

approve the general line which Stalin followed against the opposition—the crash programs of industrialization and, above all, collectivization. The actual process of collectivization produced the worst excesses, on the largest conceivable scale, against the peasantry; yet, nothing has been, or probably can be, said against it. Moreover, the collective-farm system, as established, has been an enormous handicap to Soviet agriculture. Pasternak, in *Doctor Zhivago*, was able to write that it was a failure as well as a mistake, and he added that it was the refusal to allow this to be said that produced the terror. But such an analysis is unthinkable for the present leadership. Collectivization remains a dogma that no one dares dispute. In general, praise of all Stalin's major policies has to be coupled with denunciation of the terror. And the terror must be regarded as peripheral, as an excess totally unrelated to the economic and social aspects of the Stalin regime. As Togliatti pointed out in 1956, this leads to the attribution of all excesses to the personal faults of a single man—a notion which could not conceivably be more un-Marxist. It is, in fact, a cult of personality in reverse.

STALIN'S SUCCESSORS were not slow to see the advantages, as well as the disadvantages, of dissociating themselves from their late master. On the one hand, deprived of the immense prestige of the late dictator and themselves beset by factions and unable to exert Stalin's single-minded, unitary tyranny, they saw the attraction, and even the necessity of a more "liberal" sort of rule—not, indeed, in the sense of admitting the populace to the political arena monopolized by the *apparatus*, but simply of moderating the methods of rule employed by that *apparatus*. But even this meant some sort of reconciliation between the populace and the regime—and the principle of alienation between the two was precisely the essence of Stalin's rule and of Stalinism. Thus, as long as the new regime accepted responsibility for the old, it was bound to bear the burden of the memory of twenty years of "mass repression." On the other hand, the disadvantages of a complete repudiation of Stalin were equally obvious. On the face of it, the new leaders' only title to rule was as Stalin's heirs. And, of course, they all bore a degree of responsibility for everything done in his time.

Their first action was to repudiate the "Doctors' Plot"—probably a gesture intended as much to mollify the party cadres threatened by the abortive purge as to calm the population. Then, during Beria's "Hundred Days," a definite campaign of silence (rather than of condemnation) was launched against Stalin's name. The most striking instances of this were Bulganin's May Day

speech and the Order of the Day commemorating the VE-Day anniversary on May 9. The latter, in particular, would ordinarily have been the occasion for a paean to the Organizer of Victory, the first *Generalissimus* since Suvorov. But Stalin's name was omitted entirely. Beria's fall modified the campaign but did not bring it to a close. *Pravda*, on July 13, 1953, came out powerfully in favor of collective leadership and against decisions taken by "individuals." Aristov later said at the 20th Congress that the July 1953 Plenum revealed blatant violations of the collective principle, "engendered by the cult of the individual." This certainly seems to imply that Malenkov at that time seized the weapon of anti-Stalinism which had fallen from Beria's (already possibly lifeless) hands.

Shortly thereafter, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the party, *Voprosy filosofii* (No. 4, 1953, which went to press in August) carried an article which played down Stalin's role to something like the position that was to enjoy official sanction between 1958 and 1961. The "Stalin Constitution" now became simply the "New Constitution," and victory in the war was attributed only to the party. Lenin was referred to frequently, and the party and its Central Committee were given credit for most achievements. Stalin was mentioned only twice, once in a quotation from Malenkov's speech at the 19th Party Congress and once as a leader in the struggle against Trotskyism. In keeping with this policy, Stalin's birth anniversary on December 21, 1953, was passed over in silence.

IT MAY WELL have been thought that these tactics would serve to dissociate the regime from excessive attachment to the Stalinist past while casting no overt slur on its legitimacy. But the question was a live one politically—which, in Soviet circumstances, is to say that it was an element in the struggle for power within the top leadership. Malenkov seems to have gained the first advantage from the fall of Beria. But once the past was open to investigation, there was an obvious temptation for all the leaders to dig into it for material usable against their rivals. For a time the fiction could be maintained that the evils of the past were due to Beria and later to Yezhov, but eventually Stalin's role would be hard to conceal.

Malenkov took the offensive in mid-54. Ryumin, the Deputy Minister of State Security responsible for the Doctors' Plot, was tried and shot to the accompaniment of what amounted to assurances that the administrative and industrial bureaucracy needed Malenkov's protection against Stalinist methods. But in the winter of 1954-55 the anti-Malenkov combination of Khrushchev and

Molotov prevailed. The "Leningrad Case" was brought into the open at the Abakumov trial in December 1954; yet, there was still no move to implicate Stalin. On the contrary, in fact, it was precisely at this time that adherents of the old regime were placated by a treatment of Stalin's birthday notably different from that of 1953. *Pravda*, in a long article, actually found it possible in effect to praise the purges: "It was he [Stalin] who mercilessly exposed the enemies of the people. Under the leadership of its Central Committee and of Stalin, the Communist Party destroyed the traitors and defeatists."

During 1955, much was written about the necessity of "collective" leadership and attacking the "cult of personality." But Stalin still remained personally immune, and his birthday was again celebrated with enthusiasm. In its article honoring this occasion, *Kommunist* even went to the length of linking Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev—a clear indication that Khrushchev himself was not pressing at this stage for any overt attack on his late sponsor. The struggle against "Stalinism" was, in fact, not so much a struggle against Stalin's principles as a struggle by one section of his followers against another. On the eve of the 20th Congress, the struggle centered around the question of rehabilitations, which had already become unavoidable.

In his secret speech to the Congress, Khrushchev referred to several cases dating back to the pre-Beria period, which he said had been investigated "in 1955." He also disclosed the curious circumstance that the judge who had been in charge of investigating the Kosior and other cases had been questioned in person by the party Presidium "only several days before the present Congress." That the Presidium should have deemed it necessary to have this direct confrontation presumably signifies that its members were not disposed to content themselves with the reports submitted by the investigative organs under Khrushchev's control. Kosior had been Khrushchev's predecessor as party First Secretary in the Ukraine, and among the important rehabilitation cases his certainly was the one in which Khrushchev was most closely involved. One may speculate that the reports submitted to the Presidium left out this aspect, and that the Presidium's personal interrogation of the judge was designed to get it into the record. Khrushchev's statements at the recent 22nd Congress now confirm (or at least assert) that Molotov and Co. heartily opposed the raising of the past in 1956. Yet, this course evidently had its dangers for Khrushchev, too.

STILL, WITH HIS usual penchant for any initiative likely to loosen up the political situation, Khrushchev seems to have been more or less determined in February

1956 to force the issue and make what use of it he could (though it was actually Mikoyan who brought matters into the open). Khrushchev now tells us that he obtained the Presidium's permission to make his secret speech only by threatening that, if permission were denied, he would go ahead and make the speech anyway as an ordinary Congress delegate. Of course, this may not be true; or it may have amounted to no more than a vague threat. In any case, the speech came too late to affect the breakthrough in the struggle for power which this new initiative was evidently designed to secure. For the intrigue and haggling over the composition of the new Presidium had without doubt already been concluded, and the result was stalemate.

During 1956 the secret speech was circulated to the party branches, producing signs of revolt in a number of them where anti-Stalinism was evidently viewed as impugning the past deeds, and hence the present position, of the entire party leadership—a tendency which, as noted earlier, had to be promptly denounced in *Pravda*. On June 30 a Central Committee resolution "On Overcoming the Cult of the Individual and its Consequences" put the attack on Stalin formally before the general public. By this time a good deal of undisciplined anti-Stalinism had cropped up in some of the foreign Communist parties, and the older members of the CPSU Presidium were doubtless pointing the moral. The text of the June 30 resolution was far milder than the secret speech, and more concerned with defending Stalin himself and the legitimacy of the "Leninist core" which had served under and succeeded him. Later in the year, the consequences of Khrushchev's new policies in Hungary and Poland, and among writers in Russia itself, further strengthened the hands of those who wished to slow down the attack on Stalin, and over the ensuing period there was considerable backpedalling. Khrushchev himself went out of his way to say that "the term Stalinist, like Stalin himself, is inseparable from the high title of Communist."³

Even when the "anti-party" group was defeated in June 1957, the Khrushchevites, in publicly denouncing the group for its crimes, seldom attacked Stalin. In fact, Stalin seems to have been spoken of only once. This was when Khrushchev charged that Malenkov had "not only failed to restrain J. V. Stalin, but very adroitly exploited Stalin's weaknesses and habits in the last years of his life," and in many cases "egged him on to actions which merit severe condemnation."⁴ Thus, even here, Stalin was pictured to some extent as the victim of evil counsellors. Similarly, when the Central Committee, in its

³ *Pravda*, January 17, 1957.

⁴ *Pravda*, August 28, 1957.

decree on music of May 28, 1958, condemned Stalin's subjective attitude towards individual works of art, it softened the condemnation by asserting that his attitude was "known to have been very negatively influenced by Molotov, Malenkov and Beria"—a complete falsehood, of course, as Zhdanov was the true instigator.

ON THE WHOLE, it is surprising how little was said of Stalin's "negative" side during the years between the 20th and 22nd party congresses. Though there were passing references to it, the sort of adjective applied to his activities was seldom any stronger than "incorrect." Apart from rather ambiguous expressions of blame for the terror, he was censured for certain political and economic errors of his later years, but never for his basic program. The secret speech already criticized him for not having been near the countryside for years, for believing Soviet propaganda films about agricultural prosperity, and for opposing incentives to the peasants suggested by Khrushchev; and it also censured his *Economic Problems of Socialism*. In addition, though less overtly, Stalin's policy and theories on Machine Tractor Stations were later abandoned, his opinion of a transition to *Tovaro-Obmen* contradicted, and ley-farming, on which he had put the greatest emphasis, denounced.

The setpiece statement of the whole official attitude over the period up to the 22nd Congress is the article on Stalin in the latest edition of the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* (Volume 40). (This volume came out in 1958 after a delay of over 18 months, during which all the following alphabetical volumes had already appeared.) The article, only 6 pages long as against 44 in the previous edition, may be taken as representing the considered opinions of the regime. Stalin's role in the revolution is toned down, though not to the extent of giving any credit to the "opposition." He is praised for his fight against the Trotsky and Rightist deviations and for his role in collectivization and industrialization. Little is said about his part in the purges, and this much more moderate in tone than the accusations of the secret speech. He is said to have employed unnecessary means of repression against political opponents on the basis of the mistaken thesis he put forward in 1937 that the class struggle becomes more and more intense during the achievement of socialism; but most of the responsibility for the liquidation of honest Stalinists is placed on "the accursed enemies of the people, Yagoda, Yezhov, and Beria, who had wormed their way into J. V. Stalin's confidence." He is credited with a "serious contribution to the defense of the country" in the war, although his faith in the Nazi-Soviet Pact and failure to prepare for the German attack are censured, together with his over-

ruling of Central Committee members on the spot in connection with operations (doubtless a reference to the Kharkov battle in 1942). Little is said of the postwar years, though some of his economic theories of this period are called fallacious and the break with Yugoslavia is condemned.

Most interesting is the article's analysis of the "personality cult," which it attributes both to negative features in Stalin's character and to the specific difficult conditions of the 1930's. The continuity of party democracy is preserved by the device of asserting that it ceased to function only at the top while the lower party branches remained democratic. The evil effects of the cult are deplored, but they are held irrelevant to the development of the Soviet state. Stalin's name is called "inseparable from Marxism-Leninism," and the article declares that "it would be a most flagrant distortion of historical truth to spread the mistakes made by Stalin in the last years of his life to all his party and state activities extending over many years. . . ." It states further that "attacks by revisionists against so-called 'Stalinism' are also essentially a form of struggle against the fundamental positions of Marxism-Leninism."

SUCH WAS THE official line right up to the 22nd Congress. The new assault that was unleashed against Stalin at the Congress was not preceded by any softening-up, but came right out of the blue. It seems to have represented a last-minute initiative by Khrushchev—somewhat like his initiative in February 1956—designed to gain an advantage in his current political maneuvers, perhaps involving Kozlov, Kosygin, and others. The main burden of the renewed attack on the Stalinist past was not directed at Stalin himself; on the contrary, its whole animus was clearly against Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov. The official rating of Stalin remained essentially unchanged from what it had been over the preceding five years, but on the other hand the charges levelled against the anti-party group were both more vicious and more detailed than before—even though there is no reason to suppose that these men represent any real political threat to Khrushchev. A reading of the speeches at the congress shows that the more detailed attacks on the group were made by Khrushchev's closest adherents, while those major figures in the Presidium who do not owe their careers to him confined themselves in the main to general denunciations. Thus, there seems to be little doubt that two main elements in the Presidium are engaged in a struggle, one of them pressing the attack on the past as a tactic in securing the elimination of the other, which wishes to go more slowly. (There was at least a hint of

a personal attack on Kozlov in Shvernik's report for the party control committee, which unexpectedly extended the "bad" period of the Leningrad purge from 1949 to 1952, when Kozlov was secretary in charge of cadres there.) The indications are, however, that Khrushchev's new initiative was not wholly successful. In his final congress speech, he had largely to withdraw the accusations he had originally made against Voroshilov, and the newly-elected Presidium reflects no increase in the representation of his own personal following nor any weakening of the position of other elements.

Khrushchev, indeed, still faces a dilemma. It is easy enough to pay lip service to "socialist legality" and to carry out such de-Stalinization as can be accomplished by a stroke of the pen, like changing the names of cities. But, just as the busts of Stalin which Soviet climbers ceremonially placed on all the highest peaks in the USSR over past decades will take considerable time and effort to remove, so will it be an even longer and harder task to erase the political heritage of his regime. For what is to succeed it?

KHRUSHCHEV'S REVIVAL of the anti-Stalinist line has evoked some very apt comments from Communist ranks outside the USSR—comments which may perhaps be taken as representing ideas that already exist even within the CPSU although they cannot yet be made articulate. At the meeting of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party in November 1961, one of the delegates, Senator Secchia, said that the Russians had "not come to executions without a long process which started neither in 1937 nor in 1934, but much earlier, a process in which minorities were first deprived of the right of expressing their views, then were isolated and kept under suspicion, and eventually were expelled and imprisoned. This is why we should not be satisfied by the mere fact that today there are no more

opponents of the regime in prisons. This in itself is not sufficient."

Another comment came from Senator Terracini, a member of the Party Directorate, who said that responsibility for the crimes of the Stalin era had now been extended from Stalin to the whole leading group of his epoch, and that this might eventually engulf Khrushchev himself, since "in fact it should be said that Comrade Khrushchev belonged to the leading group around Stalin which shares responsibility." Terracini, however, went on to praise Khrushchev as deserving trust for having seen the necessity of airing the matter and facing the risks. Another speaker, Garavini, pointed out the contradiction presented by the existence in the USSR of a "highly articulate and rich economic balance" with "no corresponding political balance, that is, a similarly developed balance of Socialist democracy."

The signs of any beginning of inner-party democracy in the Soviet Union are as yet negligible. At the 22nd Congress, however, Kozlov mentioned that in the discussions of the draft party statutes (presumably the pre-congress discussions held in party branches around the country), the question had been raised whether the hitherto existing prohibition against factionalism and the formation of cliques needed to be retained in the statutes any longer. Kozlov answered that it did. Yet, the demand for greater democracy in the party evidently exists, and as long as the leadership is split into warring groups (as it chronically must be), there is always the possibility that one of them may break the rules and seek the support of this democratic trend—just as Kadar and the anti-Rakosi faction in the Hungarian party *apparatus* entered into an uneasy alliance with Nagy and the democratizers in 1956. The Kadar wing miscalculated the strength of the new forces and in the end could dispose of them only by calling in Soviet armor.

But from where are the tanks to come that would enforce order in Moscow in similar circumstances?

Khrushchev and the Purges

By Lazar Pistrak

KHRUSHCHEV'S CLIMB to power was an almost uninterrupted process from his arrival in Moscow in 1929. It was not easy for a postrevolutionary newcomer with no ideological and a poor educational background to gain a high position among old Bolsheviks whose revolutionary zeal was born in times of persecution and anger and strengthened by a doctrine whose standard bearers they were believed to be. Under "normal" political conditions Khrushchev would have been unable to make such a swift jump toward the higher Communist hierarchy. But the conditions were abnormal in the sense that intellectuality was not in high demand; the totalitarian dictatorship whose birth coincided with Khrushchev's arrival in the capital needed simple-minded people with overemphasized ambition, strong nerves, without scruples, ready to follow blindly the party line drawn by Stalin and his closest collaborators and thus to help build the foundation for the rule of a single person. The Great Purge of the 1930's was the touchstone by which the fitness of the newcomers for the incoming era had been tested. Khrushchev passed that test with distinction. When the year 1937 reached its end, the decision to admit Khrushchev to the highest party body, the Politburo, was about to be made. But this was also the time when the bloody Purge reached its climax.

Nikolai Yezhov, the diminutive, long-eared maniac with the shrieking voice, still enjoyed unlimited authority to extort confessions from innocent people. The places of detention were filled with men and women whose bodies ached from tortures and whose minds approached the brink of insanity. Fear and anguish stifled friendship and sympathy. The persistent, threatening appeals for vigilance, in which Khrushchev excelled, had brought results. To avoid accusations of "faint-heartedness" and

"rotten liberalism," frightened men and women produced false reports charging others with spying, wrecking, and counterrevolutionary acts. In one district in Kiev one man wrote 69,¹ another over 100 false reports;² in Odessa a man fabricated 230 reports,³ and in Poltava province one Communist accused the entire membership of the party organization to which he belonged of being "enemies of the people."⁴

Yezhov was the hero of the day. On December 20, 1937, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Cheka, the Bolshoi Theatre was crowded with Stalin's supporters, and Anastas Mikoyan, one of the present rulers, paid tribute to Comrade Yezhov as a "talented, faithful pupil of Stalin, [a man who] is beloved by the Soviet people, [and who] has achieved the greatest victory in the history of the party, a victory we will never forget." Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Molotov presided over this meeting and applauded warmly when Mikoyan cried out: "Learn the Stalinist style of work from Comrade Yezhov, as he learned it from Comrade Stalin."⁵ The same day, *Pravda* editorially greeted Yezhov with a "Long live the faithful son of the people, the Stalinist People's Commissar, Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov!" It was around this time that Stalin chose Khrushchev to become his vicar in the Ukraine.

Attacking Beria, Khrushchev said in his February, 1956 speech: "It has now been established that the villain had climbed up the government ladder over an untold number of corpses."⁶

This was certainly so. Beria's Chekist record in Transcaucasia probably surpassed many other records of the kind as far as brutality was concerned. This was the

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¹ *Bilshovik Ukrainy* (Kiev), No. 1, 1938, p. 53.

² *Visti VTsVK* (Kiev), May 23, 1938.

³ *Ibid.*, June 17, 1938.

⁴ *Ibid.*, February 14, 1938.

⁵ *Pravda*, December 21, 1937.

⁶ See *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1956, p. 65.

main reason for his advancement. But reading Khrushchev's statement one cannot help remembering that Khrushchev's appointment to the Ukraine in January 1938, which really launched him on his career, was closely related to the annihilation of Pavel P. Postyshev and Stanislav V. Kosior, Politburo members and First and Second Secretaries of the Ukrainian Communist Party. In view of this relation, a brief look at the circumstances under which they were purged is required.

POSTYSHEV'S DARING BEHAVIOR at the February-March plenary session of the Central Committee in 1937 is all the more remarkable because he was aware of the fact that he was approaching his end;⁷ at the 13th Ukrainian Party Congress (May-June, 1937) one of Postyshev's former "friends," a member of the Kiev Province Party Committee, M. S. Vasilenko, had revealed Postyshev's resentment at the criticism which the All-Union Party Central Committee in Moscow had leveled against "mistakes" of the Kiev party organization on January 13, 1937.⁸ This was why Kaganovich was immediately dispatched to Kiev to straighten out the situation. A plenary session of the Kiev Province Party Committee was urgently convoked for January 17 with the participation of Kaganovich in his capacity of Secretary of the Party Central Committee. At this session, Postyshev was relieved from his post of First Secretary of the Kiev Committee "because of the impossibility of combining" this position with that of the Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee.⁹ The actual reason for Postyshev's dismissal was, of course, not the duality of offices held by him. From 1930 to 1935, Kaganovich himself simultaneously controlled three party offices in Moscow, and Khrushchev repeated this performance in Kiev in 1938, when he managed to carry the burden of first secretaryship in the Central, Kiev Province, and Kiev City Party Committees.

Postyshev was to be reduced, but his popularity among the party workers in Kiev and the Ukraine was the reason for camouflaging the first blow Stalin dealt him through Kaganovich. The second indirect attack on Postyshev came at the beginning of February when the name of Karpov, Postyshev's protégé, appeared in the Ukrainian press with the epithets "enemy of the party, loathsome Trotskyite."¹⁰ For more than two weeks after

that about sixty prominent Kiev party workers in political, educational, economic, and other fields, including a large number of people who had worked under Postyshev, were labeled as enemies of the people, Trotskyites, and the like. On March 17, twelve days after the plenary session in Moscow, Postyshev was officially relieved of his post of Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Party Central Committee "in connection with his transfer to another job."¹¹ The other job was the secretaryship in the Kuibyshev Province Party Committee. On January 20, 1938, Postyshev was expelled from the Politburo, to which he had belonged as an alternate member for four years, and Khrushchev was nominated to that position instead. Although the official announcement still called Postyshev "comrade," there can be no doubt that he already was under arrest, since his name entirely disappeared from the Soviet press after November 17, 1937.

The same issue of the Kiev *Visti* which reported Postyshev's dismissal from his post in the Ukrainian Party Central Committee (March 18, 1937) and editorially accused him of "political blindness" devoted half a page to Khrushchev's report on the results of the February-March plenary session which he had delivered two days earlier in Moscow. His speech was prominently displayed on page two, while the report on the same subject made by the Ukrainian leaders was not carried. Two days later, in an editorial, *Visti* repeated a motto from Khrushchev's speech. This was certainly not accidental: It seems that as early as March 1937 Khrushchev was considered a man of influence in Kiev. It had not taken long before Khrushchev, who left Kiev in 1929 as a low-echelon worker, returned there as a ruler.

Following Postyshev's dismissal and arrest, Kosior still remained party boss in the Ukraine, but his position was considerably weakened. On January 18, 1938, the newspapers announced that Kosior had been appointed deputy chairman of the Soviet Control Commission. This was not a favorable appointment; it was Stalin's kiss of death. Three months later, probably around the end of April, Kosior was arrested. The investigating judge, Rodos, testified in February, 1956: "I was told that Kosior and Chubar [Politburo member, arrested in 1938] were people's enemies and for this reason, I, as an investigative judge, had to make them confess."¹² It was Khrushchev who informed the 20th Party Congress about Rodos' shocking testimony, but it was also Khrushchev who, in June 1938, addressing the 14th Ukrainian Party Congress in Kiev, said:

⁷ P. I. Postyshev, an Old Bolshevik, openly questioned Stalin's demand that the purges be intensified; this incident is described in Chapter 10 of Mr. Pistrak's book—*Ed.*

⁸ *Visti VTs VK*, June 1, 1937.

⁹ *Ibid.*, January 18, 1937.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, February 1, 1937.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, March 18, 1937.

¹² *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, p. 42.

The enemies of the people who sat in the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party [Bolshevik] of the Ukraine and in the [Kiev] Provincial Party Committee knew very well that the stronger the party organization, the more dangerous it is to the enemies of the working class and, first of all, to the Polish landlords and the German barons. And therefore they—the Polish agents, the Pilsudchiks—did everything in order to weaken the Bolshevik discipline, to corrupt the party organization.¹³

It is evident that in his diatribe against the "enemies of the people who sat in the leadership of the Ukrainian Central Committee and in the Kiev *obkom*," Khrushchev had in mind Kosior and Postyshev. At the same time that Khrushchev assailed Kosior, Rodos "made him confess," and it was not long afterward that Khrushchev filled the vacancy of full-fledged member in the Politburo vacated by Kosior's removal.

THERE ARE SEVERAL reasons why such leading old Bolsheviks as Postyshev and Kosior had to make way for the intellectual low-brow, Khrushchev. One of the reasons was their intellectual superiority and more independent thinking—a quality for which there is no place in a totalitarian dictatorship. Another reason was, as stated above, that in spite of their brutality, Postyshev and Kosior, like Kirov and Ordzhonikidze, possessed a spark of honesty in their hearts; it seems that they showed insufficient readiness to go along in putting the label of "enemy of the people" on just anybody at the

¹³ *Bilshovik Ukrainy*, No. 6, 1938, p. 10.

Some Old Ukrainian Folklore

*Today and forever, oh, Stalin, be praised
For the light that the plants and the fields do emit!
You are the heart of the people, the truth and the faith!
We're thankful to you for the sun you have lit!*

*Kiev is free, will remain so for ages,
Our land, our Mother, salutes it with cheer,
Khrushchev and Vatutin,* brave and courageous,
Lead forward the armies who fight without fear.*

*We're united and solid, and no one will dare
To touch our young land—clean as first love,
As fresh and as young with his silver-gray hair
Is Stalin's companion, Nikita Khrushchev.*

* General N. F. Vatutin, Commander of the First Ukrainian Front, died in 1944.

—From the poem, "To the Great Stalin from the Ukrainian People," published under the signatures of thirteen Ukrainian poets in *Pravda*, December 14, 1944; as translated in Lazar Pistrak's *The Grand Tactician*, p. 165.

whim of a Yezhov or even a Stalin. Finally, the last but not least reason for their downfall was their popularity among the Ukrainian party workers and, in the case of Postyshev, among the younger generation (Pioneers and Komsomol). Stalin could not permit Kosior, Postyshev, and others to be called "*vozhd*s of the Ukrainian people," which had been the case on several occasions. In Stalin's time, this planet could have only one *vozhd* (leader). That Postyshev's fall was in part caused by the violation of this rule is evident from a statement made by one of his former "friends," N. N. Popov, who recanted but was nevertheless liquidated. Popov said: "One of the reasons why Comrade Postyshev became so quickly susceptible to intoxication with success was the noise which our press made around his name."¹⁴

Khrushchev was aware of the danger of self-promotion, and thus at the first appropriate occasion "promoted" Stalin instead to the status of "*vozhd* of the Ukrainian people." This was done in a resolution passed at the 14th Ukrainian Party Congress. Furthermore, Khrushchev demonstrated his modesty by allowing himself to be called only "glorious son of the proletarian Donbas," "best son of our people."¹⁵ These appellations, however, were used less frequently than those describing Khrushchev's closeness to Stalin: "faithful pupil of Stalin," "friend and comrade-in-arms of J. V. Stalin," "Stalin's closest pupil and comrade-in-arms," "Stalinist leader of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks," "closest companion-in-arms of the great Stalin, militant leader of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks."¹⁶

"Modesty" was not the only advantage Khrushchev had over his predecessors. Another more important advantage was his greater ruthlessness and readiness in exposing and liquidating the "enemies of the people." Actually the purge in the Ukraine had not been greatly hampered by Postyshev and Kosior. As everywhere else, Yezhov's terror machine worked well enough in the Ukraine even before Khrushchev's arrival, but Stalin and Yezhov were perfectionists, and the slightest obstruction capable of slowing down the speed or impairing the smooth functioning of the machine was not tolerated by them. They expected Khrushchev to do a better job than his predecessors. In a speech before the 14th Party Congress, Demyan S. Korotchenko, at the time Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars, stated that Khrushchev, "the best son of our [Ukrainian] people, the excellent Bolshevik, the

¹⁴ *Visti VTs VK*, June 2, 1937.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, May 22 and June 21, 1938, respectively.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, May 23, 1938, June 18, 1938, June 9, 1939, and November 24, 1940, respectively.

Donets miner, was sent by Stalin to the Ukraine "to deal the final blow at all this Trotskyite, Bukharinite, and bourgeois-nationalist gang in the Ukraine."¹⁷

The purge of top local party officials was carried out by Khrushchev with remarkable speed. S. A. Kudryavtsev, who had become First Secretary of the Kiev Province Party Committee after Postyshev's dismissal in January 1937, and Politburo member of the Ukrainian Party in June of the same year, was purged at the end of that year and arrested as an "enemy of the people." On April 17, 1938, Khrushchev purged Kudryavtsev's successor and member of the Ukrainian Central Committee, D. M. Yevtushenko, and took over his position. The same procedure was repeated with regard to the Kiev City Party Committee, of which Khrushchev also became First Secretary. With the helping hand of Mikhail Alekseevich Burmistenko, whom Moscow had dispatched to the Ukraine together with Khrushchev to become Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Khrushchev, appearing in many cases in person, purged practically all top party and government officials in the Ukrainian provinces.

KHRUSHCHEV'S ASSIGNMENT called not only for full cooperation with Yezhov's henchmen in the Ukraine but also for initiative in exposing the "enemies of the people." In May 1938, in a letter of consent to "run" for the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev wrote: "I pledge to spare no efforts in seizing and annihilating all agents of fascism, the Trotskyites, Bukharinites, and all these despicable bourgeois nationalists on our free Ukrainian soil."¹⁸

Only a few months after his arrival it became clear that Stalin had not made a mistake when he selected Khrushchev for the job. The Ukrainian press and prominent Communist speakers soon described the situation on the Purge front in the following manner:

The merciless uprooting of the enemies of the people—the Trotskyites, Bukharinites, bourgeois nationalists, and all other spying filth—began only after the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (B) sent the unswerving Bolshevik and Stalinist, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, to the Ukraine to lead the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (B).¹⁹

This flattering statement in an editorial in *Bilshovik Ukrainy* was seconded by leading Communists such as A. S. Shcherbakov, at the time First Secretary of the Stalino Province Committee, who said:

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, June 21, 1938.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, May 23, 1938.

¹⁹ *Bilshovik Ukrainy*, No. 7, 1938, p. 25.

I subscribe to the opinion of the comrades that a really merciless crushing of the enemies of the people in the Ukraine began after the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (B) had dispatched Comrade Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev to lead the Ukrainian Bolsheviks.

Now the toiling people of the Ukraine can be assured that the crushing of the agents of the Polish landowners, the German fascists will be carried out to the end, that the enemies of the people, every one of them, will be completely annihilated.²⁰

The most interesting statement of this kind was, however, made by the "master of ceremonies" himself, the chief of the NKVD in the Ukraine, A. I. Uspensky. At an election meeting in Proskurov he introduced himself in the following manner:

I consider myself a pupil of Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov. Comrade Yezhov teaches us to fight the enemies of the people, to clean up our country, our Motherland from the enemies. I pledge to follow Comrade Yezhov, the militant leader of the NKVD, in every respect.

(This pledge materialized: Uspensky disappeared at the end of 1938 as did his beloved teacher.) He went on:

And only after the faithful Stalinist, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, arrived in the Ukraine did the smashing of the enemies of the people begin in earnest.

He concluded his speech with a personal note:

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev asked me to transmit to you his regards and to ask you to prepare yourselves in a Bolshevik manner for the collection of a rich Stalinist harvest. . . .²¹

The exact number of the top party and government officials arrested and executed in the Ukraine is not known, but since these officials belonged to the Ukrainian Party's Central Committee, a comparison of the composition of this body before and after Khrushchev's arrival in the Ukraine may serve as a yardstick by which Khrushchev's ruthlessness can be measured. The last Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party elected before Khrushchev's arrival consisted of 117 members with voting rights and 49 candidates or alternate members. These 166 men had been elected at the 13th Ukrainian Party Congress on June 2, 1937, when the Great Purge approached its peak. Postyshev and many of his friends and followers were already purged, and this was also reflected in the fact that only 31 percent of the members of the outgoing Central Committee elected at the 12th Congress in January 1934 reappeared on the new list. On June 19, 1938, five months after Khrushchev took over, at the 14th Party

²⁰ *Visti VTs VK*, June 17, 1938.

²¹ *Ibid.*, June 24, 1938.

Congress, a new Central Committee was elected, to which only three men from the 1937 Committee, or less than 3 percent, were re-elected. The 15th Party Congress took place in 1940, when the Great Purge was over, but, in spite of this fact, 53 percent of the members of the preceding Central Committee were not re-elected to the new Committee.²²

In his secret report of February 25, 1956, Khrushchev disclosed that "of the 139 members and candidates of the [All-Union] Party's Central Committee who were elected at the 17th Congress [in 1934], 98 persons, *i.e.*, 70 percent, were arrested and shot."²³ On the other hand, it can be established that 23 members and candidates, or 16.5 percent of the same Committee were re-elected to the Central Committee at the 18th Party Congress in 1939.²⁴ A comparison of the composition of the Ukrainian Party Central Committee elected in 1934 at the 12th Congress with that of the one elected in 1938 at the 14th Congress shows that not a single member of the 1934 Committee was re-elected and, as stated above, 97 percent of the Central Committee members were removed in 1937-38.

The only reason why 70 percent of the [All-Union] Central Committee and candidates elected at the 17th Party Congress [in 1934] were branded as "enemies of the party and the people" was that honest Communists were slandered, accusations against them were fabricated, and revolutionary legality was gravely undermined.

Such was Khrushchev's explanation of the massacre of the members of the All-Union Party Central Committee which took place in 1937-38. Putting on the mask of indignation, Khrushchev further revealed that of the 1,966 delegates to the 1934 Congress with either voting or advisory rights, 1,108 persons had been arrested on charges of antirevolutionary crimes—decidedly more than a majority.

"This very fact," said Khrushchev, "shows how absurd, wild, and contrary to common sense were the charges of counterrevolutionary crimes made, as we now see, against a majority of the participants at the 17th Party Congress." The subordinate clause, "as we now see," was obviously inserted to suggest to his comparatively young audience, who hardly knew the particulars about the Great Purge, that at that time he, Khrushchev, was not aware of the fact that over 56 percent of the

delegates to the 17th Congress (which he also attended as a delegate, at which he was presiding officer, and which elected him to the Central Committee) were arrested on trumped-up charges of treason. Khrushchev did not spare kind words for these victims: they "were active participants in the building of our Socialist state"; many of them "suffered and fought for party interests during the prerevolutionary years in the conspiracy and at the Civil War fronts"; and "they fought their enemies valiantly and often nervelessly looked into the face of death." And then with underlined naiveté Khrushchev asked: "How then can we believe that such people could prove to be 'two-faced' and had joined the camp of the enemies of socialism . . . ?"

It was "the abuse of power by Stalin" which was responsible for these crimes, Khrushchev asserted. But who was responsible for the far wider swing of the terror sword in the Ukraine that cut down more than 70 percent of the Ukrainian Party Central Committee in one year? Had Khrushchev not been the highest party authority in the Ukraine who decided the fate of these members? And was not Khrushchev—the ruler over 40 million Ukrainian inhabitants for more than a decade—also responsible for the liquidation of tens of thousands of non-party people who died for no good reason during and after the Great Purge?

KHRUSHCHEV HIMSELF WAS proud of the first results of his purging activities in the Ukraine, but he would not cease brandishing the sword until he heard the last gasp of the last "enemy." On May 26, 1938, in a public speech before a crowd described as "100,000 people," Khrushchev boasted that "this year was a distinctive year as far as crushing of the enemies of the people is concerned"; the Polish and German fascists have good reason to "bemoan the death of their agents," while "the peoples of the Soviet Union rejoice that they have uprooted this foul, abominable, treacherous gang, the loathsome Trotskyite-Bukharinite bandits, that they have eradicated and exterminated them under the leadership of our great Stalin, under the leadership of our Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov." At the same time Khrushchev threatened with complete annihilation "all kinds of bourgeois nationalists" who survived.²⁵

On June 5, 1938, in his first major speech delivered at the Fourth Kiev Party Conference, Khrushchev asked the party workers not to relax their vigilance:

We got rid of a considerable number of enemies. But as [party] workers of the Ukraine, and particularly of the Kiev province, we should not be conceited. We must not relax, for

²² *Ibid.*, May 18, 1940.

²³ *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, pp. 22-23.

²⁴ XVII sezd vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (B) (Stenographic report; Moscow, 1938), pp. 680-681; XVIII sezd vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (B) (Stenographic report; Moscow, 1939), p. 688.

²⁵ *Visti VTs VK*, May 27, 1938.

the enemies will never, under any circumstances, cease carrying out their subversive work against our state. Comrades, we have annihilated quite a few enemies, but not all of them. That is why we should be vigilant. We should not be lulled either by applause, or by approval, or by unanimous votes. We should always keep in mind Comrade Stalin's word that as long as the capitalist encirclement exists, spies and diversionists will be sent to our country. We should carefully ponder these words of Comrade Stalin.²⁶

One might think that in speaking of the "enemies" Khrushchev actually referred to agents of foreign intelligence services. But he really referred to others:

The Yakirs, the Balitskys, the Liubchenkos, the Zatonskys, and the other riffraff wanted to let in the German fascists, the landowners and bourgeois, and make the Ukrainian workers and peasants slaves of fascism, and the Ukraine a colony of the Polish-German fascists.

The absurdity of this statement is evident from the background of "Yakirs, Balitskys, Liubchenkos, and Zatonskys." These men had been active in the revolutionary movement long before Khrushchev joined it, and rendered great service to the Bolshevik cause.²⁷

These statements by Khrushchev referring to the Great Purge show that he was not merely following the general party line. Excerpts from some of Khrushchev's speeches, quoted elsewhere in this book, also distinguished him from other leading Communists as a more forceful inspirer and promoter of the bloody Purge, the need for which he later denied in his secret speech of 1956. There was hardly a speech that he delivered in the Ukraine which did not contain the same violent threats to annihilate the "people's enemies" as did his Moscow harangues. The Ukrainian speeches of 1938-40 differ, however, from the Moscow orations, in firmness of tone and selection of targets. As Stalin's vicar over 40 million people, Khrushchev spoke with greater authority and self-confidence. As for the targets, an additional enemy was added: the so-called bourgeois nationalists. The Great Purge reached this category of enemies at the end of the summer of 1937. In August, *Pravda* began the campaign, and all Soviet republics, one by one, suddenly discovered that they were seats of "bourgeois nationalists."

It was to be expected that the Ukraine, "the western outpost of the Soviet Union," bordering on Poland and Rumania and threatened by Hitlerite Germany, would be selected to "expose" a greater number of "spies and traitors" than any other non-Russian republic. This ex-

plains why the "bloody touch" in Khrushchev's speeches delivered in the Ukraine became more accentuated. A resolution of the Moscow party organization, proposed by Khrushchev in May 1937, read:

The Moscow Party Conference assures the Central Committee of the Party and our *vozhd*, teacher, and friend, Comrade Stalin, that there has not been and will not be mercy for the spies, diversionists, and terrorists who raise their hand against the lives of the toilers of the Soviet Union; that we will annihilate the spies and the diversionists also in the future and will not let the enemies of the USSR live; and that for every drop of workers' blood the enemies of the USSR will pay with *poods* of blood of spies and diversionists.

This part of the resolution was considered so well phrased that *Pravda* quoted it in an editorial (May 31, 1937).

IN THE COMMUNIST dictatorship purges of dissenters have been "substantiated," almost without exception, by alleged connections of the defendants with foreign intelligence services. It was with treason to the country that the best pupils of Lenin were charged at the great trials of the 1930's. Much later alleged treason was also chosen as the most appropriate charge to finish off Beria. Treason and espionage were also high on the list of particulars in charges against "bourgeois nationalists."

Hitler's aspirations included the Ukraine, and there can be no doubt that some agents were actually dispatched to that part of the Soviet Union. However, tight passport controls, close supervision of the borders, and travel restrictions made spying in the Soviet Union incomparably more difficult than in free countries. In addition, there were no common borders between the Soviet Union and Germany at that time, and small neighboring Poland, herself threatened by Hitler, certainly had no aggressive designs against her mighty neighbor to the East. Thus there cannot have been many spies in the Soviet Union. Fully aware of the absurdity of the espionage and treason charges against old party members whose elimination was desirable for other purposes, Stalin and his associates used the natural aversion of the people against spies to cover up the real reasons for the Great Purge.

When Khrushchev became party boss in the Ukraine, he charged into the fray as a prosecutor of "traitors" and "spies" to an almost incredible extent. What Yezhov lacked in eloquence was more than compensated for by Khrushchev. No Communist leader, dead or alive, showed greater verbal zeal in turning this Purge into the greatest blood bath ever conducted by any group of men against their own comrades.

²⁶ *Bilshovik Ukrainy*, No. 6, 1938, p. 7. Italics added.

²⁷ *Ibid.* Y. E. Yakir, V. A. Balitsky, and P. P. Liubchenko were all Old Bolsheviks whose very records made the charges against them absolutely grotesque. See p. 151 of Mr. Pistrak's book—*Ed.*

Facts That Have "Come to Light"

You have heard Comrade Shelepin's speech. He told the Congress many things, but needless to say he told by no means all that has now come to light. Thousands of completely innocent people perished, and each person is a whole story. Many party, government and military figures perished. . . .

People have spoken here with pain about many innocent victims among outstanding party and government figures.

Such outstanding military commanders as Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Yegorov, Eideman and others fell victim to the mass repressions. They had been worthy people of our army, especially Tukhachevsky, Yakir and Uborevich, who had been brilliant military leaders. Later Blyukher and other outstanding military commanders fell victim to the repressions.

A rather curious report once cropped up in the foreign press to the effect that Hitler, in preparing the attack on our country, planted through his intelligence service a faked document indicating that Comrades Yakir and Tukhachevsky and others were agents of the German general staff. This "document," allegedly secret, fell into the hands of President Benes of Czechoslovakia, who, apparently guided by good intentions, forwarded it to Stalin. Yakir, Tukhachevsky and other comrades were arrested and then killed.

Many splendid commanders and political officials of the Red Army were executed. Here among the delegates there are comrades—I do not wish to name them so as not to cause them pain—who spent many years in prison. They were being "persuaded"—persuaded by quite definite techniques—that they were either German or British or some other kind of spy. And several of them "confessed." Even in cases when such people were told that the accusation of espionage had been withdrawn, they themselves insisted on their previous testimony, because they believed it was better to stand on their false testimony, in order to put an end as quickly as possible to the torment and to die as quickly as possible. . . .

I knew Comrade Yakir well. I knew Tukhachevsky too, but not as well as Yakir. In 1961, during a conference in Alma-Ata, his son, who works in Kazakhstan, came to see me. He asked me about his father. What could I tell him? When we investigated these cases in the Presidium of the Central Committee and received a report that neither Tukhachevsky nor Yakir nor Uborevich had been guilty of any crime against the party and the state, we asked Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov:

"Are you for rehabilitating them?"

"Yes, we are for it," they answered.

"But it was you who executed these people," we told

them indignantly. "When were you acting according to your conscience, then or now?"

But they did not answer this question. And they will not answer it. You have heard the notations they wrote on letters received by Stalin. What can they say?

In his speech to the Congress, Comrade Shelepin has told you how these finest representatives of the Communist Party in the Red Army were killed. He also read Comrade Yakir's letter to Stalin and the recommendations on this letter. It should be said that at one time Yakir was highly esteemed by Stalin.

It may be added that when Yakir was shot he exclaimed: "Long live the party, long live Stalin!"

He had so much faith in the party, so much faith in Stalin that he never permitted himself the thought that a deliberate injustice was being committed. He believed that certain enemies had found their way into the NKVD agencies.

When Stalin was told how Yakir had behaved before his death, he cursed Yakir.

Let us recall Sergo Ordzhonikidze. I attended Ordzhonikidze's funeral. I believed what was said at the time, that he had died suddenly, because we knew he had a weak heart. Much later, after the war, I learned quite by accident that he had committed suicide. Sergo's brother had been arrested and shot. Comrade Ordzhonikidze saw that he could no longer work with Stalin, although previously he had been one of his closest friends. Ordzhonikidze held a high party post. Lenin had known and valued him, but circumstances had become such that Ordzhonikidze could no longer work normally, and in order to avoid clashing with Stalin and sharing the responsibility for his abuse of power, he decided to take his life.

The fate of Alyosha Svanidze, the brother of Stalin's first wife, who was less known to the broad circles of our party, was also tragic. He had been an old Bolshevik, but Beria made it appear, through all kinds of machinations, that Svanidze had been planted near Stalin by the German intelligence service, although he was a very close friend of Stalin's. And Svanidze was shot. Before the execution, Svanidze was told that Stalin had said that if he asked for forgiveness he would be pardoned. When Stalin's words were repeated to Svanidze, he asked: "What am I supposed to ask forgiveness for? I have committed no crime." He was shot. After Svanidze's death, Stalin said: "See how proud he is: he died without asking forgiveness." It never occurred to him that Svanidze had been above all an honest man.

Thus many completely innocent people perished.

That is what the cult of the individual means. That is why we cannot show the slightest tolerance toward abuses of power. . . .

*—From the concluding remarks of N. S. Khrushchev
at the 22nd Party Congress, Pravda, October 29, 1961.*

The Party's New Rules

By Leonard Schapiro

THE DECISION to revise the rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dates back to January 10, 1961. On that date the Plenum of the Central Committee decided to convoke the 22nd Party Congress on October 17, 1961, and laid down the agenda for the session. Among the items scheduled for submission to the congress were the draft of a new party program, on which First Secretary Khrushchev was to report, and proposed "Changes in the Rules of the CPSU," to be presented by Frol Kozlov. It may be presumed that the drafts of both the party program and the new rules were the work of a commission or of two commissions, but the composition of the drafting body or bodies has not been announced. The next stage in the proceedings was the approval of the draft rules and draft program by the Plenum of the Central Committee on June 19, 1961.

Of course, the adoption of a new program is in many ways a much more important event in the history of the party than the adoption of new rules. Since the first party rules were adopted in 1898, they have gone through fairly frequent changes. New rules were adopted at the Second Congress of the party in 1903, again in 1906 at the Fourth Congress when the party was nominally reunited by a reconciliation between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, and once again in 1907 when the union was cracking at all joints. The rules were amended in 1912, and then a whole new set was once again adopted at the Sixth Congress in August 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution. New rules were adopted still again in 1919, 1922, 1925, 1934, 1939, and 1952, and the 1952 rules were slightly amended in 1956. But the party leadership has never been narrowly bound by the rules, however frequently revised,

and has always shown flexibility in ignoring them when necessary, or in circumventing them by means of instructions formally issued in the name of the Central Committee but actually drawn up by the Secretariat.

The New Rules and Party Policy

The fact that a fresh overhaul of the rules was decided on by the Central Committee at the same time that it decided on the framing of a new party program, with both drafts to be formally acted upon at the 22nd Congress, suggests that the modification of the rules represents part of a general policy of permitting greater relaxation in the party, of making some attempt to restrain its traditionally arbitrary nature. The most sensational aspect of this policy at the congress was the renewed denunciation of Stalin and of the anti-party group. The question has been raised whether this policy, to which Khrushchev is committed, has aroused opposition. The discussion of the new rules at the congress session does not throw much light on the answer to this question. However, the general debate and especially the new composition of the top party organs determined by the congress elections allow certain conclusions to be drawn.

The first is that there is no real evidence to suggest that Khrushchev is faced with any serious opposition to his policy at the top levels of the party. The new Presidium consists entirely of his close supporters, and the removal from it of such important figures as Ignatov and Aristov is probably explained by their refusal to accept with sufficient resignation their ousting from the Secretariat last year. The fact that Khrushchev has further demoted two such stalwart former supporters is in itself an indication of the extent to which he controls the party. Nor does the new make-up of the Central Committee, much less that of the Secretariat, offer any evidence of present opposition to Khrushchev at the only level of the party where it matters.

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But if Khrushchev is fully in control at the top, as all indications suggest, this does not mean that in the party apparatus as a whole, through which the winds of change have been blowing in recent years, there is unanimous support for his policy of relaxation. On the contrary, it is not only likely but indeed already evident that there are "conservative" elements in the apparatus who look upon de-Stalinization and the acknowledgment of past illegalities as a serious threat to their own positions, and as a dangerous and unwise policy. It was very probably on the support of these "conservatives" that the "anti-party group" hoped to lean. The renewed renunciation of the group, conversely, is probably explained in part by this factor.

Although the draft of the new rules was put through the usual preliminary stage of organized mass discussion, this was merely routine and much less revealing of opinion in the ranks of the party than of the efficiency of the agitprop network. At the congress itself, the discussion that followed Kozlov's speech introducing the new rules was a purely formal affair. There were a number of speeches of a set pattern, all approving the proposed draft, and the whole debate illustrated anew the ability of the party leaders to control the congress completely, whatever the currents of opinion at the lower levels. The only real discussion of the rules has been in the great mass of letters published in the party journals, mostly sent in by rank-and-file members. This type of debate is not entirely new in the USSR, but it can probably be said that the discussion of the new rules was rather more open and frank than any similar discussion in the party press had been for a long time.

AS A FAIR SAMPLE, one may take a single issue of *Partiinaiia zhizn*.¹ First we find several letters strongly rejecting a proposal made by the writer of an earlier-published letter (*Partiinaiia zhizn*, No. 17) that open voting should replace secret voting in elections of party officials and delegates. Of course, says one contributor, it can happen in elections by secret ballot that some Communists behave in an unprincipled manner. For example, a candidature is sometimes supported by all in open discussion, and then in the secret vote it is unanimously rejected. But, continues the correspondent, this is no reason for abolishing secret voting, but rather a reason for developing a sense of principle among party members and teaching them to speak the truth openly. Another letter writer denies that secret voting enables a party member to take a pencil in his hand and hide behind it. On the contrary, he argues, it is by taking

pencil in hand and voting that a party member openly declares his will, and any candidate who has a considerable number of votes cast against him will be led to re-examine his own conduct and draw the right conclusions from the voting results. A third correspondent touches on an obviously sore spot. He sees the value of secret voting in the fact that it prevents unprincipled party secretaries from getting rid of those who criticize them. Of course, he says with transparent sarcasm, nobody can be dismissed for criticism; this would be coarse, crude, even dangerous, and it might have unpleasant results for the particular party secretary or official. "But," he adds, "to remove a critic when an opportunity presents itself to do so at his own request, this often comes off."

Other letters published in the same issue of *Partiinaiia zhizn* put forward some interesting proposals which obviously met with no sympathy from the party leadership. One was a proposal to insert in the new rules the declaration that "membership in the party does not give a Communist any advantages or privileges over non-party members, but only imposes on him additional duties towards the toilers." Another, likewise never accepted, was a suggestion that expulsion of a party member should require an affirmative vote of not less than three-fourths of all the registered members of his particular party organization, and not, as provided in the draft rules, merely a two-thirds majority of those actually present.

This sort of discussion in the party press did give some indication of rank-and-file reactions—and possibly was useful as a means of permitting party members to let off steam. However, it is doubtful that it had very much effect on the final form of the new rules. What happened at the congress, in fact, was that Kozlov merely summarized the amendment proposals which had been made—no doubt omitting anything that he considered it wise to omit—and then, with complete confidence that nobody would gainsay him, proceeded to select those amendments which the congress might adopt and those which he thought should be rejected. Perhaps this is a measure of the degree of democracy in the party today. Even so, it represents a considerable advance over many periods in the past.

In general, the freer character of the preliminary public discussion, as well as the changes embodied in the new rules, give the impression of being in line with the general trend of party policy in the past few years, a trend with which Khrushchev has particularly identified himself. This may be described by the Russian expression "going downhill with the brakes on." It is plain that there is a growing demand in the lower and

¹ No. 20, October 1961, pages 46-53.

younger ranks of the party for greater decency and greater democracy, for less manipulation, less dishonesty, and less dictatorship. Khrushchev and his supporters have apparently decided that the proper way to deal with this tendency is not to suppress it, but rather to associate themselves with it, to encourage it to a limited degree at the lower levels, and at the same time to keep it well under control so as to prevent any weakening of the top leadership's decisive voice. In the author's view, it is this policy of controlled relaxation which is reflected in the new party rules.

Amendments to Initial Draft

If one compares the original draft of the new rules as published in July 1961 with the final version approved by the 22nd Congress, one finds that there have been a total of 30 amendments. Of these, 26 are amendments of a purely grammatical nature—and it must be observed parenthetically that the grammar of the gentlemen who prepared the draft left quite a lot to be desired—and four can be described as changes of substance, none of them very fundamental. Perhaps the most significant of the latter is an amendment to the first section, which deals with the duties and rights of party members, adding "religious superstitions" to the originally enumerated manifestations of bourgeois ideology and private property psychology against which party members have the duty to conduct a decisive struggle.

In his speech presenting the new rules to the congress,² Kozlov gave an analysis of the proposals which had been made for amending the draft, dividing them into three categories. The first embraced proposals which supplemented or developed matters already dealt with in the draft (such as the point about religion,) four of which were added to the draft. The second category comprised proposed changes which, according to Kozlov, were superfluous and ought not to be adopted. These related mainly to the duties of party members and the method of admitting candidates to the party, and were considered already fully covered in the existing draft. To the third category Kozlov relegated proposals which, as he said, do not take into account the "contemporary conditions" of the party's activity and should therefore be rejected. Two that he mentioned are of interest. One was that the secretaries of party organizations up to the level of the Central Committees of union republics should be elected, not by the Plenum or Bureau of the relevant committee or organization, but by the full con-

gress, conference, or party meeting. (Presumably the supporters of this proposal thought that a conference or congress might be harder to pack.) Also in this category was the proposal, mentioned earlier, that voting should be made open instead of secret, on the ground that open voting better educates members of the party in responsible behavior. This was rejected by Kozlov on the ground that it would be a step backwards from party democracy.

As already shown, the letters that appeared in the party press suggested that there was considerable rank-and-file agitation for greater democracy in the party, for greater freedom of expression, and for a greater measure of real choice in the election of party committees and officials. There also were a number of proposals which, if adopted, would have had the opposite result, and which represented the opinion of those who view "liberalization" with alarm; but the general impression left by the debate on the rules is that at the lower party levels there is a strong desire for emancipation from the manipulation by higher officials to which party members have always been subject. This movement is not new. It has been evident in the party press for several years and has, in particular, taken the form of successful insistence by a primary party organization, against pressure from a higher party instance, on electing a secretary or a bureau of its own choice rather than accepting the nominees thrust upon it. In other instances it has taken the form of successful complaints against local party officials who abused their positions in attempting to create for themselves immunity from criticism.

So far as the party leaders are concerned, they have been aware of the trend in favor of relaxation and have endeavored to keep it under strict control. This they have largely achieved by channeling the debate into the party press and formal mass meetings: letters to the party newspapers could, if necessary, be ignored, and the mass meetings could be guaranteed to produce wholehearted approval of the new rules. But at the same time it looks very much as if the party leaders have been anxious to conciliate the demand for greater democracy at the lower levels, and at any rate not to go back on the trends which have been permitted to express themselves in recent years. The best example of this is the refusal to replace secret by open voting, but it is not the only one. Evidently, in the matter of the rules as in matters of general policy, the party leadership no longer believes it wise or possible to ignore pressures from below, but seeks to take the direction of these pressures into its own hands and, by yielding to some of them, to prevent them from getting out of control.

² *Pravda*, October 29, 1961.

Comparison of the new party rules with those adopted in 1952 (and slightly amended in 1956) reveals a large number of changes, which can be divided into three categories. Into the first category fall changes which may be described as declaratory, that is, which merely assert certain propositions without providing any kind of institutional framework for their implementation. The second category consists of changes concerned with the rights of the individual party member and his protection against the exercise of excessive tyranny over him by the party organization. The third comprises real institutional changes.

"Declaratory" Changes

The declaratory changes are found mainly in the preamble to the rules and in the articles defining the duties of party members. First comes the revised description of the party as the "vanguard of the Soviet people," corresponding to the formulation adopted in the new Party Program. The preamble also proclaims ideological and organizational unity and the prohibition of factions and groups as part of the fundamental law of the party. There is nothing new about this requirement, except that it has been promoted, as it were, to the status of a general preamble.

A number of new declaratory ideas are to be found in the list of duties of party members set forth in Section I of the new rules, dealing with membership in the party. Article 2 imposes four new duties that did not appear in the old rules, namely: sub-paragraph (a), the duty to struggle for the achievement of the material and technical basis of communism, to be an example to others in productivity, and actively to promote everything that is new and progressive in technical development; sub-paragraph (c), the duty to take an active part in the political life of the country, in government work, and in economic and agricultural construction; sub-paragraph (e), the duty to advance the ideas of socialist internationalism and Soviet patriotism, to struggle against relics of nationalism and chauvinism, and to promote friendship among the peoples of the Soviet Union, between the Soviet peoples and the peoples of the socialist camp, and among the workers of the world; and sub-paragraph (j), the duty actively to strengthen the military might of the USSR and, at the same time, to struggle for peace and friendship among peoples.

CERTAIN CHANGES in the formulation of the rights of party members also fall under the declaratory heading. The right of free discussion, in particular, has been

more comprehensively defined. Whereas Article 4(a) of the old rules gave party members the right "to take part in free and businesslike discussion, at party meetings or in the party press, on questions of party politics," Article 3(b) of the new rules omits the words "and businesslike." Since, in practice, the latter qualification had been used in the past for the purpose of stifling criticism on the ground that it was "demagogic," the omission may be of importance in indicating a new trend. Otherwise, the new formulation is rather more extensive than the old. It affirms the party member's right:

Freely to discuss at party meetings, conferences and congresses, at meetings of party committees, and in the party press, questions of the policy and practical activity of the party; to introduce proposals, openly to express and defend his opinion until the organization has reached a decision.

Similarly the right of the party member to criticize "any party worker," as set out in Article 4(b) of the old rules, has been widened by the addition, in Article 3(c) of the new rules, of the words italicized here:

To criticize at party meetings, conferences, congresses, and committee plena any Communist *independently of the position which he occupies. Persons who are guilty of stifling criticism or of persecuting Communists for expressing criticism must be strictly made to answer for such action before the party, even to the extent of being expelled from the ranks of the CPSU.*

Another declaratory change worthy of note is the general injunction newly inserted in Section V, Article 42, which deals with the fundamental duties of republican, regional, city, and district party organizations—that is to say, all party organizations lower than the central organizations. The injunction states: "Party organizations do not replace Soviet trade union, cooperative, and other public organizations of the toilers, and do not tolerate confusion of the functions of party and other organs, or unnecessary parallelism in work." This did not appear in the old rules, but it has been a traditional injunction issued by repeated congresses throughout the history of the party. It deals with what is probably the fundamental problem of the Soviet system of government, namely the difficulty of determining the line of demarcation between party and other organs in a system which basically maintains parallel administrative structures of different kinds, charged with very similar duties. This, however, is not a problem which can be solved by pious injunctions. It is of interest that the declaration inserted in the new rules is limited to party organizations from the republic level down, which rather leaves the impression, whether intended or not,

that at the highest level, where the party Presidium and the Central Committee are interwoven with the government organs, the prohibition is not intended to apply.

THERE IS ALSO much that is new in the formulation of the duties of primary party organizations, dealt with in Article 58 of the new rules. The duties are now set out at much greater length than in Article 57 of the old rules, and with the greater length also goes greater pathos. In particular, great stress is laid on the new moral code laid down for Communists in the party program: Article 58 repeats much of this part of the program as the moral code to which the primary party organizations should endeavor to ensure obedience on the part of every Communist. The principles of morality borrowed from the program may be summarized as follows: love for the socialist fatherland and for the socialist countries; conscientious work for the public weal; concern for increasing the public wealth; high consciousness of public duty; humane relations with others, honesty, truthfulness, moral purity, and impeccable family life; rejection of injustice, dishonesty, careerism, and material greed (the addition of "material greed" is one of the few substantive amendments to the draft adopted at the Congress); friendship for all peoples of the USSR and intolerance of national and racial enmity; intolerance towards the enemies of communism, peace and the freedom of peoples; brotherly solidarity with all toilers and all peoples. (One may perhaps legitimately inquire whether the attitude of Soviet Communists towards Albania is henceforth to be governed by love for socialist countries or by intolerance towards the enemies of communism, peace, and freedom.

Two further alterations in the declaratory category may be noted. One relates to the matter of broad-scale discussion in the party. The old rules (Article 28) included the statement that such wide discussion must be so organized "that it could not lead to attempts by an insignificant minority to impose its will on the majority of the party." This formulation naturally lent itself to a certain amount of ridicule by non-Soviet critics (including the author), since it did not say much for the political maturity of the party if it had to restrain an "insignificant" minority from leading the majority astray. This absurdity has now been dropped in the new Article 27, which retains only the provision of the old rules that discussions on a large scale must not be allowed to encourage attempts to form groups or split the party.

The last declaratory change worth noting seems to reflect something of the conflict between the party lead-

ership and Marshal Zhukov regarding the function of the party organization in the army. Article 64 in Section VIII of the new rules, which deals with military organizations of the party, contains an additional long sentence stressing the duty of these organizations to promote loyalty to the party among members of the armed forces and to educate them in the spirit and ideas of Marxism-Leninism (listed first), as well as in other more military duties, in patriotism, discipline, and military efficiency. The absence of any such provision in the earlier rules presumably reflected Marshal Zhukov's view that party organizations should not be allowed to interfere excessively in military matters.

Changes in Disciplinary Rules

We now come to the second category of changes, affecting the relationship of the individual party member to the authorities who control the party and him. Most important among these are the changes that relate to the discipline exercised by the party over its members. Broadly speaking, the changes express two trends. One is a trend towards relaxation which seems to reflect the rapidly increasing size of the party—now ten million strong—and the realization that, if it is to be retained at that strength, a certain moderation of disciplinary stringency is necessary. The other trend is toward increased protection for the party member and reflects the desire in the party—to which the leaders have thought it prudent to yield—for some sort of safeguards against the arbitrary expulsions which characterized the party during the purge period.

One important change is found in Article 8 of the new rules, which deals with penalties for non-payment of dues. Under the old rules (Article 9), non-payment of dues without good reason led to automatic expulsion from the party. (In one sense, this provided a kind of indirect method of resigning from the party, for which no direct provision has ever existed in any rules promulgated by the party throughout its history.) Under the new rules, expulsion is no longer automatic: if a member defaults his dues for three months, his case is to be discussed and he is regarded as having renounced his membership only if it appears from the discussion that he has in fact lost touch with the party.

The most important disciplinary change relates to the expulsion of a party member. A decision to expel can now be taken only by a vote at a party meeting, with at least two-thirds of the members present voting in favor of the expulsion. As letters published in the party press show, some members still seem to feel uneasy about this, since two-thirds of those present at a suitably

packed meeting can actually amount to a very small proportion of the total membership. The decision to expel is, as before, initiated by the primary party organization and requires confirmation by the higher party organizations up to the union-republic level. The right of the expelled member to appeal all the way up to the Central Committee is still preserved, the only change being the new provision in Article 13 requiring consideration of an appeal within one month, instead of 20 days as under Article 15 of the old rules.

There are also some interesting changes relating to the expulsion of members of the Central Committee. Under Article 26, a member or candidate member of the Central Committee can be expelled by a vote of two-thirds of all *members* of the Central Committee, and the voting is by secret ballot. The introduction of this rule into the formal constitution of the party is new. The rule itself dates from the 10th Party Congress in 1921, but originally expulsion had to be decided by a vote of all candidates and members of the party Control Commission as well as of the Central Committee. This was the practice followed as recently as June 1957 when all candidates and members of both the Central Committee and the Revision Commission were called to vote on the expulsion of alleged members of the "anti-party" group. The new formulation narrows the number of persons entitled to vote in such cases.

AN ENTIRELY NEW provision relating to expulsion is contained in Article 11 of the revised rules. This stipulates the right of primary party organizations to discuss and recommend action to call to account any member of a higher party organization up to and including candidates and members of the central committee of a republic, for any misdeed. If a primary party organization decides to recommend that a member of one of these higher organizations be expelled from the party, its recommendation has to be communicated to the party committee of which the accused person is a member, and the committee plenum must then take the decision, expulsion requiring a two-thirds majority of all committee members—not, be it noted, only of the members present at the meeting.

The old rules contained no provision at all empowering the primary party organizations to bring up the question of expelling members of higher organizations; in fact, such action was expressly prohibited under Article 11. It should also be noted that, so far as recommending expulsion is concerned, the right conferred on the primary party organizations by the new rules does not apply to members and candidates of the All-Union Central Committee or members of the Central Revision

Commission, all of whom can be expelled from the party only by the party congress or, in intervals between congresses, by a two-thirds majority vote of the Central Committee plenum. It may be observed, however, that the rights of party members, as newly defined in Article 2, include the right to criticize any member of the party irrespective of position and therefore theoretically include the right to criticize members of the Central Committee. Whether in practice a primary party organization would have the courage to do so without having been given the green light from higher up is another matter.

There is one other change in the disciplinary rules that appears to be verbal rather than substantive. This is the new provision relating to party members who fall afoul of the criminal law of the country. Although the wording of the new rules (Article 12) differs from that of the old (Article 13), neither formulation can be said to show any strong sense of the nature of legality. The old rule provided that when a member of the party "has committed offenses punishable by the ordinary courts, he is expelled from the party and the fact of his offense is communicated to the administrative and legal authorities." The new article reads: "If a member of the party has committed offenses punishable under the ordinary criminal law of the country, he is expelled from the party and is brought to responsibility in accordance with the law." Obviously, both formulations are grossly unfair to a party member who is merely supposed to have committed a criminal offense, because expelling him from the party before his offense has been established by a court, in effect, prejudices his guilt and renders the possibility of a fair trial very remote.

Institutional Changes

The most important category of changes relates to the institutions of the party. The first change under this heading is found in Article 24 of the new rules, which contains the following general provision regarding the election of party organs:

... elections to party organs are conducted by closed (secret) voting. All members of the party participating in elections have the unlimited right to reject candidates and to criticize them. Voting must be conducted separately for every candidate. Those candidates are considered elected who have received the affirmative votes of more than half the participants in a meeting, conference or congress.

The difference between this new formulation and the old lies in the stipulation that more than half the participating votes are required to elect a candidate. The old rules (Article 26) adhered to the traditional prac-

tice of the party, namely that candidates were considered elected in the order of the number of votes individually polled by them.

In presenting the new rules to the 22nd Congress, Kozlov pointed out the reason for this change. Under the old system,⁸ candidates who received the most votes in relation to the other candidates as well as more than half the votes of those present at the meeting or conference were elected. According to Kozlov, this practice often had the result that valuable party workers who received an absolute majority of votes nevertheless were not elected because they polled as few as three to five votes less than the successful candidates. This, he said, was to permit an insignificant minority to impose its will on the majority. What Kozlov apparently had in mind was the case in which there might be, say, five vacancies to be filled from a slate of more than five candidates, a situation which we know from the party press occurs sometimes, but not very frequently. In such a case, a candidate could fail to be elected by a margin of a few votes even though an absolute majority had voted for him.

Kozlov went on the point out that under the new system the total number of candidates elected would have to be flexible, and accordingly the new rules no longer lay down numerical limits for the membership of the various party organs throughout the hierarchy. On the face of it, the revision of the election system looks like a move in the direction of greater democracy, but it could also be used as a means of forcing an unpopular candidate in from above. Certainly, the long-standing demand in the lower party organizations for the right to choose from among a larger number of candidates than there are vacancies shows that the question is a live one. However, it may be that what is contained in the new rules will, in practice, prove less important than the qualification appended to Kozlov's remarks on the electoral changes. He indicated to the congress that "as hitherto" all details relating to the election of party organs will be determined by instructions from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

THE MOST DRASTIC change relating to elections is the principle laid down in the new rules (Article 25) requiring systematic renewal of the composition of party organs. The rules provide for a rotating system of election to these bodies, with a portion of the membership to be renewed at each election. In the case of the Central Committee and its Presidium, not less than a quarter

of the membership is to be newly elected at each party congress, and members of the Presidium will as a rule hold office for a term spanning no more than three consecutive congresses. For party organs at the next lower level on down through *oblast* party committees, the rules require the renewal at each election of one-third of the membership, and for organs below the *oblast* level, of half the membership. Secretaries of primary party organizations can theoretically be elected to hold office only through two plenary meetings of the organization, which would seem—since these organizations are required to meet once a month—to limit their tenure to two months.

On the face of it, the provisions for periodic renovation of the membership of party organs would seem to introduce a revolutionary change which, if carried out in practice, will no doubt be very popular in the party—or, at any rate, in some sections of the party—because it will accelerate the turnover of party officials and enable younger men to rise more rapidly. However, the practical effect of these provisions should not be exaggerated. For one thing, there is an important qualification to them: namely, that whenever a party worker's exceptional political or organizational abilities make a lengthier tenure of office desirable, he can be elected for an unspecified "longer period," provided that this decision is voted by not less than a two-thirds majority of those present. This exception can easily be abused so long as the party leadership—which means, in prac-

Some Pertinent Questions

For Mr. Khrushchev personally the decision [to bare the facts about Stalinist crimes] was certainly a courageous one, though no member of his audience asked "What were you doing at the time?" What guarantees can he offer that similar "distortions of the Leninist line" will not reappear? Mr. Khrushchev said in a later speech that a leader who forgot that he held his authority by the will of the party and the people "pays dearly for such mistakes." But it was not Stalin who paid; true, in death he is dishonored, and a monument is to be erected to the memory of his victims. The new program and rules, Stalin's successor told his audience, "preclude the possibility of a revival of the personality cult." What was there, one may legitimately ask, in the program and rules of which Lenin approved which did make it possible?

—From "Communists in Congress," by Jane Degras,
The World Today (London), No. 12,
December 1961, p. 524.

⁸ Contained in CC instructions, not in the rules.

tice, the Central Committee Secretariat—retains the control it exercises at present. Moreover, it should be noted that turnover has always been high at the lower levels, though not normally as high as one-third in the intermediate party organs.⁴ Even in the case of the Central Committee, the normal turnover has been rather more than one-fourth of the membership: of the members elected in 1956, only around 55 percent still remain in the present Central Committee, having been either continuously reelected or promoted from candidate to full membership. On the other hand, it may be observed that the Presidium chosen at the 22nd Congress has only one new member out of eleven, notwithstanding the new rules' provision for regular renewal of one-fourth of the membership.⁵

Practical enforcement of the rotation principle at the lower levels of the party would, however, be consistent with another policy which is explicitly confirmed in the new rules, namely, a policy of relying more on unpaid party officials and committeemen. Article 42(e) specifically makes observance of this rule in the future a regular duty of all party organizations below the republic level. (Article 52 contains a similar provision with respect to city and district committees.) Like the rotation requirement, this may be regarded as a move towards greater democracy in the party, where antagonism on the part of the rank-and-file members (to say nothing of the general public) towards the paid party professionals has been an unhealthy feature for many years past. Although the trend towards "deprofessionalization" is not entirely new, the new rules seem to foreshadow a shift on a much larger scale than hitherto. Many speeches at the 22nd Congress, including Kozlov's, made it clear that a massive attempt is being made to draw into a more positive role in the party, or in party-related activities, the literally hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of party members who have hitherto regarded their responsibilities as limited to compulsory attendance at meetings and automatic adoption of proposals handed down from above.

THE NEW RULES introduce some other noteworthy changes relating specifically to the Central Committee. One that could be of real importance, if it is actually carried out, concerns the Central Committee's power to control appointments of regional and republic party secretaries. While the new rules still preserve the previ-

ous requirement that party secretaries below the regional or *oblast* level must be confirmed, after their election, by the next higher party organs, they omit the provision in the old rules (Article 42) which also made appointments of regional and republic party secretaries subject to confirmation by the CPSU Central Committee. Since the regional secretaries form the most important stratum of the party apparatus below the Central Committee Secretariat in Moscow, this change on its face looks quite revolutionary. Whether it will prove so in fact, however, remains to be seen. It may be pointed out in this connection that Article 35 of the new rules contains a sentence (not found in the old rules) to the effect that one of the Central Committee's functions in between party congresses is to effect the selection and distribution of leading cadres. In practice, this authority has always been exercised by the Central Committee Secretariat (which maintains a large department specially for this purpose), and it has been a mainstay of the leadership's power as long as the party has existed. It would be very strange indeed, in present Soviet conditions, if the Secretariat were not to continue, as before, to wield this authority with respect to the designation of regional party secretaries, even though it might act behind the disguise of formal election procedures.

Another change under the new rules is the relinquishment by the Central Committee of its former authority (under Article 37 of the old rules) to set up anywhere in the country, for special purposes, political departments directly responsible to itself. This power enabled the Central Committee to by-pass entirely the regular network of subordinate party organs and was used in the past by the Committee, or rather by the party leaders at the top, to impose particularly severe measures of dictatorial control wherever these were considered necessary—on the collective farms and railways, for example. Actually, the abolition of the Central Committee's authority in this regard seems merely to give formal recognition to the fact that the practice has fallen into disuse in recent years.

Finally, the new rules effect some changes in the functions of primary party organizations. These organizations retain their general functions as agencies of party control except with respect to government organs (including not only ministries but also the *sovnarkhozy*—councils of national economy), where their power has long been limited to reporting. In Article 59, however, there is a change the significance of which is not immediately apparent. According to this provision, primary party organizations in the ministries and other government organs no longer have the power to report (as they had under article 58 of the old rules) both to the party

⁴ On this, see the author's *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Random House, New York, 1960, p. 568.

⁵ According to Kozlov (*loc. cit.*), the pre-congress elections resulted in a turnover of 40-45 percent in the memberships of party organs at the republic and lower levels.

Central Committee and to the responsible officers of the ministry concerned, but are now authorized to report only "to the appropriate party organs."

TO SUM UP, the new rules reflect two trends which have been apparent for some time. First is the attempt to draw into the party a large number of members, to encourage more active participation by them in the work of the party, and also to attract into this work an ever-increasing proportion of the population at large. This must be seen as an integral part of Khrushchev's general policy of trying to instill new life and enthusiasm into a party which had largely atrophied into a caste of petty dictators. Secondly, it reflects the desire of the party leadership to meet, at any rate to some extent, the

widespread pressure at the lower levels for greater democracy in the party, for less dictatorship and less manipulation. This is clearly reflected in the institutional changes embodied in the new statutes of the party.

At the same time, a constitution can never be more than what its executors choose to make it. While the new rules grant certain concessions, they do not indicate that the party leadership has given up any substantial part of its powers. Thus, they suggest determination to keep the pressures for greater democracy under firm control and to move towards satisfying them with considerable caution, and then only at the lowest levels. At least, however, the new formulations seem to afford greater leeway for those in the party who actively aspire to make it a real medium of political participation instead of a façade for centralized despotism.

Forward to Communism?

By Rush V. Greenslade

IN THE GLARE of factional fireworks that erupted at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October, the main purpose of the convocation—endorsement of the party's 20-year program for the building of communism—nearly disappeared. It was certainly overshadowed in Western news reports by the attacks launched against Stalin, the anti-party group, and Albania (read "China"). Yet the program may be of more fundamental significance than the disputes. Underneath a facade of propaganda and ideology it is a major statement of intentions—of marching orders for the Communist parties of the world and especially that of the Soviet Union. It is also a comprehensive if not entirely clear statement of what the party expects Soviet society, its organization, and its living conditions to be like 20 years hence, at which time the Soviet Union will supposedly be on the threshold of communism.¹

The program, which is only the third of its kind in Soviet history, can thus be characterized as a major event in the life of the party. The last pronouncement of this scope was adopted at the Eighth Congress in 1919. Considering that the Soviet regime in the intervening 42 years has been devoting its energies (and those of its people) with unprecedented single-mindedness to building for the future, one may feel that it is high time the party revealed what that future will be, and when and by what path it will be reached.

The economic portion of the program is in itself historically unique, since it is the first economic blueprint projected for a period as long as 20 years (1960-1980). It sets forth the party's general plans for industry, agriculture, services, investment and standards of living, presenting them as the economic goals which

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¹ The comments in this article are based on Nikita Khrushchev's speech to the CPSU Congress on October 18, 1961 (*Pravda*, October 19), and on the final text of the CPSU program (*ibid*, November 2).

must be achieved by Soviet society for the transition to communism.

Detailed planning so far into the future is, of course, not possible. As other observers have already pointed out, the present program can hardly be called a "plan" in the sense in which the prior one-year, five-year and most recently seven-year plans have been understood.² The latter, which have set the direction of the Soviet economy since 1928, had as their crucial feature the simultaneous setting of output goals and investment plans, and the attempt to achieve a consistency between the two. The output goals had to be supported by a specific list of investment projects and, at the same time, were expected to provide the materials and equipment to complete the projects.

By contrast, the present program simply sets forth major commodity goals and offers a number of aggregative projections for the 20-year period. There is no indication that a consistent and detailed blueprint for investment has been worked out—indeed, it could not be, given the uncertain nature of future technology and mineral resources. The program is, moreover, inconsistent in some parts and implausible in others. While one can discuss the feasibility of its various features in a general way, the chief interest of the program is the clues it offers to the party's grand design for the future.

In this connection, the program not only outlines plans for overall economic growth but to some extent indicates the share of output that will go to consumers. The plans for economic growth, if fulfilled, are supposed to provide the Soviet Union with the strongest industrial economy in the world. The plans for consumption make it clear that the bulk of these industrial resources will be devoted to the purposes of the state rather than to the consumer. Although consumers have been told that they will have the highest standard of living in the world, there is nothing in the program to support this promise, and much to show that a steadily rising share of economic output will be reserved for the objectives of the state.

Some Western observers have suggested the possibility that a radical rise of consumer demands may cause future trouble for Soviet planners. The program may be aimed in part at curbing such demands in advance. Any expectations Soviet citizens might entertain for a living standard that would include, for example, widespread private housing, automobiles, household appliances, and the like, are emphatically discouraged. On the contrary Soviet consumers are explicitly told that future con-

sumption will be tied in large measure to a pattern of communal living.

Against this background, let us turn to an analysis of specific features of the program.

Production Goals

Insofar as industrial development is concerned, the output goals that are set forth in the program can be characterized as "more of the same"—that is, as a continuation of trends that have been evident over the past five years and that are embodied in the Seven-Year Plan. The announced goal of not less than a six-fold increase in industrial production is equal to an average annual increase of nearly 10 percent. Industrial "group A" (producers' goods) is scheduled to expand by over 10 percent annually, and "group B" (consumers' goods) by 8.5 percent annually. These rates—as well as the overall total and the ratio between the two groups—are in line with the actual performance of industry over the last five years, as measured by Soviet gross production indices.³ Thus the priority of heavy industry which has guided Soviet planning since 1928 is reaffirmed.

Another major output target is an increase to 3.5 times the 1960 level of agricultural production by 1980. Given the priorities of the past and of the program itself, the goal for industry appears possible of fulfillment, but the agricultural goal seems quite infeasible. The latter—representing an average increase of 6.5 percent annually—is perhaps not impossible in a technical sense. However, it would require a large increase in the share of investment going to agriculture, and there is no indication in the program that such an increase is planned or that organizational changes of a kind that would make the investment fruitful are even remotely contemplated. Certainly unrealistic is the scheduling of the largest share of expansion in the first decade of the plan: the goal by 1970, according to the program, is an increase to 2.5 times 1960 production, or 9.5 percent annually. Specific targets for grain, meat, milk, cotton and other major agricultural commodities—cited by Khrushchev in his first speech to the Congress—all reflect the same steep trend from 1960 to 1970, with a much smaller rate of growth from 1970 to 1980.

The program is rather noteworthy for its lack of innovation in the field of agricultural organization, in which Khrushchev has been so experimental in the past.

² See, for example, Naum Jasny, "Plan and Superplan," *Survey, a Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* (London), October 1961.

³ Independent indices of Soviet industrial production calculated by Western economists estimate somewhat lower rates of growth than those shown in the Soviet indices for recent years. Presumably this will continue to be true.

Both the private plot and the *kolkhoz* were defended by Khrushchev. However, the programs for extensive irrigation, for reclamation of lands in the western part of the USSR, and for expansion of fertilizer production strongly suggest that the Soviet Premier is determined to continue pressing large-scale schemes in an effort to improve the food supply.

Labor and Production

In the sense that industrial sectors of the economy (in order of assigned priorities) can always be favored, if need be, at the expense of other goals, the production targets for industry can be called realistic—that is, barring any massive shift to armaments output. The goal for industrial labor productivity, however, is probably overoptimistic: the plan calls for an increase by 4 to 4.2 times over 1960 productivity, or more than 7 percent annually, while the rate of increase for the past few years has been only 6 to 6.5 percent (as measured by the Soviet index).

As in the past, employment in industry in excess of planned levels could make up for some underfulfillment in terms of productivity. The size of the industrial labor force (as implied by output and productivity goals) is expected to rise from the 1960 level of 23 million workers to 30 million by 1970 and 36 million by 1980. Assuming the productivity rate will fall short, it can be expected that industrial manpower needs will exceed these levels by at least a few million. Such an increment would have to be supplied either through an increase of women in the labor force (on which more later) or from other economic sectors, including agriculture.

Outside of industry, the implied employment levels of the 20-year program contain major inconsistencies. Output and productivity goals for agriculture, for example, indicate no expectation of change in the size of

the agricultural labor force from 1960 to 1970, but anticipate a 30-40 percent drop—that is, from 50 million to 30-35 million workers—between 1970 and 1980. Any such drastic drop in the agricultural force seems highly unlikely, given the past record of Soviet agricultural production and management policy. At the same time, the regime has promised to triple employment in non-productive services by 1980—presumably an increment of at least 31 million workers to a total of about 47 million. The largest part of this increase supposedly would come in the second decade of the 20-year period, coinciding with the decline in agricultural employment. Programming these massive labor shifts for a period beginning ten years hence can hardly be described as realistic planning.

Investment Issues

As noted earlier, no detailed investment planning is set forth in the program. However various statements on investment, considered in conjunction with the priorities of the plan and past investment policy, permit certain deductions. Insofar as the investment requirements for industrial growth are concerned, the program can be thought of as almost automatically self-perpetuating. The established 10 percent annual growth rate in heavy industry can provide the machinery, equipment and construction materials for a 10 percent annual growth rate in total investment. This rate accumulated over 20 years about equals the figure of two trillion rubles cited by Khrushchev in his Congress speech as the amount planned for investment. Actually, the portion of total investment allotted to heavy industry will probably exceed the 10 percent annual growth rate, with proportionately less going to light industry and non-industrial sectors. With this allowance and with a boost from foreign technology, there is no persuasive basis—as far as investment is concerned—for forecasting underfulfillment of the industrial growth goal. If the projected investment trend should prove insufficient, perhaps because of rising capital/output ratios, the leadership can always increase the rate of investment in industry at the expense of lower-priority sectors or of consumption.

Productive Education

In terms of economic implications, one of the most impressive and important features of the overall party program is the plan for education. There are reasons for believing that improvement in the level of training

COMING THIS SPRING

Russia Under Khrushchev

An Anthology of Articles from
Problems of Communism

Edited by A. Brumberg

Praeger, New York

Methuen, London.

of the labor force has been nearly as important a factor in Soviet growth over the past 20 years as improved technology. In the coming 20 years, when gains from borrowed technology (embodied in new capital) will perhaps become a declining factor in the rate of progress, the training of the labor force will be even more important. The prospects for approaching the productivity goals for industry and other key sectors depend heavily on the success of the educational program.

The educational goals outlined in the plan aim at continued and perhaps accelerated progress in improving the quality of the labor force as measured by educational attainment. Khrushchev stated that during the next decade a program must be implemented to provide 11-year, general-polytechnical education for all children coming of school age and at least an 8-year education for all young people now at work. If an 11-year education were to become more or less universal by 1980, the average length of schooling of the labor force would rise by about three years, compared to a rise of about two years during the past 20 years. Enrollment in higher educational institutions is scheduled to increase from 2.6 million in 1960 to 8 million in 1980—about the same rate of increase as in the past decade.

These are formidable tasks, given the fact that less than one-third of Soviet children of high-school age are now in school and that the educational attainment of the labor force averages only about six years of schooling. Doubtless the regime is relying on the success of present experiments in running the educational system on a combined work-and-study basis. More and more stress has been laid on part-time, evening, and correspondence programs, thus allowing students of working age to hold down nearly full-time jobs. To what extent this policy of learning while working will be effective still remains to be seen.

Khrushchev against the Planners?

Education is to be aimed, then, at making Soviet man a better producer. But for whose benefit—for his own, or for the state's? We come to one of the most crucial aspects of the 20-year program when we consider the regime's attitudes and projections on consumption.

Interestingly, these were more conservative than one might have expected on the basis of recent statements by Premier Khrushchev. On several occasions over the past year his remarks have indicated that he was somewhat less than happy about the entrenched principle of the priority of heavy industry over other sectors of the economy. For example, at the Central Committee plenum on agriculture in January 1961 he protested

against overemphasis on heavy industry at the expense of producing foodstuffs for consumption:

Some of our comrades have developed an appetite to give the country more metal. That is a praiseworthy desire, providing no harm is done to other branches of the national economy. But if more metal is produced while other branches lag, their expansion will be slowed down. Thus, not enough bread, butter, and other food items will be produced. This will be a one-sided development.⁴

On the issue of heavy versus light industry, as late as last May—in a statement at the British exhibition—Khrushchev categorically declared:

Soviet heavy industry is considered built. Therefore in the future, light and heavy industry will develop at the same pace. . . .⁵

The issue that Khrushchev raised is fundamental. Now that the Soviet Union has a massive heavy industry, to what uses should it be put? A noted analyst has suggested that a nation which has reached industrial maturity must choose whether it will devote its resources to consumer welfare or to imperialist adventures.⁶ The economic policy that the Soviet Union has been following—production of more means of production for industries producing means of production—is essentially a postponement of such a decision. Soviet heavy industry constitutes in effect a stockpile of uncommitted resources that can be turned in any of several directions.

It is doubtful that Khrushchev wanted to change economic policy very much, but whatever innovations he had in mind when he made the above statements are not reflected in the 20-year program. The considerations or pressures that may have changed his mind are not clear. One must simply accept at face value his full endorsement of the program at the Congress—including its reaffirmation of the leading role of heavy industry and its lack of any major commitment of resources to high mass consumption of goods.

Prospects for the Consumer

How much capacity is left for growth in consumption after the requirements for industrial development are met? According to the party program, a great deal. On close examination, however, the plans for consumption are implausible wherever concrete prognostication is

⁴ *Pravda*, January 21, 1961.

⁵ Quoted in the *New York Times*, May 20, 1961.

⁶ W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth, a Non-Communist Manifesto*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

ventured and ambiguous or misleading in other respects.

In aggregative terms, the economic program projects a fivefold increase in national income; this supposedly will allow more than a sixfold increase in investment and defense (a little over 10 percent a year) yet at the same time permit a 4.5 fold increase in consumption. While the investment defense projection is feasible, it is hard to see how the consumption goal can be achieved simultaneously. It should be noted, however, that even if the consumption goal were to be fulfilled, the part of output specifically earmarked for the state would continue to be a rising share of total output.

Caveat Consumer

While the new Program of the Soviet Communist Party contains several general prophesies of a higher standard of living and level of consumption for the Soviet people, in all of its 50,000 words only two short and notably vague passages deal with the specific problem of consumer goods production. Here is what the program has to say:

The CPSU will direct its efforts toward ensuring a rapid rise in the output of consumer goods. The growing resources of industry must be applied more and more to meeting fully all the requirements of the Soviet people and to building and equipping enterprises and institutions serving the everyday and cultural needs of the public. Along with the accelerated development of all branches of light industry and the food industry, the share of consumer goods in the output of heavy industry will also increase. . . .

* * *

The demand of all sections of the population for high-quality consumer goods—well-made and attractive clothing, footwear and goods for improving and adorning the daily life of Soviet people, such as comfortable modern furniture, improved household articles, a wide range of goods for cultural purposes, etc.—will be amply satisfied. Production of automobiles for the public will be considerably expanded.

The output of consumer goods must fully meet the growing consumer demand and must conform to its changes. The timely output of goods in accordance with the varied demand of the public, taking into account local, national and climatic conditions, is an imperative requirement for all the consumer industries. . . .

—From the CPSU Program, translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York), Dec. 13, 1961.

In terms of per capita consumption the program promises to effect a 3.5-fold aggregative increase, and thus, in Khrushchev's words, "to achieve in the next 20 years a standard of living higher than any [in] capitalist countries"—and specifically "80 percent above the US 1960 level." This projection would have to be based on an estimate that the living standard in the USSR is at present over 50 percent that in the United States. Non-Soviet economists have calculated, however, that Soviet per capita consumption in 1960 was only around 30 percent that of the US; on this basis, a 3.5-fold increase by 1980 would barely raise the USSR to the 1960 US level.

While the Soviet people might not recognize the doubtful foundations of these overall claims, some of the particulars of the plans for consumption and a higher living standard must certainly give rise to skepticism. One area in which the regime ventured specific promises, for example, was food production. As noted earlier, Khrushchev cited specific 1970 and 1980 output targets for various food items, including meat, milk, and eggs, the achievement of which would require a large increase in agricultural production especially in the first decade of the plan.⁷ The performance of agriculture will of course determine not only food supplies but the availability of such consumer items as textiles, clothing, leather shoes, and so forth. In the light of both recent and long-run experience, it seems unlikely that the average Russian can feel much confidence in this area of prediction.

A wide array of free services is also promised to future consumers—including ultimately free housing, utilities, public transport and medical care. The regime lays heavy stress on these services, together with various promised workers' benefits (a reduction of work hours, extensive paid annual leaves, an extension of pensions, etc.) in supporting its guarantee of a future living standard second to none. However, the plan's projection of a ten-fold increase in free services by 1980 is somewhat misleading. Most of these services are already available—however inadequate their quantity or quality—at low cost to the consumer (such services represented slightly more than 10 percent of total private consumption in 1960). Whether the consumer pays directly for services or indirectly through taxes is mainly a bookkeeping problem, and has no effect on his stand-

⁷ Most of the food targets cited by Khrushchev called for at least doubled production by 1970. The most spectacular goal projected was that for fruits, berries and grapes; it called for a six-fold increase of output by 1970 and a 10-fold increase by 1980. Given the time required to grow fruit trees or even vines, planting will have to proceed at a tempestuous rate for the next few years.

ard of living. Thus the portion of the projected growth which represents simply an elimination of the price on an existing service does not constitute an increase in consumption. The portion that would represent a genuine increase in services cannot be achieved without additional manpower, which, as we have seen, is unrealistically counted upon from a sharp decline in agricultural employment. In view of these considerations, skepticism over the promised increment in services may properly be entertained.

A word must be said about the alleged tendency of free services to level income differentials. Free services can be used to reduce inequality of income—if the provider of the services so chooses. There is no guarantee, however, that the services promised in the plan will be unlimited in supply or equally distributed. Free housing, for example, is and will remain rationed and assigned housing. It is highly possible that the size and quality of quarters will continue to correspond rather closely to the rank and importance of the occupants, even in 1980. Rationing systems are, in fact, notoriously amenable to the provision of special privilege to a favored minority.

IN HOUSING, consumers are promised a tripling of the housing stock by 1980. Allowing for population growth this implies a future dwelling space of about 11 to 12 square meters per capita. If this level were achieved—which is not very probable—it would be a most welcome improvement to Soviet citizens. However it would still fall below the present housing standard in Western Europe in terms both of space and, from all indications, of quality. Judging by present construction, apartments are likely to be poorly built, badly maintained and sparsely furnished.

The regime's promises on housing should be judged in the light of its virtual abandonment, in the second half of 1960, of a loan program for the construction of private housing—a move which undoubtedly contributed to the significant underfulfillment of housing goals in 1960 and 1961. The most welcome offer the party could have made to the Soviet people would have been to restore the private-housing loan program. The rapid growth of private-housing construction in 1958-60, along with a steady but slower growth of state-housing construction, foretold a substantial expansion in the stock of housing by 1965; if the program had been continued, it might eventually have alleviated the housing shortage to some meaningful degree. Private housing, however, brought with it "evil" companions, remnants of capitalism. The eagerness with which the population—and especially party members—started speculating

in houses, building for sale or rental, cultivating commercial garden plots, *etc.*, led to the curtailment of the loan program. The party leaders were not willing to purchase consumer welfare at the cost of control over individual behavior.

A similar conflict between party plans and popular wishes is apparent in the matter of consumer durables. The eagerness of Soviet citizens for consumer durables has been noted both by visitors to the Soviet Union and by the Soviet press. The present program frankly discourages any hope the people might have had for eventually acquiring such items for themselves. The regime has made clear that in promising the wide introduction of "cheap household machines," it refers primarily to communally-shared equipment. Khrushchev explicitly stressed in his Congress speech that the requirements of the population would be met by the establishment of communal kitchens, laundries and repair shops. The finality of this policy is attested to by the fact that apartments presently under construction are equipped with electrical circuits only large enough for lighting.

The emphasis on communally-shared goods and services is clearly not just a matter of economic necessity but part and parcel of the regime's long-range political and economic planning. On the practical side, one aim of the projected pattern of communal living is to free more people, and especially women, for jobs. Khrushchev specifically cited the objective of increasing the already high proportion of women in the labor force (amounting in 1960 to 55 percent of the female population over 14 years of age). He declared: "We must develop all forms of communal services so that all those who so desire can use them instead of performing household work." While he used the word "desire," the basic party principle remains that everyone is expected to work for the common good where needed, and the availability of "free" nurseries, communal dining and other communal facilities will make it more difficult for women or anyone else to avoid this obligation when the party chooses to impose it.

Conclusion

The general drift of the future pattern of Soviet life is, then, to restrict still further individual freedom of choice and personal or family goals and activities. It is a thought-provoking question whether human beings can be taught to accept the life of the ant in return for an officially determined supply of goods and services. Regardless of ideological rationalization, the practical corollary of an absence of individual freedom of choice is the presence of state control. The intent of the 20-year

program is to move steadily toward a society in which the population directs its loyal efforts toward state objectives, with a minimum of attention to personal aims or preferences. While the Soviet citizen has been promised shorter working hours, he will have to surrender an increased portion of his leisure time to state-directed education and to "voluntary" work for the "common good" as determined by the party. And even though future leaders may find it expedient to provide more consumer durables than planned, there is no hint that a surge of consumer expectations will be allowed to get out of hand. The grandiose phraseology concerning consumer welfare in fact outlines a restricted pattern of consumption that will be quantitatively and qualitatively controlled by the state.

It has been argued above that the 20-year economic program must have a rather mixed appeal for the Russian people. Judged as internal propaganda, it could have been much more attractively designed. Another audience which the Soviet party leaders no doubt had in mind was the peoples of underdeveloped countries, to many of whom the consumption program doubtless sounds attractive simply because their own present needs are so great.

However, the main target audience of the program, in the view of this writer, was the assemblage to whom Khrushchev delivered his speech, the Communist Party. The 20-year program was meant to justify the party's past and to offer a *raison d'être* for its present and future. Khrushchev expressed this thought perhaps more vividly than he realized when he declared:

The party's third program heralds the coming of a period in which all the difficulties and privations which the Soviet people have endured *for the sake of their great cause* will be made good a hundredfold.⁸

What kind of a consumption program could make these privations worthwhile from the party's point of view? Certainly not one envisioning a consumer-oriented economy, which presumably could have been achieved under some form of capitalism. The projected consumption pattern had to be, as it is in the program, uniquely Communist; it also had to ensure a minimum of diversion of the resources of the state from the leadership's primary purpose—the struggle for power in the world at large, by which the Soviet Communist Party justifies its permanent power at home.

⁸ Author's italics.

The Economics of Communist China

*Die Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung
der Volksrepublik China,*
by Bernhard Grossmann.
Gustav Fischer Verlag, Stuttgart, 1960.

Agrarian Policy of the Chinese Communist Party,
by Chao Kuo-chun,
Asia Publishing House,
Bombay & New York, 1960.

Reviewed by Alexander Eckstein

THE TWO BOOKS here under review are of rather different types. The first, by Bernhard Grossmann, is a broad survey of mainland China's over-all economic development under the Communist regime, while the second, by Chao Kuo-chun, is a monograph focused on a particular area of Chinese Communist economic policy. Moreover, although both books are essentially descriptive, they differ in approach: Grossmann's is objective and impartial, whereas Chao's is confused and partisan.

Of the general surveys of Communist China's economy thus far published, Grossmann's study is unquestionably the broadest in scope, assembling a wide range of data and information, both quantitative and institutional. It is more up-to-date, comprehensive, and lucid than Yuan-li Wu's *An Economic Survey of Communist China* (New York, 1956), more thorough than T. J. Hughes' and D. E. T. Luard's *The Economic Development of Communist China, 1949-1958* (London, New York, and Toronto, 1959), and not propagandistic like Solomon Adler's *The Chinese Economy* (New York, 1957).

After a brief and not too illuminating introductory discussion of development problems, Grossmann reviews the actual development of China's economy prior to 1949, its recovery from war devastation, and the successive economic plans of the Communist regime. The next six chapters then describe the development of the

principal sectors of the economy during the first decade of Communist rule. The rest of the book is devoted to an analysis of certain basic economic problems facing the Peking regime, such as the dilemmas posed by rapid population growth, production bottlenecks, and inflationary pressures generated partly by high rates of investment and partly by recurrent imbalances resulting from the bottlenecks and from planning errors.

By its very nature, such a broad survey is bound to be uneven, with some topics treated more adequately than others. Thus, Grossmann's discussion of the organization and administration of Chinese Communist economic planning, the development of agricultural production, and the problem of population growth is quite interesting and may be considered a contribution to our knowledge of Communist China's economy. On the other hand, his treatment of industrial development, foreign trade, Sino-Soviet economic relations, national income, the budget, and the underlying strategy of the Second Five-Year Plan is inadequate and, at times, confused.

PERHAPS the most serious shortcoming of Grossmann's work is its reliance on official Chinese Communist statistics. Even while recognizing that these statistics present problems of authenticity, the author shies away from any real attempt to analyze and appraise them on the ground that there is no means of verification. This, of course, is taking the easy way out, a course which is chosen all too often by writers on mainland China's economy. There is no denying that it is infinitely more difficult to dissect and evaluate the official statistics, examining the methods of their collection and compilation, than it is to take them as they are. But unfortunately any study that uses these statistics in their original, unevaluated form inevitably becomes their prisoner, for they must necessarily condition the whole analysis and the conclusions reached.

One of the clearest illustrations of this danger is provided by official Chinese Communist figures showing the value of industrial production or of industrial and agricultural production combined. In Chinese Communist

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practice, these figures always represent the gross sales value of the output rather than the value added in the process of production, which has the effect of greatly exaggerating the relative share in total production of those industries or sectors of the economy which consume the most raw materials per unit of output. Since raw materials generally are a larger component in industrial than in agricultural goods production, it follows that the Chinese Communist data inevitably overstate the relative weight of industrial production and thus serve to magnify substantially the degree of industrialization attained in China.

Exclusive reliance on official data as they stand would indeed be necessary if there were no means of evaluating and correcting them. This, however, is not the case. At least up till the end of 1959, one could subscribe to a number of economic, statistical, engineering, and agricultural journals which discussed and analyzed prevailing Chinese Communist statistical practices in considerable detail. It is clear from the information provided by these publications that Chinese Communist statistics vary in reliability. They are relatively most reliable for the 1955-57 period, and least reliable for the years since 1958. The data also tend, in general, to be more accurate for those economic sectors in which performance has been good than for those which are lagging. Again, the statistics appear relatively more dependable for the public than for the private sector of the economy, and more reliable also for large-scale than for small-scale enterprises.

Obviously, no study of the economic development of Communist China, however wide-ranging its scope or however objective the author's approach, can avoid the risk of being misleading and superficial on some points unless it gives detailed attention to these statistical pitfalls and makes due allowances for the biases inherent in the official Chinese data. While Grossmann's survey makes useful contributions in certain areas, it may legitimately be criticized for falling short in this rather fundamental respect.

STILL, whatever his shortcomings, Grossmann approaches his subject in a spirit of objectivity. By contrast, Chao Kuo-chun's monograph on Chinese Communist agrarian policy seems to suffer from definite political bias. It transports the reader into an almost Alice-in-Wonderland sort of world in which there are no problems and no difficulties, where everything works out smoothly, without friction, and just as planned. It is a beautiful dream-world, if only it were true. The Chinese peasantry, we are told, has willingly accepted collectivization, spon-

taneously and enthusiastically joining the cooperatives, then the collectives, and finally the communes. Chao tells us further:

The recent few years have been an epic era in the annals of China's agrarian development. The increase in crop production in 1958 is outstanding in the modern history of China. Concomitantly, gigantic socio-economic changes like the organization of people's communes are being carried out in rural China. When these coordinated programs . . . develop their full impact on the nation in general and on rural areas in particular, even greater development in agricultural development may be expected in China. (p. 250)

Moreover, declares the author, "the big leap forward in agriculture in 1958 was not something materializing out of the blue; it was the cumulative result of various positive steps taken since 1949 by Chinese leaders, as the weather was not exceptionally good in that year [1958]." (p. 252)

Reading these lines, one cannot help but wonder whether Mr. Chao and the rest of us live in the same world. Certainly, his view of reality in mainland China seems to deny all the accounts of acute food shortages and agricultural crises which have been appearing in the Chinese Communist press itself for the past two years. It also seems to contradict Communist China's large purchases of grain from Australia and Canada during the past year.

How can one account for the wide discrepancy between Chao's account and what appears to be the actual state of agriculture in Communist China? The explanation clearly lies in the author's uncritical approach. He accepts without question the Chinese Communist claims of great agricultural progress, yet seems to disregard Peking's more recent acknowledgments of agricultural difficulties. He does not question the effectiveness of what he terms the "agro-technical" programs of the Chinese Communist regime, completely failing to recognize the disruptive and counterincentive effects of collectivization and communization.

Since the Communists' advent to power in 1949, there have been three years of really good harvests in mainland China—1952, 1955, and 1958—with only mediocre or poor crops in the other years. The pattern has been one of several years of inferior harvests interspersed periodically by a year of superior crops, with all these fluctuations taking place around a rising trend in production. Thus, the total agricultural product of Communist China certainly was greater in 1958 than in 1952, although we do not know by how much. According to the official claims, food-crop production increased by more than 60 percent during these years and almost doubled between 1952 and 1960. Since the population grew in the same period by about 20 percent, the alleged doubling

of production should have provided an ample margin for bringing about an increase in the per capita food supply; yet, all indications point to a probable decline, or at best a stagnation, of the per capita level of food consumption in 1960 and 1961. This deterioration of the domestic food situation cannot be accounted for by Chinese exports of food crops, since these have at no time absorbed more than one to two percent of Communist China's total farm production. At the same time, the fact that the Chinese Communist government has found it necessary to expend its very meager foreign exchange resources for purchases of grain from Australia and Canada suggests that the deterioration is likewise not due to an official policy of accumulating reserve grain stocks, since if such stocks had been available, the regime would certainly have used them to relieve the domestic food shortage before resorting to large-scale emergency purchases abroad.

ALL THIS points to the conclusion that the official Chinese Communist figures for agricultural production are simply too unreliable to be used as a basis for analysis. There is no question that, in part, the claimed increase in output between 1952 and 1957 was statistical rather than real, reflecting improvements in crop reporting. As far as 1958 is concerned, the official figure for grain production was 250 million metric tons. As against this, Grossmann gives a figure of 205 million tons (p. 176), representing a 10-percent rise in production compared to 1957. Although this still would be a healthy increase for one year, it is at least within the realm of reasonable possibility.

Assuming that food-crop production in mainland China actually did rise by about ten percent in 1958, we can estimate the total increase in output between 1952 and 1958 at something in the neighborhood of 25 percent—or less than half the 60-percent increase claimed by the regime. Given the 15-percent growth in population over the same period, this still should have meant a slight improvement in the per capita food supply by 1958. Even if such was the case, however, it seems likely that any improvement attained by 1958 has since been more than wiped out inasmuch as food-crop production from 1959 through 1961 has either decreased or remained stationary, while the population has continued to expand, perhaps by another 6-7 percent.

Chinese Communist statements have cited successive years of unprecedentedly bad weather as the main cause of the difficulties in agriculture. Actually, however, the primary explanation of these difficulties appears to lie rather in the cumulative impact of inept government policies. Weather conditions in the last few years have

evidently not been exactly benign, but there is no evidence that they have been unusually unfavorable—or more unfavorable, let us say, than in 1956 or 1957. Regardless of the weather, the continuous disorganization of agriculture as a result of the Communist regime's successive programs of land reform, cooperativization, collectivization, and communization, combined with grossly inadequate investment allocations to agriculture, negative producer incentives caused by heavy taxation and various forms of "squeeze," and a number of specific errors in planning, were bound to take their toll. It is now clear that the attempt at mass mobilization of rural labor, undertaken in 1958 through the instrumentality of the communes, has been, at least in part, counterproductive. The dikes and irrigation works built by mass labor teams drawn from the communes have evidently been so poorly constructed in most instances that they have not stood the test of major floods and droughts. At the same time, the mobilization of rural manpower for these projects caused labor shortages in agriculture and thus contributed to the post-1958 decline in farm production.

In the light of the overwhelming accumulation of evidence now pointing to a serious crisis in Chinese Communist agriculture, one cannot help but wonder how Mr. Chao could have been so completely misled. A partial explanation is, perhaps, provided by the fact that when his book was published in 1960 the outlines of the crisis, though already visible, were not nearly as obvious as they are now. At the same time, it is apparent that the author's roseate picture of agricultural progress in Communist China stems above all from his readiness to accept the claims of the regime at face value, without qualification or critical appraisal.

Despite this, Chao's book does shed some useful light on the historical background and evolution of Chinese Communist agrarian policies. It is particularly interesting to note how many of the policies implemented by the Communist regime since 1949 were already foreshadowed during the so-called "soviet period" between 1927 and 1937.¹ For instance, Mr. Chao's study clearly points out that one of the central tenets of Chinese Communist agrarian strategy—"rely on the poor peasants and farm laborers, and ally yourself with the middle peasants"—was formulated and tried out then. Similarly, many of the mass organizations which were to play

¹ This period saw the emergence in certain areas of China, principally in Hunan and Kiangsi Provinces, of a number of local Communist "soviets" which, in 1931, joined together in proclaiming the "Chinese Soviet Republic." These governments practically ceased to exist with the retreat of the Chinese Communist forces into northwest China (1934-35), and the Chinese Soviet Republic was formally dissolved in 1937.—Ed.

such a crucial role during the land reform drive of 1949-52 (the Peasant Associations, Youth League, etc.) were first formed and tested in that early period. The same applies to the Chinese Communists' definition of rural class status, the organization of mutual aid teams, and a number of other measures.

In the last analysis, both books reviewed here illustrate in what an early stage of development scholarly studies of Communist China still are. Grossmann's task would certainly have been much easier had there been a backlog of detailed monographic studies on which to base a

comprehensive survey. This raises the question whether it is worthwhile to devote such a large share of the limited scholarly resources available for the study of Communist China to the preparation of general surveys rather than of studies of narrower scope—sharply focused, deeply probing, and truly objective—which would illuminate specific aspects of Communist China's society, polity, and economy. The more available such authoritative studies become, the less will be the attention paid to such pseudo-scientific, superficial works as Mr. Chao's one-sided eulogy of Chinese Communist agrarian policy.

Filling Stalin's Shoes

Power and Policy in the USSR,
by Robert Conquest.
St. Martin's Press, New York, 1961.

Russland unter Chruschtschow,
by Boris Meissner.
R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich, 1960.

The Red Phoenix,
by Harry Schwartz.
F. A. Praeger, New York, 1961.

Moscow Journal,
by Harrison E. Salisbury.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1961.

Reviewed by Leon Gouré

SINCE WORLD WAR II, the uneasy and increasingly difficult "coexistence" of the Communist and non-Communist powers has elevated "understanding Soviet Russia" to something akin to a Western goal and an intellectual sport. The many unresolved mysteries in the field of Soviet studies have fascinated scholars and laymen alike. And few of these mysteries have stirred the imagination more, or been more hotly debated by

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Western observers, than the internal politics of the Kremlin, and especially the power conflicts within the Soviet leadership.

This aspect of Soviet political life has of course remained largely hidden from view. However, the curiosity of investigators has been piqued by occasional outward evidences of cracks in the monolithic facade of the Soviet ruling system—the sudden bloody convulsions which have repeatedly shaken it, the sleight-of-hand which overnight has transformed venerated leaders into traitors or criminals, the seemingly inexplicable changes in the political fortunes of many prominent personalities. These recurrent clues to the inner workings of Soviet politics have all served to confirm the widespread belief in the West that there is a continuous and debilitating struggle for power within the Soviet ruling group.

Such being the case, identification of the current locus of controlling power, of the issues at stake and the influences at work, assumes vital importance for the evaluation of Soviet policy. Hence, Khrushchev's leadership position and what, if any, limitations there are upon his ability to impose his decisions have become a focal point of study and debate.

The views on this subject are as varied as they are numerous. In part, the absence of any consensus results from the paucity and unreliability of the available data and from the fact that differing approaches are

used in analyzing them; in part, however, one suspects that it reflects the propensity of some analysts, more than others, to be influenced in their judgments by the wish to make a solution of the East-West conflict appear more hopeful. It is at once striking and disquieting to note that the same "facts" have been interpreted by some as indicating a progressive collapse of collective leadership and a consolidation of Khrushchev's one-man rule, and by others as signifying that Khrushchev has at times been the unwilling spokesman of a continuing collective leadership in which he has had to wage a constant struggle against more reactionary and aggressive elements.

The latter view has tended to present Khrushchev in a relatively favorable light and has been used by its exponents in order to explain retrogressive developments in Soviet policy. Thus, they attributed the stiffened Soviet posture which caused the collapse of the 1960 Paris summit conference to a combination of pressures on Khrushchev from the Stalinists, the Soviet military, and the Chinese. For a long time, too, it has been fashionable among members of this school to point to Suslov as a sort of *éminence grise* of Soviet politics—a line which Moscow spokesmen have sought to exploit by hinting that unless the Western powers make appropriate concessions to Soviet demands, Khrushchev stands in danger of being replaced by some other—presumably more intransigent—leader.

Certainly, however, in view of the obvious importance of correctly assessing the "real Khrushchev" and the character of the Soviet ruling group, no Western analyst or statesman can allow himself the luxury of indulging in wishful—or what has sometimes been called "positive"—thinking. Least of all is there justification for assuming that Khrushchev's de-Stalinization moves, suspension of mass terror, and other reforms represent a fundamental transformation of the Soviet system, or that they imply, *a priori*, a change in the ultimate goals of Soviet foreign policy.

The books under review all attempt to describe and interpret the political character of the Soviet system. The fact that each of the authors uses a different analytical method may be partly responsible for the divergent pictures they present.

MR. ROBERT CONQUEST'S *Power and Policy in the USSR*, besides covering the greatest time span, is an unusual and highly provocative study of Soviet politics. The author presents his work as an exercise in "Kremlinology." He notes that while the book as a whole provides a "fairly full political history of the USSR in recent years," each of its chapters is designed primarily

to "demonstrate . . . the interplay of the various evidential factors, to be an exercise in the application and development of method" (p. 15). The author's thesis is that the basic and constant force in Soviet politics is the Communist ideology, as interpreted in the party line: "This force, operating in the minds of the thousands of senior officials structured into the apparatus of power, exerts the tension which produces the struggle for power" (p. 19). On the other hand, he holds that social pressures are external to the Soviet political mechanism and need only be taken into account by the analyst "in the same way as the weather or the Ural Mountains" (p. 18).

Mr. Conquest likens Kremlinology to paleontology in that both must build their theories on insufficient factual evidence. Whether this is a fair parallel is open to some doubt. The paleontologist, given a single authentic bone, can reconstruct an entire prehistoric skeleton with a high degree of certainty; Kremlinologists, on the other hand, have fewer scientifically proven guidelines to go by and are liable to reconstruct a whole menagerie of dissimilar beasts from the same evidential fragments—or even to disagree on what constitutes acceptable evidence. The author restricts his own search for evidence to official Soviet materials, probably a wise decision since it eliminates any argument over the validity and significance of information obtained from secondary or unofficial sources.

Mr. Conquest's book concerns itself with Soviet politics in the period from 1949 to 1960 and is divided into three parts. The first part describes the methodology and evidence employed. The second deals with the struggle for power under Stalin. Since the focus is on the evidences of struggle in the leadership, the author here analyzes the Leningrad Case of 1949-50, the disputes of 1950-53 over agriculture, the Georgian purges of 1951-53, the 19th Party Congress (October 1952), and the Doctors' Plot in the last days of Stalin's rule. The conclusions he draws from these developments hold few surprises, but the thoroughness and care with which he analyzes and documents each case are impressive. The third part of the book, entitled "Struggle for Power in Conditions of Collective Leadership," covers the period 1953-60. Here it becomes evident that Mr. Conquest does not believe in the thesis of a successful consolidation of one-man rule by Khrushchev, and it seems likely that some of the conclusions and interpretations he advances in this section will encounter disagreement.

One criticism that may be made is that while the author's method of research succeeds in showing the alignment of forces in the various power conflicts and the public issues dividing the antagonists, it often fails

to explain why a contender was able to gain the advantage. For example, it is not made clear why Beria, just after Stalin's death in March 1953, was allowed to regain control of the entire police apparatus despite the fact that none of his colleagues in the Presidium had much reason to trust him. Again, the author can shed no light on why the other members of the Presidium, having successfully united against Beria, later failed to recognize Khrushchev as the major threat to their power and allowed him to destroy them piecemeal. Mr. Conquest further takes the view that the Presidium formed after the 20th Congress represented at least a partial defeat for Khrushchev, notwithstanding the fact that it was not able to prevent him from forming and controlling a Party Bureau for the RSFSR.

There are still other unresolved mysteries, such as the role played by Mikoyan in prompting the final decision on Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Congress, or the remarkable change in Khrushchev's power position between the December 1956 Central Committee plenum and the February 1957 plenum—a change which resulted in the unusual phenomenon of the Central Committee successfully overruling a majority of the Presidium as well as a decision of the Supreme Soviet.

The most dramatic moment, of course, was the June 1957 plenum, when the "anti-party" group is alleged to have attempted its coup against Khrushchev. Mr. Conquest appears to believe that Khrushchev was saved by the intervention of Serov and Zhukov in preventing the majority decision against Khrushchev in the Presidium from being made public. Zhukov's purported role in the crisis has been frequently cited although there is no evidence from official Soviet sources to support it, just as there is no clear indication that the issue was necessarily—as many analysts have assumed *a priori*—a proposal by the anti-party group to remove Khrushchev outright. It is equally possible that the group merely sought some limitation of Khrushchev's power, which might explain why its members kept their party membership for such a long time and why Khrushchev could continue cooperating temporarily with Bulganin and Voroshilov.

Mr. Conquest's final assessment seems to be that Khrushchev, in spite of his recent ascendancy, still faces opposition forces capable of resisting and even defeating his decisions. What these opposition forces could have been since 1957, however, is not clear, and the 22nd Congress has given no indication that Khrushchev's consolidation of his controlling position is likely to undergo any significant reversal in the foreseeable future.

Whether Mr. Conquest's conclusions strike individual readers as sound or unsound, few will question that his book makes a real contribution to Soviet studies. Read-

ers will also welcome the lengthy appendices which, in addition to translations of various documents, include a useful index of the membership of the Presidium since 1949 and of the Central Committee since 1952.

PROFESSOR BORIS MEISSNER is likewise a distinguished Kremlinologist. His book, compared to Conquest's, covers a more limited time span, dealing primarily with the period from the 20th through the 21st Party Congress, and also provides a broader treatment of events since it is not restricted merely to political developments within the highest leadership but also discusses the party and economic programs. On the whole, Professor Meissner's study aims less at an analysis of the power struggle than at a comprehensive and detailed description of Soviet internal politics during the period in question. Documentary appendices take up almost two-thirds of the book, and the author, in his description and analysis, does not confine himself exclusively to Soviet official documents as does Mr. Conquest, but also uses satellite and Western Communist sources.

Concerning the events at the June 1957 Plenum, Professor Meissner's interpretation is that Khrushchev was saved by Zhukov's initiative in summoning the members of the Central Committee to Moscow, while Bulganin and Voroshilov may have attempted to mediate between the two factions in the Presidium. However, the new revelations made at the 22nd Congress about these events cast doubt on this thesis. It is by no means clear in any event why the anti-party group, with its majority in the Presidium, had to debate for three days with Khrushchev, supposedly supported only by Mikoyan and Kirichenko, unless the objectives of the majority were actually far more limited in scope than is often assumed. Nor is it clear why Zhukov should have acted as such a champion of Khrushchev if, as Professor Meissner claims, there was a close relationship between Zhukov and Bulganin (pp. 46-47). It seems fairly evident that Khrushchev, though victorious in 1957, was not then prepared to reveal publicly that a majority had opposed him, and therefore retained Voroshilov and Bulganin since they by themselves constituted no threat to him and their retention would make his position appear stronger. Professor Meissner believes that the 21st Congress confirmed Khrushchev's leadership, but that the question still remained open as of that time whether he would succeed in establishing undisputed one-man rule.

Mr. Harry Schwartz is well known to students of Soviet and international affairs. His book, *The Red Phoenix*, is largely a selective compilation of his articles for the *New York Times*, arranged under various headings according to subject matter. He has supplemented

these with an introductory and a concluding chapter and has inserted some material to connect the various articles.

Mr. Schwartz covers a far wider range of subjects than either Mr. Conquest or Professor Meissner. He is concerned not merely with the internal politics of the party and the power struggles within the leadership, but also with the whole gamut of social, economic, ideological, and external political factors which have a part in shaping the character of Soviet policies. Unfortunately, however, the format of his articles does not permit him either to develop his interpretations as fully as would seem desirable or to bring together all the elements he treats into a unified over-all analysis.

Notwithstanding these shortcomings, it would be difficult to quarrel with Schwartz' general conclusion that the Soviet leadership—first of Stalin and later of Khrushchev—has proven itself highly skillful in waging the cold war, and that the next fifteen to twenty years may well see a further significant expansion of Soviet power. How this power will be applied, the author believes, will depend greatly on how successful the leadership will be in solving the country's growing social and agrarian problems and on how disruptive the succession crisis may prove when Khrushchev leaves the scene. Mr. Schwartz is in general far from optimistic about future prospects and does not share the view of those who see in Khrushchev a progressive reformer and liberalizer of the Communist dictatorship.

COMPARED to the works discussed above, including that of his colleague Mr. Schwartz, Mr. Harrison Salisbury's *Moscow Journal* is much more plainly journalistic than scholarly in approach. The book is an extensive—and apparently largely unedited—selection of news dispatches and extracts from a diary, both written while Mr. Salisbury was in Moscow, from 1949 to September 1953, as correspondent for the *New York Times*. One of the author's stated aims is to demonstrate that the "old-fashioned virtues of using one's eyes, ears and, sometimes, one's nose to detect what is going on about him have not entirely lost their purpose. . . ." But if these virtues are indeed of value, the book hardly shows that they are enough.

The material from Mr. Salisbury's diary makes painfully clear the handicaps under which newsmen in the

Soviet Union have had to work. In the absence of real contacts with Soviet governmental and political sources, foreign correspondents stationed in Moscow were forced to rely for news largely upon translations from the Soviet press and on gossip among themselves or with embassy personnel. At one point in his diary, in fact, Mr. Salisbury complains that a reduction in the number of foreign correspondents seriously constricted his sources of information.

Although much of this material was already used in the author's *American in Russia*, published in 1955, a novel feature of his present book is that it includes the censored portions of his news dispatches from Moscow, thus providing the reader with a concrete picture of the strategy and idiosyncracies of the Soviet press censorship. Considering the extremely difficult conditions under which correspondents in Moscow had to work, it is not surprising that Mr. Salisbury at times reached wrong conclusions and that some of his estimates of the character and aims of Soviet policy were quite mistaken. This may possibly explain also why his views on American foreign policy, expressed quite forcefully at various points in his book, do not always appear founded on a full understanding of the problems and forces confronting the United States.

Although all the books reviewed here put considerable stress on the problems and uncertainties facing the Soviet leadership, they offer the reader little ground for optimism. On the contrary, they indicate not only that Khrushchev has consolidated his position and expanded the bases of Soviet power, but also that there is as yet no evidence to suggest that "Khrushchevism," for all its de-Stalinization, is less dangerous for the West than old-fashioned Stalinism. Mr. Schwartz' conclusion seems well taken when he warns that "the prudent assumption for the outside world would seem to be that they [the Soviet leaders] will be successful and that the essential features of the Soviet dictatorship will remain for the indefinite future." Indeed, Khrushchev's vicious public humiliation of Voroshilov at the 22nd Congress echoed the political cruelty of the Stalin period and provided a sobering reminder that the present Soviet dictator, who knew how to dance the *gopak* when ordered to do so by the *Vozhd*, may know how to make others dance to his own tune as well.

Notes and Views

How Statistics Are Made

IN DEALING WITH Soviet statistics, three basic problems have to be overcome: 1) difficulties of interpretation arising from differences in the economic and statistical concepts used in the Soviet Union and in the West; 2) deliberate Soviet suppression, omission, or befogging of statistical data; and 3) faulty reporting within the USSR at the enterprise or collective farm level. All three problems stem, directly or indirectly, from the fact that the Soviet leadership regards statistical information as a weapon of the proletarian state, but the degree of difficulty they cause for Western analysts of Soviet economic performance differs with the individual problem.

In principle, the first is the least formidable since it ceases to be of much concern once the conceptual differences are understood. Western economic observers know, for example, what major components make up the "national income" by Soviet definition. Such knowledge is, however, far from complete, partly because disagreements of definition continue to exist among Soviet economists and statisticians, and partly because there is some doubt how far even those definitions which are ostensibly agreed upon are adhered to in actual statistical practice. In any event, conceptual differences as such are quite legitimate, and if due care is exercised to take them into account, difficulties of analysis can be more or less resolved.

The second problem is, of course, much more troublesome, directly connected as it is with the use of statistics for window-dressing purposes. Whatever other purposes they may serve, a primary function of statistics in the Soviet Union is to provide substantiation for what Stalin called the "law" of the smooth, proportional development of the Soviet economy.¹ This requirement gives rise to three kinds of statistical malpractice: 1) the suppression of information on how particular data were arrived at; 2) the disclosure of relatively meager data for a number of important economic categories (for example, the industrial labor force); and 3) the omission of embarrassing statistical information. In spite of some improvement since 1953, both in the volume of data published and in the range and

coverage of accompanying explanatory notes, Soviet statistical handbooks are still poor in data and lopsided in the information they furnish. Duplication tends to exaggerate the volume of information supplied. For instance, about one-seventh of the Soviet statistical handbook for industry (*Promyshlennost SSSR*, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie) consists of a mere repetition in percentage form of absolute figures presented elsewhere in the handbook.

The third problem, with which this article is mainly concerned, is somewhat more subtle and has particular interest in that it tends to give trouble not just to Western analysts, but to the Soviet Central Statistical Administration itself. Manipulation of economic data at the central government level—which the Soviets consider ideologically justified on various grounds—is one thing. But tampering with figures at the lower echelons of the reporting hierarchy is quite another. It is regarded, in fact, as a serious crime since it undermines the work of the national economic planners and usually covers up activities which violate "socialist morality." It would nevertheless appear that the very nature of the Soviet economic apparatus and the way it functions are such as to make conscious tampering with the flow of statistical information to the central government quite common, if not inevitable.

IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE that the production demands made upon Soviet enterprises and collective farms are often unrealistic in relation to the amounts of productive resources allocated to them. The result is that enterprise directors and collective farm chairmen spend a good portion of their lives trying to circumvent regulations. Fulfillment of the plan comes first, and often this can be achieved only by entering into illegal deals with private "fixers" and friends among the officialdom.² The former

¹ See Naum Jasny, *Soviet Industrialization 1928-1952*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960.

² For an instructive account of a Soviet manager's plight, see Ignat Ovsyannikov, "I was a Soviet 'Capitalist,'" the *Sunday Telegraph* (London), July 23, 1961. For a study of the "fixer" network, see Jan S. Prybyla, "Private Enterprise in the Soviet Union," *The South African Journal of Economics*, September 1961, and December 1961.

provide materials and services which are in short supply, and the latter help to block the channels of communication with the upper strata of the executive hierarchy. The risks, of course, are great, and leave no room for the fainthearted. Nevertheless, the system virtually necessitates taking them, with the twofold result that much of what actually takes place at the production level is not shown in the reports sent in to the government authorities, and that the figures which do reach the top echelon of the economic hierarchy are often grossly distorted.

From time to time, the system of managerial collusion breaks down. This sometimes occurs because of the managers' blatant disregard for the minimum living standards of workers in areas which the authorities regard as of particular importance to the economy. Several breakdowns of this kind have occurred in the "virgin land" regions of the USSR, where the miserable living conditions of immigrant workers on a number of state farms and development projects became a national scandal.⁸ In these cases, to be sure, the managers' total disregard for even the simplest needs of the workers—reflecting their one-sided concentration on plan fulfillment ("Don't bother me with dormitories; I have other things to attend to. The plan is collapsing.")⁴—was only the proximate cause of the break-

down in the system of data-fixing. The ultimate cause was an increase in labor turnover, which in itself was serious enough to endanger fulfillment of the plan.⁵


Illegal deals and false cover-up reporting seem to be particularly common practices on the part of collective farm chairmen, probably resulting from the fact that agriculture in the Soviet Union has for years suffered from singularly poor treatment in the matter of resource allocation. In the Ukraine alone, an investigation of the operations of 8,199 collective farms revealed that 5,945 illegal deals had been entered into over a period of two years.⁶ They had, of course, been covered up by deceptive reporting, which in turn vitiated subsequent central economic planning. One can readily appreciate the planners' irritation at being fed falsified information, but one can also sympathize with the hard lot of those whose duty it is to translate unrealistic production targets into actual goods and services. Moreover, the process is a cumulative one in that the falsification of production reports induced by unrealistic central planning generates still more unrealistic planning, and hence still more falsification. This vicious circle stems from the inherent rigidity of the system itself, which has not been essentially altered despite repeated moves toward decentralization of the economic administration.

⁸ See "Virgin-Landers Are Tired of Lame Excuses," *Komsomolskaia pravda*, November 28, and December 27, 1959, and January 8, 1960. Also, "Letters with Commentary: Concern about Everyday Life is Concern for the Plan," *Izvestia*, January 5, 1960.

⁴ A manager's answer to workers' complaints, quoted in *Izvestia*, loc. cit.

⁵ On the construction sites of the Pavlodar Elevator and Flour Mill Construction Trust in the single year 1959, 1,800 workers left their jobs and 1800 new workers were hired. *Izvestia*, loc. cit.

⁶ Resolution of the CC of the Ukrainian CP, *Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost*, No. 10, October 1960.



CAPTION LEFT: "Let us take another type of official, the type who likes to live off the state. There are some enterprise directors, collective farm chairmen and heads of state farms and various departments who make a specialty of requesting year after year that their production assignment be reduced and their payrolls and capital investments increased." (From Khrushchev's speech of October 18 to the 22nd CPSU Congress.) CAPTION BELOW: "On a true fishing tackle." Tackles spell out "Petition."

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), October 30, 1961.

The wide prevalence of fanciful reporting by *kolkhoz* (collective farm) managers does not mean that it is less risky for them than for factory managers. They also have to contend with regular official auditing of their accounts as well as with periodic "raids" by party inspection brigades. There is also the danger that disgruntled *kolkhozniki*, spurred by some personal grudge against the collective farm chairman, will write letters to the editors of local papers exposing any cheating on his part. No less than the director of an industrial plant, the *kolkhoz* chairman knows that if he tries to hoodwink the government and a show-down comes, he will stand alone.

THERE ARE other factors, however, which explain the greater readiness of *kolkhoz* administrators to assume these risks. One is the rapid turnover of collective farm chairmen. A *kolkhoz* chairmanship is not a coveted position, but one which is regarded, at best, as merely a stepping-stone to professional advancement, and at worst, as a burden to be passed off as soon as possible. In either case, the occupant is not anxious to keep the post any longer than necessary, and he feels under strong compulsion to make the production record of his *kolkhoz* look as good as possible while he is there, in the hope of being rewarded with a better managerial post. In 1955, when 30,000 *kolkhoz* chairmen were replaced by party appointees because of the unsatisfactory performance of their farms, one of the newly designated chairmen found that his particular farm had been successively managed by some twenty different chairmen, most of whom had not held the job for more than a year.⁷ This is not at all an unusual phenomenon in Soviet agriculture. In fact, at the CPSU Central Committee session convened in January 1961 to discuss agricultural problems, Premier Khrushchev specifically complained about the attitude responsible for the rapid turnover of collective farm managers. Their outlook, he said, seemed to be dominated by the idea that "next year I'll be going to another *gubernia*."⁸

Another factor that facilitates data-juggling at the *kolkhoz* level is the shortage of competent bookkeepers on the collective farms. Finally, complaints have been raised about the practice of disguising a farm's lagging production by displaying prominently a leading worker's spectacular achievements.⁹

False reporting in the agricultural sector is by no means limited to collective farm chairmen. Transgressions are

apparently committed with at least equal frequency by procurement officials, who cheat the collective farms either to fulfill their own plans or to enrich themselves. One of their methods, for example, is to understate the fat content of delivered milk (the procurement official insists on doing the measurement by the eye) or to overstate the moisture content in grain (use of moisture gauges is avoided). Khrushchev himself criticized the latter practice in his speech before the Central Committee plenum last year.

The factories make fine instruments, but reasons are always found for the gauges to be out of order. Why? That's clear. A collective or state farm brings in grain, and the receiving agent bites a grain and determines the moisture content that way.¹⁰

Needless to say, practices such as these induce the swindled *kolkhoz* chairmen to cheat even more. One device they have adopted rather widely consists in purchasing clarified butter in a state store—preferably in a different province or republic—and reporting the purchase as part of the farm's production. It is also a common practice to buy butter in one republic and sell it, remelted, to a creamery in another republic.¹¹ When the stores are short on the products which the *kolkhoz* chairman wishes to buy for inclusion in his "output," he often resorts to purchases from the collective farmers' private plots. The private sector thus becomes a useful reserve to be drawn upon when planned deliveries of meat, milk, vegetables, and other products to the state begin to lag.¹²

THE EFFECT OF false reporting at lower levels becomes, of course, cumulative as the figures travel upwards. Union republics and provinces have been known to report fulfillment of grain procurement quotas and at the same time ask the state for seed and feed grain for their livestock. In other words, while the plan was "fulfilled," no allowance was made for future production. In 1959, for example, the Russian Republic delivered 1,643 million poods of grain but took back 361 million poods or 22 per cent of the grain it had delivered.¹³ Hence, after allowance is made for padding, the republic plan was fulfilled only to the order of 78 per cent, and this does not take into account faulty reporting at the farm level.

In the industrial sector matters are not much better. Falsification of figures and illegal practices at the enterprise or trust level appear to be quite common in spite of num-

⁷ Letter addressed to Khrushchev by the Chairman of the Lenin Collective Farm, village of Sulimovka, Baryshevka District, Kiev Province, *Selskaia zhizn*, December 13, 1960.

⁸ *Pravda*, January 14, 1961.

⁹ "We often see one man on a collective farm achieving outstanding results year after year, while the collective farm as a whole is lagging. The front-ranker's name becomes a kind of shield behind which the collective farm's managers take refuge." Khrushchev's speech at the Party CC Plenary Session on Agriculture, January 17, 1961, *Pravda*, January 22, 1961.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ See Khrushchev's speech at Rostov-on-Don, *Pravda*, February 5, 1961; also speech by I. R. Razzakov, First Secretary of the Kirgiz Party CC, Party Plenary Session on Agriculture, *Pravda*, January 14, 1961.

¹² "Private Flocks on Collective Pastures," a report on hoodwinking in the Rhilaya Kosa District, Guryev Province, *Komsomolskaia pravda*, January 12, 1961.

¹³ Khrushchev's speech at the Plenary Session of the Party CC, *Pravda*, January 22, 1961.

erous checks which are built into the system of industrial reporting. Two examples will illustrate the situation.

Soviet raw materials salvage trusts normally operate under a scrap metal collection plan. In 1957 the Chief Metal Salvage Administration for a certain area reported fulfillment of its plan. The following year, however, it was discovered that the Salvage Administration's figures included 1,800 tons of metal which had in fact been collected by private operators from the dump of the Dzerzhinsky Metallurgical Plant and sold to the Chief Metal Salvage Administration for 120,000 rubles. The Salvage Administration had thereupon sold the metal back to the same plant.¹⁴


The second example is even more instructive. The District of Tsarichanka was in serious difficulties, having failed to reach the scrap metal collection targets set by the plan. Seeking a way out of their predicament, the District Cooperative officials contacted a private operator who was in possession of receipts for scrap metal sold to state enterprises; the scrap metal had been previously stolen from the railroad. The District Cooperative bought these receipts and thereupon reported fulfillment of the plan. The state enterprises which acquired the railroad's scrap metal through the services of the "fixer" also fulfilled their plan. The railroad officials, to be sure, found themselves short of scrap metal, but since in the subsequent proceedings their name was not mentioned, it is probable that the deficiency had been made good by accounting methods. The benefits of the operation, however, did not end here. For fulfilling the plan, enterprise and cooperative officials received a bonus, and since the officials of the local soviet had had the good sense to look the other way, the plan in the area of their jurisdiction was fulfilled, and they too received bonuses. When eventually the whole matter came to light, the private fixer was the only party punished.¹⁵

In their efforts to keep in step with the plans, managers resort to a number of well-established courses of action. If the plan is stated in terms of physical output, there is a distinct temptation to fulfill it by lowering quality per unit of weight or item of production. If, on the other hand, the plan is set in terms of value of output at constant prices, the possibility exists of fulfilling the plan by producing commodities which require large inputs of materials and much processing per unit of output. Since, however, materials and processing capacity tend to be limited, illegal sources of supply are often used, or the assortment of output is violated.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Izvestia*, August 24, 1958.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ See Robert W. Campbell, *Soviet Economic Power*, Houghton-Mifflin, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960, pp. 127-134.



—Again, the calf hasn't gained any weight!
—Well, that's not his concern. The livestock specialist makes up the report; he'll take care of it.

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), October 10, 1961.

All this should not be interpreted to mean that the Soviet economy is paralyzed by waste and bogged down in a morass of statistical falsification at the production level. Waste, inefficiency, rigidity, and fraud there are in plenty, but they should be viewed as subtractions from the economy's forward movement and as an indication of the high price the Soviet system exacts for economic progress. These conditions of life in Soviet industry and agriculture should also serve as a constant reminder that waste in Soviet economic reporting often parades as achievement, and that Soviet statistics always require critical examination. Soviet economists and statisticians are aware of this problem, but they are obliged to work with such material as they get from the field, and while loopholes are constantly being closed by legislative and executive action, the relentlessness of every new plan spurs managers to ever more ingenious feats of circumvention.

Jan Prybyla

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Some Aspects of Soviet Reality

THE 22ND CONGRESS of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was grasped by the Kremlin image-makers as another opportunity to project their idea of the world's future. Against a background of spectacular sputnik successes and undeniable (though far more limited) achievements in the economic field, speaker after speaker at the Congress offered stentorian declarations to the effect that "the 20th century is a century of graphic Communist triumphs" and that the Communist Party is "the only social and political force that really solves the social problems troubling mankind and really fulfills the undertakings it sets forth in its programs." It would be impossible within the space of a short article to challenge in detail all the pretentious claims made at the Congress by the rulers of Soviet Russia. But a recent visit to the USSR has enabled this writer to collect substantial evidence of the fact that the Communist system, far from solving the social problems that plague all societies to some degree, produces additional problems which are indigenous to communism and which its leaders are forced to combat.

In his speech to the 22nd Party Congress, Mr. Khrushchev described these problems as "a terrible power that fetters the minds of people." In one single passage he listed them in the following order: ". . . indolence, parasitism, drunkenness and rowdyism, swindling and money grabbing. . . , dominant-nation chauvinism and local nationalism. . . , bureaucratic methods, a wrong attitude towards women. . . ." Some of these maladies are not unknown in non-Communist nations. But in what western country do "indolence," "parasitism," and "a wrong attitude to women" become matters of national concern? Elsewhere in the speech the Premier added that economic progress in the Soviet Union is being hampered by "stagnation and conservatism," bad management, the opportunism of careerists, and the machinations of crooks who falsify production results and circumvent efforts aimed at their removal.

THE KREMLIN PROPAGANDISTS conveniently label all these deviations from the prescribed code of behavior as "survivals of the capitalist past." Naturally they are not prepared to admit that communism is at fault. They argue that it is the individual who must be blamed. Yet it is quite obvious that one of the root causes of the phenomena listed by Mr. Khrushchev is the Soviet economic system. A rigidly

planned economy in which the laws of supply and demand are ignored, in which too few goods are perpetually chased by too many citizens, and in which the much maligned profit motive is supposedly non-existent, is tailor-made for anti-state and anti-social evils.

The Soviet captain of industry, for example, is judged solely by his ability to fulfill the all-important plan. His targets are laid down for him and he depends for his supplies of raw materials on other government agencies. Yet as Mr. Khrushchev himself has noted, "output plans do not always dovetail with plans for the supply of materials and machines and with coordinated deliveries. . . ." Consequently the manager is engaged in a constant struggle between the limitations of his producing unit and the demands of the state. Though directors of industrial enterprises—and state-farm managers or collective-farm chairmen as well—may ask for production plans to be reduced and for payrolls and investment funds to be increased, in the final analysis they are forced to accept orders from organizations which do not necessarily consider their local problems.

It is in this atmosphere that the *tolkach*—literally translated pusher, but better rendered as "fixer" or "expediter"—comes into his own. It is his job to ensure that the factory which employs him, albeit surreptitiously, gets its raw materials and machines on time, whatever the cost. He is authorized by his director to use all means at his disposal to attain these ends, including bribes, presents, pressure and even threats.

The writer met a *tolkach* in Moscow who explained how the system worked. He had come to the capital from one of the Far Eastern *sovnarkhozy* (the basic administrative units of the Soviet economy) for the purpose of persuading a friend in the Central Planning Organization to reduce his factory's targets, and he felt confident that he would be able to do so. But this, as he put it, was a "special *kommandirovka*" (assignment). His usual job was to travel around the area covered by the *sovnarkhoz*, buying from other plants the surplus materials that his director needed. He would pay for them either by using factory funds in deals subsequently "concealed" by the accountant, or by "diverting" some of his factory's production (cars in this instance) to his helpful friends and contacts. An educated man in his forties, thus a product of the Soviet regime, he saw nothing wrong with a system which relies on dishonest

practices to deliver the goods. "Everybody does it" was his comment. Under the increasing influence of quantities of vodka in Russia's largest hotel, he became more expansive, admitting that he thoroughly enjoyed his life and position, although it was based on corrupt practices. He was full of praise for a regime that enabled him to live a life of comparative luxury—including an official car for his journeys, a large expense account and the ability to "make something" for himself on the side. I asked him whether he wasn't afraid of being caught and tried for what he knew to be an "economic crime." His reply was illuminating:

My director will protect me. He is in well with the local party people and has done them many favors. If they touch me, they'll have to purge many others much more important than I am. Anyway, as long as the targets are met, no one is going to ask too many awkward questions.

The moral, or rather amoral aspects of the matter didn't concern him at all. "I'm a pragmatist" he laughed. "Without me and thousands like me our economy would be in a bad way."


The Russian term for the various practices that involve using "pull," influence or unofficial contacts and channels for attaining one's ends is "*blat*," and it permeates life in the USSR. A few days after the above incident, I came across another sample of it. In the same hotel I was joined at dinner by an elderly man, who subsequently identified himself as a second party secretary of a Ukrainian town. He too had come to Moscow to see a "friend." But his problem was a different one. In his provincial town, this party bureaucrat occupies a position of some importance. Because of it, he is under constant pressure from relatives and friends to do them favors: a better flat, a voucher for a Black Sea spa, a transfer to another part of the country, protection from inquiries, and so on. Mostly out of fear, he

was resisting various inducements to break the law, with the result that his life had become a misery. "My wife calls me a fool" he complained. "What's the point of being a *shishka* [slang for big-wig], she says, if you don't cash in." This man, too, is a member of the Soviet elite, obviously one of the "moral cripples" castigated by Mr. Khrushchev at the Party Congress. His main interest in life is to be left alone. When asked why he didn't expose those who were pressuring him to break the law, and, apparently, his principles, he shrugged his shoulders and said: "What's the use." All he wanted was that his friend in Moscow get him another appointment in a new environment. When I pointed out that this was precisely the type of favor he was denying his friends, he replied: "Oh no, I don't want this for myself. The party will benefit if I move to a new place, where people don't know me. Then I'll be able to work in peace." It did not seem to occur to him that the predicament he finds himself in is directly attributable to the system, which puts its servants in positions vulnerable to various pressures.

IN DISCUSSING production problems in his speech to the Party Congress Khrushchev made the statement that "routine and stagnation" coupled with "conservatism in technology" are "alien to the very nature of socialist production." In point of fact they are, to a very large extent, endemic. Like many other features of the Soviet scene, they do not spring from covert hostility to the regime but are based on a realistic grasp of the harsh facts of Soviet economic life. Mr. Khrushchev cited the example of one of Russia's largest car factories—the Moscow Likhachev Works—which has made only "slight changes" in the design of its four-ton lorry, first produced in 1947. He admitted that the introduction of the new sometimes involved

ABOVE: "Tssss!" BELOW: "The introduction of the new sometimes involves certain production expenditures, extra worries and even disappointments. How much easier it is to go on calmly doing today what one did yesterday, and tomorrow what one is doing today! Unfortunately, we still have executives who want to spend all their days in complete calm." (From Khrushchev's speech of October 18 to the 22nd CPSU Congress.) Sign carried by the two men reads: "Wall Newspaper. For Quiet and Tranquility."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), October 30, 1961.



"extra worries and even disappointments," but he did not get to the root of the problem that confronts industrial managers.

A director of a Leningrad factory explained to me why so many Soviet managers are opposed to the introduction of new techniques. He himself is in charge of a comparatively smooth-running plant, producing lathes. He has been meeting and surpassing his targets for the past three years, in part because he was successful in getting his quotas scaled down; thus he and his workers are earning substantial bonuses for overproduction. Last year the central planning authorities advised him that one of his shops would soon be modernized. They proved to him that ultimately his output (and consequently his salary) would increase. But like so many Soviet citizens he is more interested in the reality of the present than in the problematical future. Long-term planning means much less to him than current rewards. He argued:

It is impossible to maintain production during modernization. There are always difficulties, and I and my workers will be worse off till the new equipment has been installed and is running smoothly. That might take months. I shall be earning less and have a headache into the bargain.

Significantly, he stressed that the trade-union representatives of his workers had approached him with a promise to back his resistance. I asked this director, a graduate of the Moscow Baumann Institute, whether he could possibly win his struggle against the planners. "Well," he replied, "ultimately they'll get their own way. But it will take time. Before then I hope to get a transfer to another plant."

DESPITE SOVIET CLAIMS about the "unbreakable ties between the party and the people," there are many signs which suggest that communism inevitably brings the individual into conflict with society. CPSU members constitute less than 5 percent of the population. It is they, together with other representatives of the élite, who derive the lion's share of the benefits the regime has to offer. The remaining Soviet citizens—about 200 million of them—seem to be fully aware of this. In no Western democracy is the gulf between the rulers and the ruled so marked as in the "motherland of socialism." In no Western democracy do people speak so contemptuously about "*Oni*"—the "They" of the ruling class. This is not to suggest that the bulk of the people feel an ardent antagonism towards the regime. What does exist is a predominantly passive acceptance of actuality—an attitude that the *narod*, the people, can do almost nothing against the self-appointed molders of society. (From this estimate must be excluded a section of the university youth, the only people the writer came across who were prepared to discuss and sometimes even challenge some of the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism.)

The Soviet man-in-the-street, the taxidriver, bricklayer, shop assistant, waiter and factory worker or employee, has

few illusions about his position in the order of things. He is far too preoccupied with making a living to argue about the intrinsic features of communism. What he wants is a better life. To achieve it he is ready to make use of the system when he can and to cheat it when he must. Mr. Khrushchev, who has the knack of pinpointing (without resolving) the issues that matter, put the problem most succinctly when he said:

The mood of the people and the productivity of their labor depend to a large extent on living conditions and on good service. The way to solve this problem is through the establishment of modern, well-equipped shops, canteens, dining-rooms, service establishments and big food factories.

In other parts of his speech he made the following points:

One of our important tasks is to meet in full the demand of the urban population and industrial centers for milk and the widest assortment of dairy products and of high-quality potatoes and vegetables. . . . The popular demand for these goods [meat, milk, dairy produce, sugar, cloth, footwear, furniture, household and other goods] is still not being fully met. . . . There must be stricter order in the allocation of flats . . . priority must be given to those actually in need. . . .

There is no reason to believe that the Soviet regime is deliberately depriving its people of adequate supplies of food, consumer goods or flats. But the fact remains that even in the two largest cities—Moscow and Leningrad—Russians find it impossible to plan a meal until they have found out what the shops are selling on any given day; that they have no option but to buy expensive (and often shoddy) clothes and furniture; and that millions still live in single rooms shared with four, five or even six other people. Mr. Khrushchev has promised that by the end of the current Seven-Year Plan (1965) the minimum monthly wage will be raised to 50-60 rubles. To get this figure into perspective, it is enough to realize that a ready-made man's suit of inferior quality costs 120 rubles; that a short-sleeved shirt is priced at 10 rubles; that the cheapest pair of walking shoes (at least among those the writer saw) is 35 rubles; and that oranges are priced at a half-ruble apiece—i.e., 50 oranges would swallow up half the monthly wage of a chambermaid, taxidriver or shop-assistant.

A Russian journalist I met who had just returned from a cross-country trek remarked that he had seen no "hungry eyes" on his trip. By all accounts the Russians do not starve. But they are still leading a very drab and to some extent primitive existence. One catches oblique admissions of this fact interspersed among the myriad claims of Russia's great material progress. In his Party Congress address, for example, Mr. Khrushchev castigated the thesis, evolved by Stalin, that "in the USSR the increase of mass consumption [purchasing power] continuously outstrips the growth of production. . . ." He added that the supporters of this point of view "were actually justifying the shortage of articles of primary necessity and the perpetuation of the ration-card system and its psychology." How-

ever much Mr. Khrushchev might protest, years of shortages have given the "ration-card psychology" a very strong grip on the people of the Soviet Union. The *narod* knows that there is not enough to go around, and every citizen is out to ameliorate his lot at the expense, if necessary, of society as a whole. A few examples will illustrate this:

A Moscow taxi-driver, pointing to a huge block of flats in a new district, said to me: "Not a single family living here has the right to do so. But I too have a friend on the Housing Committee and he hopes to fix things for me soon."

A Moscow University professor disclosed that he always speaks English in shops and restaurants to "get better service."

A stranger approached me in a Leningrad record shop and asked me to buy him three discs: "They'll serve you, even if it means they'll have to go to the storeroom. As far as we are concerned, we have to take what they have on the counter." (This man, who refused to tell me what his job was, seriously suggested that the trading network should be handed over to private enterprise. "A bit of healthy competition," he said, "would soon bring goods into the shops.")

I also heard of a Leningrad engineer who lived in a modern three-room flat. His wife had left him, taking their three children. He did not tell the authorities, but instead illegally sublet two of the rooms at 60 rubles each per month.

MR. KHRUSHCHEV would label these attitudes—reiterated in many similar instances noted by foreigners—as "petty-bourgeois degeneration," as "remnants of capitalism" infecting isolated individuals. He alleges that the concept of "mine" is the supreme and exclusive principle of bourgeois society, that Communists, on the other hand, "reject ethics . . . where the prosperity of some is possibly only at the

expense or the ruin of others, where the corrupting psychology of egoism, greed and lust for money are cultivated." In contrast to the frank admissions of self-interest made to me in casual conversations, I found it impossible to discuss this problem with official representatives of the regime. Their stubborn refusal to admit facts which must have been as apparent to them as they were to me, precluded any sensible conversation. An interesting instance on the difficulties of communicating with Communists was provided by a friend of mine. At a diplomatic reception in Moscow he described to an employee of the Soviet Foreign Ministry an encounter he had had with a black-market peddler who wanted to buy the shirt off his back. My friend remarked that this must be a problem for the authorities. His Soviet contact reacted quickly: "You are all wrong. There is no black market. We arrested all the black-marketeers in Moscow a fortnight ago."

The edifice of Communist society, then, can only strike the visitor as a façade. Behind the veneer provided by very gradual material improvement, there is a nation which knows little contentment. The Communist Party is not the embodiment of the genuine will of the Soviet people, but is trying to manipulate the aspirations of the people to attain its own ends. A good illustration of the rift between communism and its subjects is supplied by a joke circulating in Moscow, related to me by a Moscow University student: A senior party official asks a local bishop, "How are your churches?" "No complaints," is the reply—"They are always full." The official is puzzled: "I can't understand it. My meetings are always empty." "Ah," the bishop rejoins, "just make them independent of the state and party."

JUSTAN

(JUSTAN is the *nom de plume* of a British student of Soviet affairs.)

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KHRUSHCHEV AND ALBANIA

TO THE EDITORS: According to Mr. Zavalani's article (*Problems of Communism*, July-August 1961) Nikita Khrushchev's trip to Albania in 1959 was the "acme" of Soviet-Albanian relations. By interpreting some events from 1956 to 1959, it can be seen that Khrushchev's journey marked not the acme, but rather the crisis in Soviet-Albanian relations. Events since May-June 1959 have essentially been implementations of Soviet and then bloc policy against the Albanian hierarchy. By noting the development of Sino-Albanian ties from 1956-59, and the events from late December 1958 to May 1959, we can see that Khrushchev's trip provided a major test for the Chinese and Albanians against Russian pressure. Recent events are proof enough that the two countries passed that test.

The shift in focus of Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia since 1955 was paralleled by an attempt of the post-Stalin Soviet leadership to replace satellite subalterns dependent on Stalin with pro-Khrushchev personnel. In Albania a threat was made in the spring of 1956 by an anti-Hoxha group to overthrow Enver Hoxha; *i.e.*, the *coup* led by Liri Grega, *et al.* was Soviet-engineered but it failed. Following his successful defense, Hoxha traveled to China for the 8th Chinese Communist Party Congress, met Mao and on his return to Albania stated:

In the Chinese people we have a valuable and dear friend. . . . This love for and interest in our country we saw also in the leadership of the Communist Party and the Government of China. . . . Particularly great is the love which Comrade Mao Tse-tung has for our country. He called our people heroic fighters. . . . He said that in our efforts to build socialism, the Albanian people will have, as always, the brotherly help of the people of China. This, he said, is our international obligation to the Albanian people. (*Bashkimi*, Tirana, Oct. 9, 1956.)

Hoxha, then, used the trip to China to bring his case against Soviet interference to the important Chinese party. Since

the leadership of that group was uneasy about the new directions of Soviet policy taken by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress, the Chinese found it useful in late 1956 to lend support to Hoxha, particularly in the aftermath of the Hungarian and Polish revolutions. The financial aid from China to Albania, first begun in 1955, was continued, and an increase in Sino-Albanian trade followed.

Although the first Sino-Albanian ties were of limited importance, the development of Sino-Russian and Russo-Albanian tensions heightened their significance. Paralleling Sino-Soviet continued disagreements after the 1957 Moscow Conference, Soviet-Albanian tensions also rose steadily. While the Yugoslav issue was a main factor causing the Albanians' disgruntlement *vis-à-vis* the Russians, their insecurity was increased by other factors as well. First, although Soviet economic aid to Albania had primarily been allotted for the development of the mineral sector of the Albanian economy, bloc needs decreased for the products of the Albanian economy. Large Soviet discoveries of oil and subsequent planning for the CMEA oil pipeline from the Soviet Union to the East European manufacturing centers served to minimize that area's future needs for Albanian oil. (This result was particularly painful to the Hoxha regime, which felt in late 1957 that its discoveries of new wells in late 1956 would yield two million tons of oil in 1960, resulting in increased domestic prosperity.) Recognizing this situation, the Russians advised a heavier investment in the development of the Albanian agricultural sector. In view of Soviet political disagreement with the Albanians, it was necessary for them to obtain new outlets for the sale of their country's prime export item—oil—because of a correctly estimated future lack of East European markets. As political succor was obtained from the Chinese, similarly, China's need for oil (and dependence on the Russians for most of its imported supplies) made the CPR a willing purchaser of Albanian oil, as well as copper and chrome.

Second, the Albanians in late 1958 and early 1959 began to show concern about military developments in the Soviet

Union and Balkans. Vaunted Soviet missile and air power reduced the military value of the Soviet naval base in Albania. Reacting to the establishment of US rocket-bases in Italy and Greece, the Albanians wanted the Russians to construct bases in the Balkans, particularly in Albania. Instead, Khrushchev proposed a peace-zone in the Balkans and paid lip-service to Albania's potential value for rocket-bases, which were not installed.

As Soviet-Albanian differences increased in the political, economic and military fields, and the Chinese at the same time indicated their interest in supporting the Albanians, the Soviet Union attempted to use economic pressure against Albania. In mid-December 1958 Hoxha left Albania for the Soviet Union for talks about the future of the Albanian economy; little was reported about the meeting. In January 1959 the Chinese pledged to advance the Albanians 55 million rubles for the 1961-65 Five-Year Plan. Shortly thereafter the USSR promised Hoxha to provide Albania with a 355 million ruble credit for the Third Five-Year Plan. (This fact contradicts Mr. Zavalani's statement that Soviet aid was promised after Khrushchev's Albanian trip.) Talks concerning implementing the Soviet promises were held in March and May 1959 between Aleksei Kosygin, the Soviet economic expert, and Koco Theodosi, Chairman of the Albanian State Planning Council. The Russians were still willing to let the Albanians exercise limited economic independence, as long as political unity could be achieved, despite their objections to the course of the Albanian economy.

Nevertheless, the Albanians remained apprehensive about the threat from the Yugoslavs, as well as about Soviet indifference. They attempted to show the validity of their concern at two trials of so-called Yugoslav spies in late April 1959. It is possible that the trials were the result of another Soviet attempt to assist in the overthrow of Hoxha; at minimum, they were an important indication of Albanian fears of external threats.

In contrast with continued Soviet flirtations with Tito, the Chinese support for the Albanians remained firm. Coincident with the above-mentioned trials, Hysni Kapo, a major Albanian party leader, departed for China. At a reception for Kapo in Peking, Chou En-lai assured him that "though Albania and China are geographically far apart, the Chinese people take a great interest in and deeply admire the struggle of the Albanian people." (*Bashkimi*, May 13, 1959.)

Shifts of power in the economic, political and military sphere thus heightened the fears of the already hypersensitive Albanian leadership. The Chinese, though far away, willingly offered the Albanians assistance in order to gain an ally in Eastern Europe. By putting economic and political pressure on the Albanians to prevent them from entering into such a liaison, Khrushchev prior to May 1959 tried to halt the formation of an *entente*. Failing to do this from Moscow, he traveled to Albania, where despite an apparently warm welcome, he failed to achieve his objective. The Chinese had offered to support the Albanians if need be,

and the latter were unwilling to continue to subvert their interests to the Yugoslavs. The May 1959 meeting of Khrushchev, Hoxha and Chinese general P'eng Teh-hua in Albanian territory marked the end of any opportunity for Soviet-Albanian amity.

DANIEL TRETIK
Honolulu, Hawaii

MR. ZAVALANI REPLIES: Answering Mr. Khrushchev's accusations made in his report to the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Enver Hoxha said in a long speech delivered before a Communist gathering in Tirana:

Khrushchev knows perfectly well the reasons which led to the deterioration of Soviet-Albanian relations because he himself is the culprit. We shall limit ourselves to saying that it all began at the Bucharest meeting of June 1960.

This disposes of the main objection raised by Mr. Daniel Tretiak to my assessment of the conflict between the Albanian and Soviet Communist parties. The rest of his extensive remarks do not essentially contradict the points I made in my article. . . .

THE 22ND PARTY CONGRESS

TO THE EDITORS: In his special supplement on the 22nd CPSU Congress (November-December, 1961), Professor Fainsod writes:

In a rather extraordinary paragraph (No. 27) which appears on its face to endorse the principle of inner-party democracy, there is a warning that "broad discussion, especially discussions on an all-Union scale, of questions of party policy must be carried out in such a way as to . . . prevent the possibility of attempts to form fractional groupings destructive to party unity or attempts to split the party."

Yet is this paragraph really so "extraordinary?" Here is Article 28 of the party statutes adopted at the 19th Party Congress in 1952:

However, broad discussion, especially discussions on an all-Union scale, of questions of party policy must be organized in such a way as not to lead to attempts by an insignificant minority to impose its will on the party majority, or attempts to form fractional groupings destructive to party unity, or to schismatic efforts which may shake the strength and stability of the socialist system.

May I say that what is really "extraordinary" is not so much the change in the party statutes as Professor Fainsod's interpretation of it? For what is truly new in the 1961 statute, and what Professor Fainsod fails to mention, is the following clause: "Discussions of controversial and obscure questions within the framework of individual organizations or the party as a whole are possible." Although this sentence is qualified in the new statutes by the same kind of

restrictions as were present in the old statutes, its very inclusion may be regarded as an attempt to broaden the scope of permissible discussion, as well as to formalize the existing situation in the party—a situation characterized by an outspoken agitation on contentious issues which began shortly after Stalin's death and continues to this day. The fact remains that Kozlov's attempt to set rigid limits on party discussion failed in fact though not in theory, since the agitation by what the 1952 statute called "an insignificant minority," and what is more likely to be, at this time, a very sizeable group within the party, led by Khrushchev himself, is still being vigorously pursued.

J. B. MARTIN
New York, N. Y.

MR. FAINSOD REPLIES: In using the phrase "rather extraordinary," I did not intend to suggest that the ban on factionalism was a novel development. What I hoped to make clear was that all the verbiage about enlarging the scope of intra-party discussion was still qualified by the familiar prescriptions against "factional groupings" and "attempts

to split the party," which incidentally apply to the new clause which Mr. Martin cites as "really extraordinary."

I would be much more impressed by Mr. Martin's description of the "existing situation in the party" as characterized by "outspoken agitation on contentious issues" had any member of the so-called "anti-party" group been given an opportunity to present his views to the 22nd Party Congress. Khrushchev's attack on these views may qualify as "agitation," but "discussion of controversial questions" in which only one side is represented does not in my book contribute to the broadening of intra-party discussion.

TO THE EDITORS: This is to tell you how much I enjoyed reading the special supplement to the last issue of your magazine, on the 22nd Party Congress. I think Mr. Fainsod has succeeded in giving us a most illuminating analytical review of the important political, ideological, and psychological facets of the congress.

LAZAR VOLIN
Washington, D.C.

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Artists and Bureaucrats—A Memoir.....by Wladimir Slepian
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